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ABSTRACT
In 1762 Rousseau’s reputation depended partly on 
his controversial essays, partly on the success of La 
Nouvelle Héloise. This is reflected in early reactions 
to Emile. The emergence and nature of his reputation as 
an educationalist can he seen in popular and professional 
reactions to the main themes of Emile. In physical 
education, Rousseau’s strong naturalistic position 
contrasts with his predecessors’ less decided support of 
art or nature. In the 1770s popular enthusiasm for Emile 
prompts the otherwise silent theorists to acknowledge 
Rousseau’s success. Emile seems to encourage both practical 
reforms and a more decided support of the natural. These 
changes lose impetus during the 1780s, but Rousseau’s 
reputation as an educationalist is already well-established. 
Rousseau believes a truly public education is impossible in 
an unreformed society, and chooses a private education for 
Emile. Unlike his predecessors, who had been concerned 
with the formation of social man, Rousseau attempts to 
combine the formation of natural, or individual man, with 
that of social man. On the whole, his complex position 
is not understood, and throughout the pre-Revolutionary 
period, Emile is interpreted as a treatise of private 
education, and often criticised as such. However, from 
1770 onwards, the theorists incorporate details from Emile 
in their treatises of public education, and this is very 
common by the Revolution. Rousseau’s insistence on 
parallel political and educational reform receives no 
comment. The theme of isolation in Emile may stimulate 
the popularity of later plans for communal educations in 
isolated State boarding-schools. Rousseau’s psychological 
theories combine Cartesian and Sensationalist elements, 
but oppose the extreme Sensationalism of, for example, 
Helvétius. Helvétius criticises Rousseau in detail, 
revealing some misunderstanding and misrepresentation.
The educational theorists restrict their comments, almost 
without exception, to the development of the rational 
faculties, and Rousseau’s system of negative education.
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INTRODUCTION
Rousseau’s reputation as an educational theorist 
is, nowadays, an accepted fact. Judgement of the 
educational principles of Emile continues to vary, but 
no-one would deny their impact on later pedagogical 
thought. Indeed, a phenomenal number of books have been 
written about the pedagogical theories of Emile and their 
importance for later writers; about the extraordinary 
success of Emile abroad, especially in England and Germany; 
and about its relevance to educational practice today.
Most of this work, however, deals with the influence of 
Emile during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or, 
if it is concerned with the eighteenth century, in 
countries other than France, Surprisingly little work 
has been done on the initial reception and fortunes of 
the book in the country in which it was composed. Yet 
the question of the development of Rousseau’s reputation 
as a pedagogue in France during this period offers 
interesting material for study.
In the first place, at the time of the publication 
of Emile, the reading public and critics can in no way
have been prepared for Rousseau as an authority on
education. Primarily a controversial figure, the author
of a series of works which attacked the basic principles
of conventional, cultured society, and, more recently,
of a highly successful novel in the English manner,
Rousseau was not at all, in the eyes of his public, the
educationalist, political theorist or philosopher we
think him now. Yet, we know that, by the time of the
Revolution, the prestige of Emile was strikingly great.
At a popular level, a decree was made by the National
Assembly in favour of ‘*1* auteur d* Emile et du Contrat
Social**^ . and Montmorency was renamed Emile, while, at a
more serious level, Emile became one of the books most
frequently referred to by the educational reformers of
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the Convention. What had happened during the intervening 
years? We know that, whereas doctors and educationalists 
had failed, Emile brought about an unexpected return to 
maternal breast-feeding,^ and that children were educated
1. Oeuvres complètes, ed. Poinçot, 1788-93, t.XIV, p.392, 
article by G. Brizard.
2. D. Higgins % Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Jacobins.
Ph.D. Sheffield, 195^. His chapter on education, 
pp.1400-1459, deals with Rousseau’s prestige in 
educational matters under the Jacobins.
3. Confirmed, for example, by Buffon’s well-known reply 
to the remark: "Vous aviez dit et prouvé avant J.J. 
Rousseau que les mères doivent nourrir leurs enfans".
"Oui, répondit cet illustre naturaliste, nous l ’avions 
tous dit mais Rousseau seul le commande et se fait 
obéir". Quoted in the Oeuvres complètes de J.J. Rousseau, 
ed. Petitain, Paris 1839.
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"à la Jean-Jacques" or "à l ’Emile". But how and when did 
this come about, and was it merely a popular reaction?
What of the opinions of the pedagogues? How did they 
react to the book, when did they begin to consider it as 
a serious work on education, and how does their attitude 
correspond to the evidence of popular enthusiasm for 
Emile? This development of the reputation of Emile, and, 
subsequently, of the reputation of Rousseau as an authority 
on education, has received relatively little attention.
The present thesis attempts to make a first step towards 
filling the gap, by studying various aspects of the 
reputation of Emile during the years before the Revolution, 
and the early years of the Revolution, before the much 
discussed cult of Rousseau under the Jacobins properly 
emerged.
Firstly, what information about the fortunes of 
Emile during this period is already available to us?
The condemnation of the book by Church and Parliament,
and the scandal it provoked, has naturally received
2
considerable attention. Since Viridet first collected
1. e.g. Mme de Genlis: Works , Paris 1785-1828. Mémoires.
Vol.VI, p.11.
2. M.Viridet: Documents officiels et contemporains sur 
quelques-unes des condamnations dont l ’Emile et le 
Contrat Social ont été l ’objet en 175F! Geneva, 1850.
together some of the official documents concerning the
1
condemnations, a number of writers have contributed
additional information and discussion. The scandal was
mainly concerned with the religious implications of the
Profession de Foi, and particularly with the passages
on miracles, and provoked a large number of early
refutations, the existence of which is wellknown.
2
Brizard*s early analysis, though partial, and by no 
means complete, gives us, nevertheless, an adequate idea 
of the generally mediocre quality of these hasty replies. 
Masson’s book on Rousseau’s religion gives us some 
interesting information about the later reactions to the 
Profession de Foi  ^during the pre-Revolutionary period, 
and this coincides with the conclusions of M o m e t ’s 
examination of eighteenth century libraries.^ According 
to both these writers, from 1770 onwards, less attention
1. e.g. G. Lanson: ’’Quelques documents inédits sur la 
condamnation et la censure de l ’Emile et sur la 
condamnation des Lettres écrites de la Montagne.
AJJR. Vol.I, 1905, pp.95-136.
J.P. Belin: Le mouvement philosophique de 1748 à 1789 
(Paris, Belin 1913). 
and. Ibid: Le commerce des livres prohibés à Paris de 
1750 à 1789 CParis. Belin. 1913) etc, etc.
2. G. Brizard: ’’Des écrits publiés à l ’occasion d ’Emile".
In the Oeuvres complètes, ed. Poinçot, 1788-93, t.XIV, 
pp.281-371.
3. P.M. Masson: La religion de J.J. Rousseau. Paris, 1916, 
Part III.
4. D. Momet: "Les enseignements des bibliothèques privées, 
(1750-178C^"; RHLF. 1910.
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began to be paid by the authorities to the dangers of
religious books than political ones, and, consequently,
condemnation of unorthodox religious ideas became less
frequent. This naturally affected the general attitude
towards books, like Emile, which had been condemned several
years earlier. According to Masson, the scandal surrounding
Emile had died down by 1773 when Rey began to put his own
name to editions of Emile. His quotation of Diderot’s
contemptuous remark in the second edition of the Essai sur
les règnes de Claude et de Néron, also suggests that Rousseau
had many supporters once he was dead, since he at least
2
afforded his readers some kind of religious belief, and 
Mme. de Geniis’ remark of 1787, which maintains that religious 
people have forgiven Rousseau for his remarks against religion 
in favour of his frequently paid hommage to the gospel 
strengthens this impression.^ Mornet’s information 
coincides with Masson’s, though he uses it for a different 
purpose. He reports that, until 1772, none of the 
catalogues he studied contain the title of Emile, but, 
that in 1772, the word Emile was entered in the catalogue 
of the Baron Julien de Saint in a space which had, 
until then, merely represented the missing title by
1. Rousseau ( J-J) ; La ’’Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard’’ 
Edition critique ... par P-M. Masson, (Collectanea 
fribourgensia) Fribourg, Paris, 1914. p.XCII.
2. P-M. Masson: La religion de J.J. Rousseau, Part III,
p.170.
3. Ibid., p.171.
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dots. In 1773, another catalogue notes Emile in full, 
then one in 1774, two in 1775, three in 1777, and one
4
in 1778. The catalogues in question are inevitably
limited to wealthy readers who could afford a library of
considerable size, mainly members of the haute bourgeoisie.
who had a public reputation to maintain, and were
consequently careful not to declare openly that they
(a)possessed such a strongly condemned book as Emile.^  ^
As a result, the few copies of Emile which they contain 
can in no way be expected to give an estimate of its 
popularity. Nevertheless, the open acquisition of Emile 
by these readers only after 1771, together with Masson’s 
information about a change in attitude towards the 
religious ideas of Emile starting with the death of the 
scandal before 1772 suggests that these may be crucial 
dates in the development of the reputation of the book, 
and it will be interesting to see whether, in fact, the 
general reputation of Emile is intricately connected with 
the early religious scandal surrounding it.
1. D. Mo m e t  : op. cit., p.467.
(a) Mornet and others insist on the fact that condemnation
of books during the eighteenth century did not mean that 
they could not be openly in the reader’s possession.
Mornet emphasises the fact that Emile and Helvétius’
De l ’Esprit seem to have been particularly compromising 
for public morality and appear much more rarely in 
catalogues than other condemned books, (op.cit., p.467). 
It is therefore extremely difficult to trace their 
fortunes through a study of catalogues.
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As far as M ile as an educational treatise, and 
distinct from the Profession de Foi, is concerned, there 
are one or two general studies and a number of articles 
which deserve investigation.
Compayré’s chapter on Rousseau’s disciples and 
"1
detractors in France is necessarily limited to only a few 
examples of each. However, his analysis does give us some 
interesting information about the development of Rousseau’s 
ideas in the hands of his friend and admirer. Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre, the comments and criticisms of Mme. d ’Epinay, 
and the similarities to Emile of some of Mme. de Geniis’ 
ideas, despite her objections elsewhere. These, and 
Compayré’s other comments, however, afford isolated 
examples of reactions to Emile, rather than a coherent 
picture of its impact on a generation.
A number of writers have devoted short articles to 
the question of Rousseau’s ideas on physical education and 
the influence of Emile in general. Some insist on the 
banality of Rousseau’s ideas, all confirm the impact of 
Emile on the women of eighteenth century France. For many 
of these writers, Emile’s impact in the field of physical 
education is an accepted fact, and they seek only to
1. G. Compayré: Histoire critique des doctrines de 
l ’éducation en France depuis le seizième siecle. 
è vols. 1879, pp.126-152.
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report this, rather than to supply the reader with 
information with which to substantiate it. Critics in 
the late nineteenth century seem to have been particularly 
eager to accept Rousseau’s reputation on this point. In a 
collection of articles entitled Jean-Jacques Rousseau .jugé 
par les Français d ’aujourd’hui. Dr. E. Monin declared:
"Rousseau, homme de lettres et philosophe, a 
eu la gloire de recueillir et de faire vivre, 
dans des pages immortelles, les idées les meilleures 
et les plus scientifiques en matière d ’hygiène; ces 
idées seraient peut-être, longtemps, sans lui, 
restées lettre morte, immobilisées ou monopolisées . 
par quelques docteurs et professeurs en médecine ..."
In the same collection, Gustave Rivet reported:
"L’Emile mit la maternité à la mode. Le livre 
fit une impression si profonde dans la société que 
les femmes les plus frivoles prirent la fantaisie 
de nourrir elles-mêmes leurs enfants ...”2
and J. Grand-Carteret went as far as to say:
"Lorsque l ’Emile paraît, toutes, mêmes les plus 
mondaines, les plus vouées aux plaisirs, reviennent 
à des devoirs trop longtemps méconnus, se mettent à 
allaiter leurs enfants."3
Later writers^ have also accepted the fact of
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau .jugé par les Français d ’aujourd’hui. 
Paris^ 1890. Dr. E. Monin: "Rousseau hygiéniste^’,
pp.387-8.
2. Ibid., Gustave Rivet : "Rousseau réformateur", p.451.
3. Ibid., J. Grand-Carteret: "Défense de Rousseau contre 
ses calomniateurs", p.13.
4. e.g., J. Roshem: "Rousseau et 1 ’hygiène de la première 
enfance". Revue politique et littéraire (Revue bleue).
July 13th, 1912, pp.53-57.
G. Variot: "La doctrine de J.J. Rousseau en puériculture 
et les opinions des médecins de son temps." Bull.Soc.fr. 
Hist.Med.^  Paris, 1926, Vol.XX, pp.339-349.
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Rousseau’s influence without attempting to trace its growth
and development. Much of their information seems to have
been based on one or two testimonies of a very general
ar
nature by Rousseau’s contempo3^ies. For example, the 
remark by Buffon already quoted, or Désessartz’s remark 
of 1798:
’’Quoiqu’il soit à-peu-près prouvé que le 
philosophe Genevois n ’a rien dit de lui-même 
dans les préceptes qu’il donne sur l ’éducation 
des enfans en bas-âge, cependant nous ne pouvons 
lui refuser une place parmi les écrivains qui ont 
traité cet important objet; puisque c ’est 
véritablement lui qui a inspiré aux femmes la 
résolution d’allaiter leurs enfans ..."^
None of these studies give us very exact information about
the extent of Rousseau’s reputation or about the emergence
and subsequent development of the return to maternal
breast-feeding.
Mornet’s article^ is also too general to give us 
much information about the fortunes of Emile. He deals 
briefly with the remarkable post-Rousseau vogue of nature 
and simplicity, which, he maintains, was responsible, on 
a theoretical plane, for works like De Beaurieu’s
1. p.7 , NoU 3.
2. Désessartz: Traité de l ’éducation corporelle des enfans 
en bas-âge. Paris, An VIII, p.458.
3. D. Mornet: "L’influence de J.J. Rousseau au dix-huitième 
siècle", AJJR. Vol.8, pp.33-65, 1912.
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Elève de la Nature.^  in which the pupil is educated on a 
desert island; and, on a practical plane, for attempts
to educate children in the isolation of their natural
2
surroundings. Mornet assesses the impact of Emile as a 
popularisation of what had been, until then, minority 
discussions.^
The most detailed work to date on the subject of 
Emile in pre-Revolutionary France is a thesis by Dr. Ruth 
Tash on the influence of Rousseau’s pedagogical principles 
on educational theories in France before the Revolution.^ 
Dr. Tash excludes the Profession de Foi and Sophie’s 
education, and restricts her comments almost exclusively 
to pedagogical writers. She distinguishes three stages 
in Rousseau’s influence during the period; one from 
1762-1770, which she describes as a period of silence or 
criticism; a second from 1770-1781, which is a period of 
discussion; and a third of approbation and a little 
criticism from 1781-1789. Unfortunately, although she 
deals with some interesting material. Dr. Tash fails to 
link up the various issues in Emile with the main 
discussions of the eighteenth century, of which they form
1. Gaspard Guillard de Beaurieu: L ’Elève de la Nature.
La Haye et Paris, 1763. This book is discussed on pp.
2. Mornet, op.cit., p.47. * 165" & Z4 S^ "'ZS0 .
3. Ibid., pp.47-48.
4. R. Tash; L ’Influence de l ’Emile de Rousseau .jusqu’à la
Révolution. Doctorat de l ’Université de Paris. 1951.
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an intricate part. Consequently, the conclusions she 
draws are based on a confusion of information concerning 
everything from maternal breast-feeding or the use of 
rattles, to the development of the child’s reason and his 
inability to comprehend religion, without any clear 
distinction between the relative popularity of these 
various ideas, or an attempt to assess the actual nature 
of Rousseau’s reputation. Moreover, she deals specifically 
with influence which is always difficult to assess.
It has, therefore, seemed more useful for the 
purpose of the present thesis to follow in Dr. Tash’s 
footsteps only to a certain extent and study reactions 
to Emile in detail, but to then depart from her method 
by examining these reactions within the limits of a few 
carefully delineated sections. The three most important 
aspects of education, the physical, social and psycho­
logical have been chosen for this purpose. It is realised 
that, although the thesis calls itself the reputation of 
Emile from 1762 to 1790, it does in fact only represent 
the first steps in assessing this reputation. Other 
sections dealing, for example, with the questions of 
syllabus, and women’s education, would need to be added 
to provide a fairer estimate of the reputation of the 
book during this period. The amount of material available
17
for each of these sections has caused the reduction of 
the present study to the three main sections already 
mentioned. It is hoped that a fuller study will prove 
possible at a later date.
It has also been felt that the question of influence 
should be abandoned for the present study. It is always 
only too easy to imagine that one can detect influence 
where there is, in fact, no reliable evidence for it. 
Writers’ comments and reactions do not necessarily imply 
influence, and it has been decided instead to follow
4
Daniel Mornet’s recommendation; and attempt a historical
analysis of the fortunes of Emile. A detailed collection
of contemporary comments on Emile, and close examination
of the degree to which the authors understand and appreciate
Rousseau’s ideas, should give a more certain image of the
reputation, and hence, influence of the book, than an
attempt to compare the ideas of Emile with later
pedagogical theories. Moreover this should help us to
trace in part the development of the legendary Rousseau
and the ideas attributed to him, which Schinz and others
2
have long pointed out.
1. D. Mornet: "Les enseignements des bibliothèques privées 
(1750-1780)", pp.449-50.
2. A. Schinz: Etat présent des travaux sur J.J. Rousseau. 
1941. Schinz discusses the growing tendency to 
distinguish between the legendary Rousseau and the ideas 
attributed to him, and the real Rousseau as found in his 
own works, pp.400-2.
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II
Rousseau’s reputation at the time of the publication 
of Emile, and the initial reception of Emile in France
Dr. Tash’3 information about a preliminary period of 
silence or criticism on the part of the pedagogical reformers 
prior to 1770 seems to coincide quite well with Mornet and 
Masson’s information about the relaxation of religious 
censureship after 1770 and its consequences for Emile.
Indeed, Dr. Tash attributes this silence and disapprobation 
to the fact that Emile was a condemned book,^ and explains 
that the subsequent interest shown in it results from the 
fact that the condemnation began to be forgotten from 1770 
onwards. Whether the period between 1762 and 1770 is, in 
fact, best described as a period of silence and criticism 
when extended beyond the reactions of the pedagogues alone, 
will have to be examined in the main body of the thesis.
But, in as far as the reported silence on the part of the 
pedagogues is concerned, it is probable that this might 
occur for more than one reason. This may be in part, as 
Dr. Tash suggests, because Emile was a condemned book, 
although criticism and comment in other fields suggests 
that there may have been some particular reason for silence
1. R. Tash, op.cit., p.56.
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on educational issues. It seems more likely that attention 
was at first focussed on non-educational issues, simply 
because Rousseau’s reputation as a serious thinker was as 
yet unmade.
Rousseau’s early literary reputation seems to have 
depended largely on his capacity as a polemical writer.
The early discourses stirred up considerable controversy, 
and were the subject of numerous energetic refutations to 
which Rousseau usually replied. This was true of whatever 
subject he chose to discuss, whether on the situation of 
social man, the rôle of the arts and sciences, music, the 
theatre or morality. His talent for defending opinions
(a)
directly opposed to the accepted point of view,  ^ together
with his outspoken attacks on established convention,
contributed to create an image of Rousseau as an eminently
controversial figure. This was coupled with admiration for
his literary powers, which were often described as dangerously
eloquent persuasion.
All this seems to have led to a growing conviction
that Rousseau was basically insincere, calculating his
attacks to attract maximum attention, both to himself and
1
to his writing. It must be remembered, however, that this
1. cf. Samuel S.B. Taylor’s similar assessment of Rousseau’s 
early reputation in ’’Rousseau’s contemporary reputation 
in France", published in Studies on Voltaire and the 
eighteenth century, edited Theodore Besterman, Geneva 
1963, Vol.XXVIII, pp.1545-1574.
(a) This is usually what was meant by the term ’paradoxe’.
See, for example, Bachaumont’s comment on p.%ù.
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reputation was limited to a small circle, that of literary 
Paris, which had enthusiastically entered into a bout of 
literary jousting over the first Discourse, and had been 
profoundly shocked by Rousseau’s attacks on French music.
In the Diderot circle he had earned himself the nickname 
of Diogenes. As far as the general public was concerned 
Rousseau’s reputation was very slight until the publication 
of the Nouvelle Heloise.
However, the reputation of Rousseau, the 
controversialist, was to accompany Emile to a certain 
extent in its early career, and may help to explain that, 
while refutations of Emile were numerous, serious 
consideration of his ideas developed more slowly. 
Bachaumont’s commentaries help us to understand the 
attitude with which the reading public awaited the 
appearance of Emile:
’’Get ouvrage, annoncé et attendu, pique 
autant la curiosité du public que l ’auteur 
unit à beaucoup d’esprit le talent rare d ’écrire 
avec autant de graces que d ’énergie. On lui 
reproche de soutenir des paradoxes; c ’est en 
partie à l ’art séduisant qu’il y emploie, qu’il 
doit peut-être sa grande célébrité; il ne s ’est 
fait coni^tre avec distinction que depuis qu’il 
ajpxls cette voie."1
On the 26th May he announces that Emile fulfils all
1. Bachaumont: Mémoires secrets pour servir à l ’histoire 
de la République des Lettres. Londres, 1784, Vol.I, 
pp.84-85.
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expectations;
"Le livre de Rousseau, lu à present de beaucoup 
de monde, fait tres-grand bruit. Il est singulier, 
comme tout ce qui sort de la plume de ce philosophe, 
écrit fortement et pensé de même
On the 30th June he assesses the contents of Emile. Firstly,
it is totally impracticable:
"Tout le monde convient que ce traité d ’éducation 
est d ’une exécution impossible, et l ’auteur n ’en 
disconvient pas lui-même. Pourquoi donc faire un 
livre, sous prétexte d ’être utile, lorsque l ’on 
sait qu’il ne servira de rien?
Secondly, any good ideas it may contain, particularly those
on physical education, are the height of banality:
"Les seules choses judicieuses qui y soient, sont 
en grande partie des remarques faites généralement, 
tirées des différents livres écrits sur cette 
matière, et sur-tout de celui de Locke".3
Thirdly, the author is self-contradictory:
"II déclame beaucoup contre la médicine, et fait 
le médecin à chaque instant".4
His charm and his probable success depend entirely on his
literary talent, and his energetic cynicism:
"O’est donc par son talent rare qu’il a le secret 
d ’enchaîner son lecteur et de l ’empêcher de voir 
le vuide de ce livre. Son éloquence mâle, rapide 
et brûlante, porte de 1 ’intérêt dans les plus 
grandes minuties. D ’ailleurs, l ’amertume sublime 
qui découle continuellement de sa plume, ne peut  ^
que lui concilier le plus grand nombre de lecteurs."^
1. Bachaumont: op. cit., p.87.
2. Ibid., p.97.
3. Idem.
4. Ibid., p.98.
5. Idem.
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We must not forget, however, that the reputation of 
Rousseau the controversialist, the literary showman, had 
just undergone a major change, and reached a much wider 
audience, with the publication of La Nouvelle Héloise.
Mornet has traced the public’s reactions to this novel:  ^
hostility of the literary world, who decried its:
"plan mal ordonné ... développement pénible 
et trop lent ... caractères hors de nature ... 
personnages dissertateurs et par là-même 
eimuyeux ... morale singulière, paradoxale p 
pédantesque ... goûts des contradictoires ;"
counterbalanced by the enthusiastic reception of the reading
public: letters to Rousseau and his publishers, financial
success, reports of popularity throughout the provinces,
seventy-two editions between 1761 and 1800, frenzied
enthusiasm. Mornet reports that the Oorrespondance
littéraire maintained that women spent whole nights reading
and crying over it:
"on écrit pour crier à Rousseau une emotion qui 
bouillorfe et qui déborde. A chaque page ’l ’âme 
se fond’î On s ’enivre d ’une douce sensibilité.
On a le coeur serré ’pendant plus de huit nours*.
On ferme sa porte à clef pour sentir ’son ame 
s’émouvoir, son coeur palpiter, son esprit tomber 
dans une douce rêverie’. C ’est un ’ravissement’,
’un feu qui dévore’, des larmes, des soupirs, 
des douleurs".3
1. D. Mornet: La Nouvelle Héloise J-pp.237-263.
2. Quoted by Mornet, op.cit., p.245 from Aublet de Maubuy: 
Histoire des troubles et des démêlés littéraires.
3. Momet: op.cit., p.249, with quotations from the 
Ms. No.7902 at the Neuchâtel library.
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This new enthusiasm for the Nouvelle Heloise was to
project itself to some extent on the reception of Emile.
There is no doubt that some of the reading public of the
day saw it as a continuation of La Nouvelle Héloise.
witness Bachaumont’s comments on Sophie’s education:
’’le quatrième volume présente une Sophie, qui 
donne lieu à une dissertation sur la maniéré 
d ’éduquer les filles. Il faut avouer que 
celle-ci est un chef d ’oeuvre d ’autant plus 
séduisant qu’il ne paraît point hors de 
nature. On est attendri jusqu’aux larmes, 
dans ce morceau de détails les plus intéressants. 
Aussi Emile en devient-il amoureux. L ’impitoyable 
gouverneur ne le laisse point à sa passion: il 
1 ’arrache; il veut qu’il cherche avant le domicile 
où il voudra s ’établir’’. '
Emile, then, was probably first read partly for its
supposedly strange and contradictory ideas, partly for the
author’s power to move the reader, and not at all as a
serious discussion of educational principles:
’’On le lit, et on le lira sans doute avec 
avidité, parce que l ’homme aime mieux le 
singulier que l ’utile. Il faut avouer 
aussi que l ’auteur possède au supreme degré 
la partie du sentiment. Ehl que ne pardonne- 
t-on pas à qui sait m o u v o i r’’.2
Bachaumont continues to note, during the following
months, the political repercussions provoked by Emile.
and to mention some of the refutations as they appear.
On the 21st July he strongly condemns the trivial
1. Bachaumont: op.cit., p.99.
2. Ibid., p.100.
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objections of an anonymous Réfutation du nouvel ouvrage
de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, intitulé Emile.  ^ On the 28th
September he notes a banal, but satisfactory criticism,
the Lettre à M.D*** sur le livre intitulé. Emile, which
he criticises mainly on the grounds that, whereas Rousseau
spurns authority and power with "trop d ’amertume et
d ’indépendance", his critic can be charged with "servitude
2
et adulation". He continues to show considerable
interest in the later repercussions of Christophe de
Beaumont’s Mandement and the Lettres de la Montagne,
His accounts, however, merely record these events as
being of interest, but are not accompanied by any
indication of the general interest occasioned by Emile,
His notes also give us one or two interesting and
amusing pieces of information about reactions to Emile,
He reports that the Dauphin, on being informed of its
condemnation, replied:
"O’est fort bien fait, ...: ce livre attaque 
la religion, il trouble la société, l ’ordre des 
citoyens; il ne peut servir qu’à rendre l ’homme 
malheureux: c ’est fort bien fait ..."
th%
It is interesting to note that he believed Contrat
Social to be infinitely less dangerous:
1. Bachaumont: op.cit., p.108. According to Brizard, 
(op.cit., p.287), this was later attributed to the 
Abbé Pérau.
2. Ibid., p.129. Attributed to the Père Griffet, 
Brizard, op.cit., p.294.
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"Quant à celui-là (le Contrat Social) ... 
c’est différent, ... il n ’attaque que l ’autorité 
des souverains; c ’est une chose à discuter. Il 
y auroit beaucoup à dire; c ’est plus susceptible 
de controverse".»
In June 1763, Bachaumont announces a new play,
Manco. in which "l’homme sauvage est perpétuellement en
opposition avec l ’homme civil. C ’est le système de
2
Rousseau mis en action". He reports that this play,
which he subsequently condemned for its bad quality, is
an adaptation in verse of all the ideas on monarchy,
freedom and human rights scattered throughout the Discours
sur l ’Inégalité. Emile, and the Contrat Social. Its
success seems to have been entirely dependant on one line:
"un seul malheureux vers, applaudi d ’abord pour 
son ridicule, ensuite exalté par les sots, a 
relevé ce drame écrasé, en a fait la fortune;
"Voilà l ’homme civil, et vjjolà l ’homme sauvage", 
dit un sauvage qui vient d ’arracher un poignard 
qu’un grand prêtre levoit contre le fils du^roi.
Tel a été le ressort qui a remonté cette pièce 
détestable".3 (a)
On the 29th December Bachaumont publishes an
1. Bachaumont: op.cit., pp.114-115.
2. Ibid., p.230.
3. Ibid., p.232.
(a) This apparent enthusiasm for the opposition of natural 
and social man seems to be a manifestation of the 
popularity of the themes of nature and simplicity, 
which, as Mornet pointed out, was in evidence both 
before and after Rousseau. Mornet:"D’influence de 
J.J. Rousseau au XVIIIe. siècle", pp.46-47.
26 .
enthusiastic poem, in the form of an epitaph,^ which,
though it refers to Rousseau’s works in general rather
than to Emile in particular, nevertheless illustrates
very well the sympathy for his works and personality which,
2
it has been suggested, was prompted by his stoical
acceptance of his persecutions:
"Rousseau prenant toujours la nature pour 
maître,
Eut de l ’humanité l ’apôtre et le martyr;
Les mortels qu’il vouloit forcer à se connoître; 
S ’étoient trop avilis pour ne pas l ’en punir.
Pauvre, errant, fugitif et proscrit sur la terre 
Sa vie à ses écrits servit de commentaire 
La fiere vérité dans ses hardis tableaux.
Sut en dépit des grands montrer ce que nous sommes.
Il devoit de nos jours trouver des échafauds;
Il aura des autels quand il naîtra des hommesJ”
Throughout 1764 and 1765 Bachaumont continues to
show interest in refutations of Emile and Rousseau’s
movements, and this continues into 1766 and 1767. On the
11th June 1767 he reports that Rousseau had been well
received, though clandestinely, by his partisans in Amiens.^
Rousseau’s correspondence and the publishing of his
Dictionnaire de Musique then takes precedence over Emile.
until even reports about his whereabouts disappear entirely
during 1769. On the 1st July 1770, however, Bachaumont
reports with some surprise that the "auteur d ’Emile’ has
1. Bachaumont: op.cit., pp.318-319.
2. By Samuel S.B. Taylor: op.cit., p.1566.
3. Bachaumont: op.cit.. Vol.Ill, p.192.
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been seen in public at the Régence in Paris, and that a
considerable crowd had collected to see him. Bachaumont’s
surprise indicates that the official condemnation of his
books had not been relaxed by mid-1770. It is also
interesting to note that it is Emile which he attaches
automatically to Rousseau’s name.
Another interesting reaction to Emile is to be found
2
in the Journal des Scavans. The author of the preliminary
announcement of Rousseau’s new work repeats the kind of
criticisms already found in Bachaumont. The reader must
expect to find in it "cette touche mâle et nerveuse qui
caractérise son style," and must be prepared for the
author’s "paradoxical" statements. To Rousseau’s:
"Je ne vois pas comme les autres hommes; il y 
a long-tems qu’on me l ’a reproché"
his critic replies:
"Rous sommes fâchés de trouver dans ce nouvel 
ouvrage de quoi justifier les reproches qu’on 
a^toujours faits à M. Rousseau sur son goût 
décidé pour le Paradoxe".3
The real analysis of Emile was only to appear in November
and December when the general atmosphere of censure
surrounding it could only be expected to produce adverse
1. Bachaumont: op.cit., Vol.V, p.134.
2. Joircnal des Scavans. combiné avec les Mémoires de 
Trévoux. Amsterdam. Juin 1762. Tome LXXI. The analysis 
of Emile is in the Mémoires de Trévoux.
3. Journal des Scavans. Tome LXVIII. 0.251.
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criticism. However, despite its extreme introductory 
comments, the article contains a number of interesting 
remarks, some of which will be studied in the main body 
of the thesis.
The article begins with an exaggerated report of 
this monstrosity, Emile:
"Rous appercumes bien au premier coup d ’oeil 
le germe de quelques paradoxes, et nous fimes 
part dès-lors de nos soupçons: mais nous n ’eussions 
pas imaginé que ce Traité chimérique d ’éducation 
dût être aussi repréhensible".^
The first scenes of "cette Comédie cynique" (i.e. the
earlier writings) had been ridiculous, but who could have
expected the "dénoument affreux qui les couronne”. The
reader is warned once again about Rousseau’s dangerously
eloquent style:
"On ne trouvera pad(i^ci (i.e. in this analysis) 
cette multitude de phrases sémillantes, qui ne 
prouvent que la fécondité de son génie, et sa 
funeste facilité de s ’énoncer; parce qu’il ne 
faut pas juger de la beauté ou de la difformité 
des objets par le masque qui les c o u v r e " . 2
Similar remarks appeared in the refutations of the
Profession de Foi. The author of the Réfutation du nouvel
ouvrage de J.J. Rousseau described Rousseau as:
"Cet homme, déjà si connu dans la république 
des lettres par ses paradoxes aussi bizarres 
que singuliers," 3
1. Journal des Scavans. Tome LXXI, Ro.13, Rov.1762, p.217.
2. Ibid., p.218.
3. Réfutation du nouvel ouvrage de J.J. Rousseau, intitulé 
Emile ou de l ’éducation. Paris 1762. Quoted by
Gr. Brizard, op.cit., p.287.
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and went on to warn his readers against the dangers of his 
style:
"On doit cependant convenir que cet ouvrage 
est d ’autant plus dangereux, que, sous les 
agrémens d ’un style riche et fleuri, qui attire 
et qui éblouit, l ’auteur insinue dans le coeur 
de son élève le poison le plus funeste; que cet 
appât et ces amorces sont séduisans pour un 
siecle qui a un goût plus décidé pour la beauté 
et 1 ’arrangement des mots, que pour la solidité 
des raisonnemens".1
Another work, the Analyse des principes de J.J. Rousseau.
though it attacked Rousseau’s person and ideas, nevertheless
acknowledges his superior powers of style and argument :
"J’ai lu VOS oeuvres; j’ai admiré votre 
éloquence; la subtilité de vos argumens m ’a 
dévoilé les ressources de votre génie".^
Bergier, in his Déisme réfuté par lui-même assigned 
Rousseau the already familiar title of Diogenes:
"Depuis environ vingt siecles que la place 
de Diogene étoit vacante^ vous vous êtes présenté 
pour lui succéder: qui eut osé vous disputer ce 
privilege?".3
and went on to declare that Rousseau had wrongly estimated 
his talents:
"Né avec l ’imagination la plus brillante, si 
vous vous fussiez borné à des sujets de littérature 
et d ’agrément, vous auriez eu le plus éclatant 
succès: mais l ’ambition de dogmatiser vous a 
malheureusement saisi ..."^
1. Réfutation du nouvel ouvrage de J.J. Rousseau, p.289.
2. Analyse des principes de J.J. Rousseâul (attributed to 
Puget de St.Pierre). Quoted by G.Brizard, op.cit.,p.325.
3. Bergier: Le Déisme réfuté par lui-même. Paris 1766. 
Quoted by G.Brizard, op.cit., p.343.
4. Ibid., p.366.
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A rather different comment appeared in the Lettre 
à M.D*** sur le livre intitulé Emile. Instead of warning 
the reader against Rousseau’s powerful style, the author 
criticised both this and Rousseau’s general lack of method, 
maintaining that an enlightened public would scorn his 
works, and that he would become a forgotten author. The 
lack of success with which he threatens Rousseau’s ideas 
on education, and his obvious belief that they will not 
be taken seriously, is interesting to note:
"On pourroit lui pardonner d ’avoir formé dans 
son imagination un plan d ’éducation chimérique 
et impraticable, qui ne sera suivi de personne ;
.... Il ne sera que plus ridicule quand il 
proposera sérieusement d ’obliger Emile de courir 
a pieds nuds ... lorsqu’il entreprendra de lui 
apprendre l ’astronomie sans sphere, la géographie 
sans cartes ... on rira de ses chimeres ..."1
The main danger of his work is, then, not his ideas on
education, but his attack on the State and religion, and,
according to the author of the Lettre à M.L***. it is this
double attack which has prompted so many readers to rise
against him. He expresses his fear of the possible
dangers of the insinuation of Rousseau’s ideas much more
explicitly than the other writers of refutations. The
book must be suppressed and censured:
1. Lettre à M.D*** sur le livre intitulé Emile ou de 
1 ’éducation par J.J. Rousseau. Paris 17^2. Quoted 
by G. Brizard, op.cit., p.295.
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"oar si les détestables principes et les dangereux 
paradoxes dont il est rempli venoient à séduire 
et à enivrer la multd^de en se commi^iquant par 
une espece de contagion, il seroit à craindre 
qu'ils ne causassent des révolutions aussi 
funestes aux états républicains qu'aux états 
monarchiques".^
Rousseau himself commented on the early reactions 
to Emile. His remark in the Confessions is well-known:
"La publication de ce livre ne se fit point 
avec cet éclat d 'applaudissement qui suiveit celle 
de tous mes écrits. Jamais ouvrage n'eut de si 
grands éloges particuliers, ni si peu d'approbation 
publique. Ce que m'en dirent, ce que m'en 
écrivirent les gens les plus capables d'en juger 
me confirma que c*étoit là le meilleur de mes 
écrits, ainsi que le plus important. Mais tout 
cela fut dit avec les précautions les plus 
bizarres, comme s'il eut importé de garder le 
secret du bien que l'on en pensoit".2
Of the letters he mentions, Clairaut's and La
Condamine's refer only to the Profession de Foi, the
reading of which leaves Clairaut "touché comme son jeune
Ami ..."  ^ and excites La Condamine's approval:
"Que je me sais bon gré de penser avec vous 
que la voix de la conscience, sorte d'instinct 
irrésistible, est un guide plus sûr qu'une raison 
orgueilleuse dont nous sentons à chaque moment 
les bornes I
1. Lettre à M.D*** ....  pp.299-300.
2. Oeuvres complètes. Pléiade edition, 1959 ••• Vol.I, 
Les Confessions~Bk.11. p.573.
3. C.G. Vol.VII, p.240, No.1370. Clairaut to Rousseau, 
24 May 1762.
4. Ibid., p.239, Nd.1369. La Condamine to Rousseau,
24 May 1762.
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D'Alembert maintained that, despite present difficulties, 
Rousseau's work would finally receive the acclamation it 
deserved:
Votre dernier ouvrage, si plein de vérités 
neuves et grandes, de vertus, de sentiment et 
d'éloquence, met le comble à votre réputation 
en mettant le comble à votre malheur, et vous 
pouvez l'appeler l'enfant de votre douleur et
de votre gloire. Les honnetes gens (.....)
auront une voix plus forte que celle de 
l'hypocrisie; et du fanatisme; et le suffrage 
de ces amis respectables vous fera goûter 
d'avance celui de la postérité qui prononcera 
votre nom avec respect et ne saura pas même 
celui de vos méprisables ennemis”. ' (a)
Mme. de Créqui insisted on the impracticable nature
of Rousseau's system of education, classing Emile as a
novel rather than an educational treatise:
"J'ai lu votre Roman de l'Education. Je l'appelle 
ainsi parce qu'il me paraît impossible de réaliser 
votre méthodej mais il y a beaucoup à apprendre, 
à méditer et a profiter".2
1. CG". p.295, No. 1411. D'Alembert to Rousseau,
.15 June 1762.
2. GG". p.265, No. 1388. Mme. de Créqui to Rousseau,
2 June 1762.
(a) De la Pouplinière also pointed out the lack of
immediate success to which Emile was destined, and 
the eventual hope of the acclamation it deserved:
"II faut, je crois, que la révolution naturelle 
des choses nous fassent reporter dans notre 
premier état de barbarie alors, on vous écoutera, 
on sentira l'utilité de vos leçons, et votre livre 
deviendra l'instruction générale pour les pères et 
les mères".
/ W  OG. p.278, No.1396. De la Pouplinière to Rousseau, 
6 June 1762.
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Her amusing reactions to the book are very reminiscent of 
the effects of La Nouvelle Heloise reported by Mornet.
They are not so emotional, but nevertheless suggest the 
impact of a novel rather than a serious work on education:
"II (votre roman) m*a donné des maux de nerfs 
insupportables ; c'est le meilleur signe du monde 
pour vôtre ouvrage: lorsque mes lectures ne me 
font pas crisper le nez, c'est une preuve que 
tout est froid, mais lorsque je ne puis remuer 
ni pieds ni pattes, que mes yeux clignotent et 
surtout que le bout de mon nez tire, alors c'est 
une preuve de style supérieur ..."1
Her remarks about Emile and Sophie also reveal an obvious
interest in them as living characters rather than simple
examples to illustrate the author's points:
"J'ai eu un instant la cruauté de désirer la 
mort d'Emile pour voir Sophie élever ses garçons, 
mais je déteste mon premier mouvement et je ne 
désire que leur prospérité".2
The impact of some of Rousseau's ideas on a woman reader
is also obvious from one of her earlier letters in which
she admits that Emile might prompt her to feel some regrets:
"Je n'ai pas nourri mon fils et je l'ai emmailloté".^
Voltaire's reactions to Emile should not be overlooked.
His unfavourable comments, together with Diderot's antipathy,
probably caused a considerable amount of opposition to Emile. 
—
1. GG. No.1388, p.265.
2. .Ibid., p.266
3. GG. No. 1372, p.243. Mme. de Créqui to Rousseau,
25 May 1762.
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not only in the literary circle in which he moved, hut
also among his partisans in the reading public. The
estrangement between Rousseau and the philosophes naturally
provoked bitter comments from his former friend. In two
letters to Etienne Damilaville he refers to Emile as "un
fatras d'une sotte nourrice en quatre tomes",^ and "le
2
fade roman d'Emile". He was obviously interested in the 
second part of the Profession de Foi, for he published it 
in his Recueil nécessaire of 1766, with one or two minor 
alterations (which, however, as Raymond Naves^ has pointed 
out, slightly altered its emphasis in a direction more 
congenial to the opinions of its editor). However, at the 
time of the publication of Emile. Voltaire was at pains to 
point out the banality of this particular section. To the 
Duchess of Saxe Gotha, he writes:
"On débite sourdement plusieurs ouvrages dans 
le goût de ces cinquante pages (contre la relligion 
crétienne). On les attribue tantôt à La Mettrie 
tantôt au philosophe de Sans Souci. Mais il est 
certain qu'il y en a un d'un curé de Champagne 
auprès de Rocroi, qui est plus approfondi que le 
troisième tome d'Emile"
1. Voltaire's Correspondance: edited by Theodore Besterman 
Vol.XLIX, Geneva 1959, p.28). No.9707. Voltaire to 
Etienne Damilaville, 14 June 1762.
2. Ibid., p.45, No.9726. Voltaire to Etienne Damilaville, 
25 June 1762.
3. R. Naves: "Voltaire éditeur de Rousseau”. RHLF.
April, 1937, pp. -14.7
4. Voltaire's Correspondance: Vol.XLIX, p.160, No.9817. 
Voltaire to Louise Dorothea of Meiningen. Duchess of 
Saxe Gotha, 2 Aug. 1762.
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One of Voltaire's correspondents, de Cideville, also 
strongly criticised Emile, and attacked Rousseau's person 
at the same time. In his letter of the 30th June he admits 
that there is "de la force dans le stile”, but the system 
of education is a "chimère" and contains "des Eternités et 
des longeurs insoutenables".  ^ As for the author:
"il faut être singulier quand on ne peut estre 
illustre, il faut avoir l'air de mépriser les p 
femmes et de haïr les hommes, sic itur ad astra".
These various comments together contain all the
elements of criticism which our knowledge of Rousseau's
early reputation would lead us to expect. On the one hand
we find antagonism and censure. Rousseau's opinions are
strange and contrary to the normal line of attack; his
ideas on religion are particularly dangerous, and must be
combatted; his style is extremely powerful, and,
consequently, a dangerous weapon of persuasion. As for
the system of education it is useless, and will obtain
little success. The good ideas it has are all commonplace
opinions.
On the other hand, we find approval from a much 
smaller group, mainly friends, and assurance of future
1. Voltaire's Correspondance: Vol.XLIX, p.63, No.9740, 
Le Cornier de Cideville to Voltaire, 30 June 1762.
2. Ibid., p.64.
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success; a certain amount of interest and sympathy for the 
persecuted writer and his works; enthusiasm for the 
romanesque quality of the hook, and particularly for the 
figure of Sophie. We also find the first sign of a woman's 
reaction to the passages on child-care.
Rousseau's style is the most important factor for 
both sides. Various critics^ have suggested that this is, 
indeed, the key to Rousseau's success: that his ideas, 
though completely unoriginal, were so enhanced by his 
superior literary talent, that he succeeded where others 
had failed. Whether or not this is true should become 
apparent from our detailed study of reactions to Emile.
It will also be interesting to see the extent to which 
these early comments accompany Emile in its pre-Revolutionary 
career, and their importance in the formation of its 
reputation.
1. e.g. R. Tash: op.cit., pp.103-4. 
Dr. E. Monin: op.cit., p.387.
G. Variot: op.cit., p.349.
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CHAPTER I
ART and NATURE in PHYSICAL EDUCATION
A. Physical education before 1762. and Rousseau's position 
in relation to this^^^
The alleged lack of originality of Rousseau's ideas 
on the care and education of the young child has, for a 
long time, occupied critics and scholars, and has, at times, 
affected his reputation in this field. Shortly after the 
publication of Emile, a Benedictine monk, Dorn Cajot, brought 
out his now well-known attack on Rousseau, in which he 
accused him of plagiarism throughout Emile. Such an 
accusation has naturally led to much study and discussion, 
particularly in the case of alleged copying from an 
eighteenth century doctor, Jean-Charles Desessartz, whose 
book on physical education appeared in 1760, and who, in 
1798, himself supported Oajot's accusation. Such questions 
have, for the most part, been effectively disproved, and 
modern scholarship has moved on to the more impartial study
1. Cajot (Dorn Joseph) O.S.B.; Les Plagiats de M.J.J.Rousseau 
de Genève sur 1'éducation. La Haye- Paris, Durand, 176é.
(a) In order to put Rousseau's ideas on physical education 
into perspective it has been thought necessary to first 
examine earlier ideas on this subject, and then discuss 
Rousseau's position in relation to these. Consequently, 
it should be easier to understand the implications of 
some of the later comments on this aspect of Emile.
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of the possible sources of Rousseau's ideas. Villey, for
example, in his book: L 'influence de Montaigne sur les
idées pédagogiques de Locke et de Rousseau, published in
1911, decided that, as far as physical education is concerned,
Rousseau is completely indebted to Montaigne and Locke:
"le programme d'éducation physique de Montaigne 
complété par Locke, passe entièrement dans 
l'Emile".l
This has since been strongly combatted. Dr. Peter Jimack
in his thesis: La genèse et la rédaction de l'Emile de
2
J.J. Rousseau, discusses the possible influence of 
Montaigne and Locke on Rousseau's ideas, and concludes that 
any influence which can be attributed to them is the result 
of much earlier reading on Rousseau's part, and had become
Uv\
an intricate- part of his own thought by the time of the 
composition of Emile.^
This and other more detailed research into Rousseau's 
sources has shown a distinct move away from the idea of 
direct borrowing or inspiration on Rousseau's part, to an 
examination of the profusion of works on child care prior
1. Quoted by R. Tash: op.cit., p.20.
2. Ph.D. Southampton, 1956. Subsequently published in 
Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century. Vol.13. 
GiEi^a,“ 9 éO.-----------  ------
3. Jimack, op.cit., p.290.
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to the composition of Emile,^  and a feeling of the general 
banality of Rousseau's ideas. Dr. Ruth Tash, for example, 
in her thesis written some thirteen years ago, states 
categorically that every reform asked for by Rousseau 
(i.e. with regard to physical education) had already been 
advocated before the composition of Emile. Again, Dr.
Roger Mercier in his recent thesis: L'enfant dans la 
société du XVIII^ siècle^ traces in detail the general 
current of eighteenth century thought on child education, 
and concludes, that, as far as detail is concerned, 
Rousseau's criticisms in Emile offer nothing new. To 
support their point of view, Jimack, Mercier and Tash 
indicate both Rousseau's actual quotations from and 
references to writers such as Locke, Plutarch, Boerhaave, 
Buffon, etc., and the frequency of such ideas in the 
eighteenth century, especially during the period
1. e.g. 1708 De la Motte (G.M.): Dissertation sur
l'obligation aux meres de nourrir lenrs enfans.
1722 Crousaz CJ-P. de): Traité de l'éducation des
enfants.
1741 Andry (N): L'Art de prévenir et de corriger dans 
les enfants les difformités du corps.
1751 Bonneval: Réflexions sur le premier âge de l'homme.
1753 Le Camus (Antoine): Médecine de l'EspritT
1754 Brouzet (R.): Essai sur 1'education médicinale 
des enfants.
1756 Vandermonde (Charles-Augustin): Essai sur la 
maniéré de perfectionner 1'espece humaine.
and many others.
2. R. Mercier: L'enfant dans la société du XVIII siècle.
Paris I960.
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1
1750 - 1760. Mercier supports this point with a quotation
from Gilibert, who, in his Dissertation sur la dépopulation
(1770), speaks of "un état de fermentation universelle” on
2
the subject of physical education around that period.
It seems unlikely, then, that any impact caused by 
Emile was the result of the extreme novelty of Rousseau's 
ideas. If we want to discover the nature of this impact, 
we must look in a different direction. When assessing 
his position in relation to other writers on the same 
subject, we must attempt to ascertain, not so much those 
things which link Rousseau to his predecessors and 
contempor^es, as those which distinguish him from them. 
Perhaps the most fruitful line to pursue is to study the 
development of idealogical differences which arise amongst 
the reformers, and which result in two distinct trends.
In this, Roger Mercier has prepared the way for us.
He traces the emergence and development of ideas 
on child care from Plutarch, through Favorinus of Arles, 
Erasmus, Laurent Joubert, the Czech reformer Komensky, 
etc. etc. The one outstanding characteristic of all these 
thinkers is their insistence on natural methods in child
1. See Jimack, op.cit., pp.259-375.
Tash, op.cit., pp.16-29. 
Mercier, op.cit., p.27.
2. Quoted by Mercier: op.cit., p.184.
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education, and particularly their advocaMen of maternal 
breast-feeding. They see the failure to breast-feed one's 
own child as a violation of the laws of Nature, which has 
provided natural food for each child in the form of the 
mother's milk. It is not until the seventeenth century, 
and presumably coincidental with a dawning belief that 
man can interfere in the natural order, that Mercier finds 
any opposition to this generally naturalistic philosophy. 
However, a seventeenth century doctor. Gallego de la Serna, 
faced by what he considers to be the unsuitability of the 
modern socialite for feeding her own child, recommends 
that the child be fed, either by another woman, who would 
be more suitable both physically and morally, or by goat's 
milk, which he sees as an effective substitute for human
i
milk. Van Helmut, a well-known Dutch 17th century doctor,
is the next thinker, singled out by Mercier, to oppose
nature on this score. It is clear from the number of
references to him by later writers that he had a considerable
effect on the theories of physical education of the
2
eighteenth century. His opposition to nature is much 
more clearly stated than that of De la Serna, and may be
1. Quoted by Mercier, op.cit., p.19.
2. See, for example. Le Camus, op.cit.. Vol.II, p.411 : 
Brouzet, Education médicinale. Paris 1754, pp.170-171.
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considered as a more consciously adopted philosophical
attitude. His argument is that much that is "unnatural"
is already well-established. Why then should maternal
breast-feeding be alone an inviolable law of Nature?
"on pretend que Dieu a fait le lait pour la 
nourriture des enfants. Mais s'abstient-on 
de manger du pain et d^oire du vin sous 
prétexte que Dieu n'a fait que les grains 
et les grappes".'l
Here, then, we have evidence of two developing, 
divergent opinions; the first traditional and naturalistic, 
the second, revolutionary and artificial. The division 
becomes more pronounced during the eighteenth century.
Amongst those doctors who recognise the need for change 
in infant education, resulting from a wide-spread belief 
in the depraved condition into which human nature has 
fallen, some base their means of reform on the exercise 
of man's natural and primitive duties (e.g. breast­
feeding) and generally natural methods (i.e. as found 
among the animals or more primitive peoples), while others 
prefer purely artificial means, achieved by an advance in
human knowledge, which enables man to invent more suitable
(a)methods than those provided originally by Nature.  ^ '
1. Quoted by Mercier, op.cit., p.19.
(a) This is linked with a widespread belief of the eighteenth 
century in the superiority of rational man, and the 
subsequent possibility of reform throu^ the spread of 
knowledge, together with a growing belief that man can 
and should interfere in the natural order.
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On one side we find names like Buffon, Brouzet, Bocquillot,
(a)on the other, Vandermonde, de Chamousset,  ^ * Moreau de 
Saint-Elier. Before attempting to assess Rousseau's 
position, it would he interesting to examine a little more 
thoroughly the differences between two or three of these 
writers.
It is important to remember that we shall, for the 
most part, be dealing with doctors, who were, at this time, 
becoming more interested in the practical and physical 
side of child education than in the moral issues involved. 
Most of them, however, still tended to attach their 
recommendations to some basic philosophical system; 
hence, the division between the supporters of Nature and 
those of Art. Although their dawning "scientific" spirit 
prompts some of them to occasionally modify their position 
in the light of observation and experiment, they tend to 
swing back time and again to their basic philosophical 
attitude. On the other hand, some of them are, not
(a) Be Chamousset should be mentioned here, as he gives 
us a practical illustration of the eighteenth century 
campaign for artificial feeding, whereas most of the 
writers discussed are interested in theoretical 
ideas. De Chamousset was responsible for the setting­
up of a sort of crèche just beyond the boundaries of 
Paris to which orphans were taken and fed on cow's 
milk, in the way he had seen it done by an old Burgundy 
peasant. Unfortunately his experiment caused a scandal, 
because some of the children died and, perhaps more 
than anything else, caused an outcry against the 
innovators of artificial feeding. See Mercier, op.cit., 
p.149.
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unexpectedly, the victims of a conservative tradition 
which prevents them from changing some of their ideas 
to fit their basic philosophy. As a result of either 
or both of these reasons, the division between the two 
sides becomes from time to time considerably obscured. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible for us to appreciate 
the basic ideological differences of the authors chosen 
for examination, if we consider their works as a whole,
cio
and^not content ourselves with studying merely a few
( a . )details, which might lead to ambiguity and confusion.^  ^
One of the most well-known authors on child-care 
around 1760 was Brouzet, sometime physician to Louis XV, 
member of the Académie des Sciences and doctor at 
Fontainebleau. It seems probable that Rousseau read his 
work, L'éducation médicinale, which was published in 1754, 
and in which he discusses the main problems of physical 
education, especially maternal breast-feeding and the 
use of swaddling-bands.
Brouzet*s attitude is basically naturalistic. He 
believes that childbirth is, and should be, the work of
1. Jimack, op.cit., p.366.
(a) Mercier seems to have done this occasionally, e.g. he 
places Brouzet wrongly amongst the supporters of the 
artificial on the strength of one passage of the 
Education médicinale, p.146.
Mercier, op.cit., p.79.
45
nature.** He decides that, rather than run the risks of
suffocation and physical deformity, it would be better to
abandon the use of the traditional swaddling bands and let
2
the child enjoy his natural freedom. He reveals a 
preference for maternal breast-feeding, provided the 
mother is strong, healthy and vigorous.  ^ But, his 
practical mind (he reveals his interest in observation 
and experimentation in the Preface) prevents him from 
blindly following nature throughout. With Brouzet, 
experience is a basic principle, and is closely linked 
to his conception of Nature. He is only prepared to 
follow Nature in as far as experience and observation 
support its claims. Consequently he realises that Nature 
alone is not always sufficient, and at times can, and 
should, be helped by man. In the case of difficult 
childbirth, he believes that human art should be allowed 
to take over, while, in the case of abortion, it can 
sometimes prevent a natural one, or, if necessary, procure 
an unnatural one. This is not Art superseding Nature, but 
merely;
"1'Art guidé par la Nature"
1. Brouzet: Education médicinale. Paris 1754. pp.37-61.
2. Brouzet, op.cit., pp.100-102.
3. Ibid. pp.181-182.
4. Ibid. pp.xxxix-xl.
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and a perfectly legitimate intervention on the part of 
human intelligence and skill. Moreover, his proscription 
of swaddling hands is hy no means a decided stand for 
Nature. He first condones their use (they are after all 
part of a well-established tradition), with the one 
stipulation that they should not be too tight. .He finally 
discards them as a result of practical considerations 
rather than from any philosophical idealism. His attitude 
is:
"II seroit done plus simple et plus avantageux 
de renoncer à l'usage de 1'emmaillotement, 
puisqu'il est accompagné de risques, qu'il est 
aisé d'éviter, et qu'il n'y a aucune utilité 
d'encourir".'!
His advocation of maternal breast-feeding is also
subject to limitations. On the one hand Brouzet sides
with many of his contemporaries in condemning the dangers
of breast-feeding in the eighteenth century, the society
of which is so corrupt that mothers can only pass on bad
(a)qualities with their milk,'‘ ' while, on the other, he 
withdraws from the obvious alternative of artificial 
feeding on the grounds that sufficient experimentation
1. Brouzet, op.cit., p.102.
(a) The idea that characteristics were passed from the 
mother to the child by means of the mother's milk 
was extremely common in the eighteenth century.
See Mercier, op.cit., pp.82-87.
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has not yet been carried out along these lines. His 
ultimate approval of maternal breast-feeding is, then, 
a last resource resulting from his unwillingness to 
propagate insufficiently proved artificial methods, 
rather than from any ideological conviction. His 
confidence in experience is linked with a certain amount 
of faith in rational man's superiority over Nature:
"l'expérience et 1'industrie des hommes a plus 
d'une fois utilement corrigé les prétendues 
regies de la Nature",'
of cbrv^  siu.CC 9 to Oü C
but, the ultimate fallibility^ on the side of Nature, and)
Brouzet's only conclusion can be in support of Nature. ^  '
And so he attempts to provide his work with a coherent 
basic philosophy. To do this, he works acceptable human 
skill and interference in the natural order into a 
basically naturalistic philosophy by defining art as a 
natural gift. His attitude is well summed-up by the 
following passage:
"L'industrie des hommes, la faculté de réformer 
par le secours de l'Art est aussi un présent 
de la Nature; et user de cette faculté ou 
prendre de ses ouvrages bruts et informes, 
n'est-ce pas toujours obéir à ses loix?
Ce n'est pas que nous ne puissions tirer des 
instructions utiles de 1'exemple des animaux 
qui étant dépourvus d'intelligence, ne font 
pas comme nous de nouvelles loix, mais suivent 
constamment celles de la Nature. Aussi nous
1. Brouzet, op.cit., p.146.
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en sommes-nous appuyés et nous nous en 
appuyerons-nous encore, mais toujours après 
un mur examen fondé sur des observations 
solides, sans nous frapper de la fausse idée 
de suivre scrupuleusement les indications de 
la Nature, et sans nous laisser séduire par 
1*appas flatteur pour notre vanité, de la 
réformer".1
Brouzet*s philosophy is, then, predominantly naturalistic, 
both at its base and in detail, though it does leave some 
room for human art and progress.
Much more important than Brouzet in the history of 
eighteenth century thought, and of a more certain 
influence on Rousseau's own ideas, is Buffon, supporter 
of Nature, and author of the voluminous Histoire Naturelle, 
in part of which he too discusses the main problems of 
infant education, including the questions of maternal 
breast-feeding and the use of swaddling-bands. We know
that Rousseau had his copy of Buffon open beside him as
2
he composed Emile. Moreover, not only Rousseau, but 
also Brouzet, Vandermonde, Le Camus, etc., quote Buffon 
at every opportunity.^
As is fitting for a naturalist, Buffon champions 
Nature throughout his work. In Volume II, for example.
1. Brouzet, op.cit., pp.146-147.
2. See Jimack, op.cit., p.344.
3. e.g. Brouzet, op.cit., pp.83-4, 103, 176 ...: 
Vandermonde, Essai sur la maniéré de perfectionner 
la race humaine; pp.109, 101-150, Bk.II, p.101.
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of his Histoire Naturelle he states quite simply that:
"La Nature est plus belle que l'Art”.**
It is not surprising, then, to find him strongly supporting
maternal breast-feeding:
"Si les meres", he says, "nourrissoient leurs 
enfans, il y a apparence qu'ils en seroient 
plus forts et plus vigoureux"
Buffon's reasons for supporting Nature in this case are 
those of the scientist rather than those of the philosopher 
They are based on the idea that the mother's milk, provided 
by Nature for her particular child, must be more suitable
(a)
for that child than the milk of another woman. ^  ^ In 
addition, he sees the resulting advantages as a physical 
rather than a moral issue.
Buffon also advocates a general proscription of 
swaddling bands, once again basing his point of view on 
observation rather than on any kind of naturalistic 
idealism. He is convinced of the physical superiority 
of the children of more primitive peoples who have never 
known the constraint of swaddling clothes.^ His general
1. Buffon: Histoire naturelle. Paris, 1749. Vol.II, p.37.
2. Ibid., p.474.
3. Ibid., pp.457-8.
(a) This is the theory of analogy widely held in the 
eighteenth century, i.e. the physical composition 
of the child is identical to that of the mother.
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educational system is based on the idea that the best 
education is that which is fitted to the child's natural 
capacities:
"la meilleure de toutes les educations est celle 
qui est la plus ordinaire, celle par laquelle
on ne force pas la Nature, celle qui est le
moins sévère, celle qui est le çlus proportionnée, 
je ne dis pas aux forces, mais a la foiblesse de 
1* enfant".1
This does not mean to say, however, that Buffon 
completely disregards the possibilities of human art.
On several occasions he notes its usefulness: art can be
2
used during the cutting of teeth to relieve natural pain,
wine might be used to cure worms,^ while goat's milk might
be effectively used to supplement human milk after the
first few months of feeding.^ At one point he even
condemns the errors to which Nature can and does expose
us with regard to the working of the s e n s e s , a n d  concludes
that here art can and must help original Nature:
"L'excellence des sens vient de la nature, mais 
l'art et l'habitude peuvent leur donner aussi 
un plus grand degré de perfection; il ne faut 
pas pour cela que les exercer souvent et 
longtemps sur les memes objets".5
The latter is, of course, merely a case of using natural 
means of perfecting original Nature, and we shall find a
1. Buffon, op.cit.. Vol.II, p.477.
2. Ibid., p.466.
3. Ibid., p.470.
4. Ibid., p.463.
5. Ibid., Vol.Ill, p.312.
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similar conception with Rousseau. As for the other 
examples, if Buffon appears sometimes undecided in his 
support of Nature, it is usually because observation has 
taught him that, in certain cases. Nature can be 
effectively helped by man.
Sometimes, however, Buffon*s support of Art is the 
result of a philosophical attitude. He feels that man is 
further from an instinctively natural state than are other 
animals, but that he has been given a reflective faculty 
which enables him to consider Nature and supplement her 
works wherever necessary, creating ultimately "une Nature 
nouvelle".  ^ But, the underlying theme of his work is the 
superiority of Nature and natural methods over art. There 
is a "natural order" which must be followed, and which is 
the only way by which man can obtain true happiness:
"tout ce que nous voulons au delà de ce que la 
Nature peut nous donner, est peine et ... rien 
n*est plaisir que ce qu'elle nous offre"2
Such general considerations do, of course, belong more
to the field of philosophical hypothesis than scientific
observation, but, as we have seen, as far as physical
education is concerned, Buffon relies much more on
arguments based on scientific observation than on
philosophical idealism.
1. Buffon, op.cit.. Vol.XII, pp.xii-xiii.
2. Ibid., Vol.IV, pp.44-45.
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Vandermonde, a surgeon trained in the schools of 
the University of Paris, though interested in the same 
questions; maternal breast-feeding, swaddling-bands etc., 
holds very different basic tenets te both Brouzet and 
Buffon. The title of his book: Essai sur la manière de 
perfectionner l'espèce humaine, implies that human art 
can itself improve on Nature and form an ideal or perfect 
human-being.
His stand-point is, however, not entirely clear cut. 
Like Brouzet and Buffon with regard to naturalism,
Vandermonde does not advocate merely artificial means of 
reform, but tends to sway between Nature and Art. The 
first section of his book gives the impression that he 
believes, in a manner somewhat similar to that of Buffon, 
that man has lost his primitive naturalness, and, as a 
result, must employ art as a means of regaining original 
Nature. It soon becomes obvious, however, that Vandermonde's 
conception of Nature is basically different te that of 
Brouzet and Buffon. Whereas they are dealing with an 
environmental, physical nature of which man is an integral 
part, Vandermonde is interested in the Platonic conception 
of an ideal Nature. Por him, the Nature to be attained is:
"non pas comme elle se présente le plus souvent;
mais comme elle doit être".1
1. Vandermonde: op.cit., p.23. The underlining is mine.
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Vandermonde* s basic idea is, then, not that original 
nature is right and good, (as Brouzet and Buffon believe), 
but that there exists an ideal of human perfection (Nature) 
which can be attained through Art.
This idea leads him to elaborate schemes of breeding 
based on a technique similar to that used with cattle, 
sheep, dogs etc. This would presumably lead to the 
formation of physically superior and more perfect or 
"natural" human-beings. Human intelligence is to be the 
guide throughout but for Vandermonde it is not, as it 
was for Brouzet, merely a gift from Nature; it is rather, 
the quality which renders man superior to Nature. As a 
result. Nature exists merely in order to be useful to man.
He concedes that Nature can undoubtedly deal successfully 
with some matters, but art, the result of human intelligence, 
is, throughout. Nature's vital auxiliary.
Let us look at his attitude towards childbirth, 
for example. Birth, he says, is usually the work of 
Nature, and an operation in which human Art may even be 
dangerous, but, in difficult cases, it passes entirely 
into the hands of Art, which often succeeds where Nature 
would inevitably fail. This is one of the triumphs of 
Art. ^
1. Vandermonde: op.cit., pp.429-431.
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There are moments when Vandermonde seems a little 
confused about his definition of Nature, and takes up the 
cause of environmental, physical Nature as conceived by 
Brouzet and Buffon. His proscription of swaddling bands 
is one example of this:
"Meres barbares!" he complains, "pourquoi rendre 
vos enfans malheureux ... Imitons les sauvages 
qui sont en cette partie moins blâmables que 
nous ... Ils se contentent de couvrir leurs 
enfans, sans les emmailloter. Cependant on 
voit rarement chez eux des boiteux et des bossus.
Ils s'éloignent moins de la nature, et en cela 
ils sont plus parfaits que nous".1
This is, however, merely employing natural methods when
they appear more satisfactory than artificial ones for
perfecting the human race. The basic idea of man's
ability to direct Nature and Vandermonde's definition of
Nature as "original perfection" remain the same.
Again, on the question of infant feeding Vandermonde
appears as the supporter of Nature. He first argues that,
as the child's mother can provide her offspring with all
he needs in the way of food, breast-feeding is advisable,
particularly as, in addition, it leads to a tender bond
of affection between mother and child. However, he no
sooner reaches this point than he realises that his
argument is no longer valid. Like many of his
1. Vandermonde, op.cit., pp.28-29.
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contemporaries, he sees that human nature is now so 
depraved that there can no longer be any tender bond.
All the mother does now is pass on bad qualities to her 
child. And so, Vandermonde abolishes corrupted nature 
and resorts to art:
"On ne peut mieux faire que d'avoir recours au 
lait des bêtes domestiques".'
If this is not sufficient, an approved "bouillie",
invented by Vandermonde, could be used; i.e. "mie de
pain bien cuit et du lait", with perhaps yolk of egg,
or a "bouillon" made from the flesh of old animals which
2
have been boiled and roasted. This, according to 
Vandermonde is the only sure way of achieving the 
regeneration and the perfection of the human race.^
Throughout his book, we are faced by the idea of 
our responsibility and power to improve on Nature:
"Faisons pour nos enfans ce que l'on a fait pour 
nous. Faisons plus, rendons-les parfaits; 
rectifions leurs esprits. Corrigeons leurs 
difformités, et faisons germer dans leurs tendres 
parties la force et la santé".4
i.e. we can change nature both physically:
"Les parens ne peuvent mieux faire que d'aider 
la nature, en diminuant son fardeau. Ils doivent 
accoutumer leurs enfans à marcher dans le plus 
bas â^e, les forcer à le faire en les permettant 
des récompenses ...."5
1. Vandermonde, op.cit., p.88.
2. Ibid., p.103.
3. Ibid., pp.106-107.
4. Ibid., p.3.
5. Ibid., p.124.
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and morally:
"II ne faut pas attendre, pour combattre les 
passions, qu'elles soient assez fortes pour 
résister aux efforts de la raison et de 
1'éducation".1
The latter is a matter of consistently destroying the
supposedly pernicious "natural" characteristics, and
artificially creating good ones.
Briefly, Vandermonde's philosophy is a constant
opposition to all that is natural (i.e. as created by
Nature and untouched by man). This results from his
fundamental belief that true Nature is not present and
real, but has to be recreated, and can only be done so
through Art, which is the product of human intelligence.
Natural methods of physical education may sometimes be
successful (childbirth and freedom of limbs), but, for
the most part, artificial or anti-natural methods (feeding,
physical and moral exercise) are more successful. Natural
methods are only employed when they effectively improve
human nature. This, of course, differs basically from
the ideas of Brouzet and Buffon. The former attempts to
reconcile art with nature, of which it is merely a product
("un présent de la Nature"), while the latter is convinced
of the ultimate superiority of nature to art ("la Nature
1. Vandermonde, op.cit., p.172.
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est plus belle que l'Art"). Both see the natural order
as something which has been lost, the inspiration of which,
however, is to be remained close to, although it may be
modified in the light of natural human intelligence.
These, then, are the two trends. How can we best
describe Rousseau's position in relation to them?
His basic educational theory is, we might say, an
(a)attempt at synthesis.^ * From the start he is aware of 
the existing opposition between art and nature, and tries 
to resolve the problem involved right from the beginning.^ 
Education, as he sees it, is most definitely an art. Since 
man has lost his original place in the order of the universe, 
or Natural Order, education is the only means by which this 
can be regained, and will thus depend on the skill of human 
intelligence. But to regain Nature, Rousseau is not 
prepared to employ artificial means, only natural ones, 
in the sense of Brouzet and Buffon. Thus, we find 
throughout Emile, admonitions similar to:
1. Emile. Gamier, 1904, pp.3-7.
(a) The idea of synthesis was present at an early date in 
Rousseau's thought. In the Confessions he says:
"Je commenpois par quelque livre de philosophie, comme , 
la Logique de Fort-royal, l'Essai de Locke, Mallebrance, 
Leibnitz, Descartes, etc. Je m'apperçus bientôt que ^ 
tous ces auteurs étoient entre eux en contradiction 
presque perpétuelle, et je formai le chimérique projet
de les accorder, ..... " Pléiade edition, p.237.
He gave this up as beyond his powers at the time of his 
studies at Les Charmettes.
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"Observez la nature, et suivez la route qu'elle 
vous trace".1
The section of Emile which deals with child-care and 
physical education is an outstanding exposition of a 
naturalistic philosophy. In it Rousseau discards, for 
example, the long-established and so far unattacked 
tradition of adding wine to the water in which the new­
born child is washed. His arguments, though dressed in 
scientific garb are, basically, entirely philosophical:
"Comme la nature ne produit rien de fermenté, 
il n'est pas à croire que l'usage d'une liqueur p 
artificielle importe à la vie de ses créatures".
This kind of ideological reasoning occurs time and again 
in Emile. For example, Rousseau advocates maternal breast­
feeding, or, at worst, human milk other than that of the 
mother, on moral rather than physical grounds :
"Mais que les mères daignent nourrir leurs 
enfants, les moeurs vont se réformer d'elles- 
mêmes, les sentiments de la nature se réveiller 
dans tous les c o e u rs " .3
He recommends a purely vegetarian diet, maintaining that,
since children rarely enjoy eating meat, it cannot be
man's natural food;^ another philosophical conviction
disguised in scanty scientific garb. He proscribes
1. Emile, p.15.
2. Ibid. p.32.
3. Ibid. p.14.
4. Ibid. p.161.
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doctors and advocates the superiority of natural means of 
recovery, on the grounds that they help men face death
courageously, and suffer less ultimately. He proscribes
2  ^
swaddling-bands, and the use of elaborate rattles.-^
He recommends loose, simple clothes,^ and a mere piece
of wood for a teething-ring.On all these points his
g
arguments are as much of a moral as a physical order.
All this is, however, counterbalanced by another 
theme running through the book, that of art helping nature. 
The best examples to illustrate this are the passage on 
the prevention of habit-forming, and the training of the 
senses. Here we see art working through purely natural 
channels; e.g. the child must learn to judge through the 
exercise of his senses. This can be done either by means 
of his own accidental experience, or through exercises 
carefully contrived by the child's tutor; e.g. Rousseau's
n
idea of nocturnal games to improve the sense of touch.'
Clearly then, what Rousseau does object to is not 
art directing nature, but art alone, or anything which is
1. Emile, pp.24-26.
2. Ibid., p.46.
3. Ibid., p.46.
4. Ibid., p.123.
5. Ibid., p.46.
6. See, for example, p.46. Practical advice - ivory etc. 
too hard for gums: moral advice - gold, precious 
stones, signs of unnecessary luxury.
7. Ibid., pp.137-138.
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obviously anti-natural. He condemns the use of ready­
made instruments, geometrical or otherwise, because he 
believes they only serve to dull the senses, and, as a 
result, the judgements derived from the senses. The child 
must invent and manufacture (with the help of his tutor) 
all he needs in the way of instruments. Then:
"quand nous mettons à fabriquer ces machines 
l'adresse (jui nous en tenait lieu, quand nous 
employons a les faire la sagacité qu'il fallait 
pour nous en passer, nous gagnons sans rien
perdre, nous ajoutons l'art a la nature, et
nous devenons plus ingénieux sans devenir 
moins adroit".1
When defining Rousseau's position in the current 
of eighteenth century thought on physical education, we 
must, then, place him alongside Brouzet and Buffon rather 
than Vandermonde, despite the underlying attempt at 
synthesis of his educational theory as a whole. For, 
as far as detail is concerned, his philosophy is, as we
have seen, entirely naturalistic. Unlike Vandermonde he
refuses to support artificial methods of any kind in 
infant education.
It is interesting to note when reading Brouzet, 
Vandermonde, Rousseau etc. the degree of consistency with 
which Rousseau supports Nature. He is much more constant 
in his opinions than even Buffon. Whereas the others lack
1. Emile: p.191.
61
ideological conviction, and fail to link up their examples 
with a basic, coherent philosophy, Rousseau reveals himself 
as a confirmed moralist. All his scientific arguments 
merely disguise a profound philosophical conviction. It 
is this which causes Rousseau to stand out amongst the 
others, and which makes his work so much more exciting 
than theirs. Here is a man who is not afraid to hold on 
to his belief and follow it through to the point of 
exaggeration.
It is this which probably caused a stir at the 
publication of Emile rather than any question of the 
novelty of the ideas expressed. Consequently, our task 
is not to examine any and every work on child education 
posterior to Emile in an attempt to find similar ideas, 
but simply those which either make direct references to 
Emile, or which are obviously influenced by, or show a 
reaction to, an extreme naturalistic philosophy.
For clarity's sake, the information we have 
concerning Rousseau's reputation in the field of physical 
education during the period 1762 to 1790 will first be 
examined in connection with the practical issues of the 
campaign, i.e., swaddling-bands, maternal breast-feeding, 
cold baths, etc., and will then be discussed in connection 
with the development of the ideological concepts related 
to these.
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B. Reactions to Rousseau's ideas on physical education
One of the first repercussions concerning Rousseau's
ideas on physical education as expressed in Emile, is to he
found in Cajot's collection of alleged plagiarisms. Four
years after the publication of Emile. Oajot drew attention
to the marked similarity of Rousseau's ideas with those of
his predecessors, both ancient and modern. One of his
most controversial parallels compared Rousseau's ideas
on the physical education of the young child with those
of Doctor Jean-Charles Désessartz, whose book on this
subject had appeared in 1760. Oajot's accusation of
plagiarism on Rousseau's part, centres around the supposed
similarity of Rousseau's and Désessartz's condemnation of
swaddling-bands. To "prove" that Rousseau is nothing but
2
a mere "Copiste", Cajot quotes two lengthy passages, one 
from each author, in which it is undoubtedly easy to find 
similar arguments, although these are phrased in strikingly 
different language. For instance, both authors insist on 
the danger of swaddling-bands to the body's circulation. 
Désessartz maintains:
1. Désessartz (J.-Ch.): Traité de 1'éducation corporelle 
des enfans en bas âge. Paris. 1760.
2. Cajot, op.cit., p.62.
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"Les vaisseaux qui se distribuent à la peau et 
aux muscles, retenus par cette forte compression, 
ne peuvent recevoir qu'une tres-^petite quantité 
de sang, et ce qu'ils en reçoivent ne coule que 
difficilement ..."1
Rousseau argues:
"L'inaction, la contrainte où l'on retient les 
membres d'un enfant, ne peuvent que gêner la 
circulation du sang, des humeurs, empêcher 
l'enfant de se fortifier, de croître et 'altérer 
sa constitution .... Quand l'enfant est bien lié, 
on le jette dans un coin, sans s'embarasser de 
ses cris .... Tous ceux qu'on a trouvés dans 
cette situation avoient le visage violet; la 
poitrine fortement compriméene laissant pas 
circuler le sang, il remontoit à la tête # e e #
Rousseau's somewhat non-medical description, culminating
in the vivid detail of the swathed child turning purple
in its bands, can hardly be seriously described as mere
copying from Désessartz's strictly medical analysis.
Again, the idea that those who do not use swaddling-
bands are rarely (Rousseau actually says never) deformed,
is not merely common to both Rousseau and Désessartz;
their arguments might well be paralleled with Buffon's
arguments on the physical superiority of savages,^ or
Vandermonde's passage:
"Imitons les sauvages qui sont en cette partie
moins blâmables que nous ... Ils se contentent
de couvrir leurs enfans, sans les emmailloter. . 
Cependant, on voit rarement chez eux des bossus".
1. Quoted by Cajot, p.59.
2. Cajot, p.62. ErnU^, pl>'10 ‘
3. Buffon, Histoire naturelle. Vol.II, pp.457-458.
4. Vandermonde: op.cit., pp.28-29.
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It is obvious from our earlier discussion that most of the 
topics and arguments common to Désessartz and Rousseau on 
the subject of swaddling-bands, maternal breast-feeding, 
etc., were already sufficiently well discussed by 1760 to 
discourage any search for direct copying on the part of a 
particular author. These ideas must be seen as part of a 
general movement, in which the same ideas, variously 
expressed, were often repeated. However striking the 
similarities which they contain may be, these do not 
conclusively suggest plagiarism.
However, the controversy concerning Désessartz 
has proved singularly persistent. After long years of 
silence, and after the death of both Rousseau and his 
alleged witness, Alexis Piron, Désessartz renewed the 
attack widening the accusation of plagiarism to include 
most of Rousseau's remarks on the early physical education 
of the young child:
"En 1762, J.J. Rousseau publia son Emile. Sa 
plume enchanteresse a disséminé dans le premier 
volume les mêmes principes sur l'allaitement 
maternel, sur le coucher, l'habillement, la 
nourriture, le sevrage des enfans, sur le choix 
d'une nourrice étrangère etc., que j'ai développés 
par ordre et avec méthode dans mon Traité;"
the only exceptions being:
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"L'usage de l'eau froide pour le nettoiement 
des enfans nouveausjnés, pour les baigner, . / \ 
celui de les laisser presque tout nuds ...  ^ '
The accusation, however, did not remain a simple
matter of easily debateable parallel ideas. Désessartz
added an air of authenticity by implicating Alexis Piron,
who, according to Désessartz, knowing that Rousseau
intended to start his treatise from the moment Emile left
the wet nurse's hands, encouraged him to start from birth,
filling in any gaps in his own knowledge of the subject
from Désessartz's book, a copy of which Piron is supposed
2
to have supplied.
The whole question has been much discussed. In 
1908, M. Ad. d'Espine published an article in the 
Bulletin de 1 'Académie de Médecine, in which he claimed 
that Rousseau only met Alexis Piron for the first time in 
1771.^ He based his information on J. Duseaulx, who 
published his De mes rapports avec J.J. Rousseau et de 
notre correspondance in 1798 (An VII), i.e. slightly 
before Désessartz's accusation, which was published
1. Désessartz: op.cit.. An VIII edition. Avertissement, 
p.viii.
2. Désessartz: Ibid., p.ix.
3. Vol.LIX, p.608.
(a) This is Désessartz's interpretation of Rousseau's
ideas in 1798. It is important to note that Rousseau 
did not recommend cold water for the new-born child. 
Por the gradual attribution of this idea to Rousseau, 
see pp.SO-^l , S t ,
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An VIII (1798-9). Duseaulx relates how, on Piron*s fête 
day, he invited Rousseau to meet Piron, and reports that 
Piron, who had extremely had eye-sight, on hearing voices, 
asked eagerly: "Qui donc est-là? Est-ce Jean-Jacques?"
On Rousseau* s reply to the affirmative, he seized his 
hand and, pressing it to his breast, recited the Nunc 
Dimittis. As Dr. d'Espine points out, this has all the 
appearance of a first meeting, although this does not 
exclude the possibility that Rousseau had previously 
corresponded with Piron. So far, however, we have no 
evidence of this either in the way of contemporary 
testimony or correspondence.
Dr. d'Espine, however, offered a further point, 
which deals with the dates of the composition of Emile.  ^
Various aspects of this have since been discussed more 
fully by Léopold Pavre,^ Masson,^ Ravier,^ and, more 
recently, by Peter D. Jimack, whose analysis takes the 
arguments of his predecessors into consideration.  ^ With 
Pavre, Jimack claims that the Pavre manuscript (designated 
by P) shows every sign of being a first complete draft of
1. D'Espine: op.cit., pp.608-610.
2. In the AJJR. 1912.
3. Masson: op.cit.
4. Ravier: L'éducation de l'homme nouveau. 1941.
5. Jimack: op.cit., pp.15-43.
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1
Emile. His evidence that the creation of an imaginary
pupil only occurs half-way through E., and that the name
Emile has been subsequently inserted in the earlier part
of the text, together with the fact that a rough plan of
the treatise, found in the margin towards the beginning
of P., and presumably as Rousseau envisaged it near the
beginning of the composition of P., in no way corresponds
to the finished manuscript, seems to prove fairly
conclusively that P. is indeed the original complete
draft of Emile. Dr. Jimack maintains that he can safely
date this manuscript between late 1758 or early 1759 and
2
November or December 1759, i.e. well before the publication 
of Désessartz's book. Although some of the details on 
physical education are missing from P., (notably the 
discussion on milk and the passage against doctors)
Dr. Jimack points out that in it Rousseau certainly deals 
with the child right from birth, and not, as Désessartz*s 
accusation claims, from the time the child leaves his 
wet-nurse. In addition, Dr. Jimack claims that he can 
also date the later manuscript, which he denotes as B., 
and which, taken together with P., gives us more or less
1. Jimack: op.cit., p.16.
2. Ibid., p.43.
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the final text, prior to January 1760, in which case, 
very few points could even be considered as being possibly 
inspired by a reading of Désessartz.
Unless conclusive, contradictory evidence were to 
be found, we can only conclude that Cajot and Désessartz*s 
combined accusation is a mere fabrication. As far as 
Cajot is concerned, it can be dismissed along with his 
countless other accusations; as far as Désessartz is 
concerned, it can only be interpreted as the work of 
jealousy. Probably embittered by the lack of success 
of his own work:
"mon livre, ...., seroit donc resté inconnu, 
sans le compte qu'en avoit rendu l'auteur du 
journal de Trévoux, sans l'estime que 
témoignent en faire quelques savans. entre 
les mains desquels il etoit t o m b é , "2
and the apparent success of Rousseau's similar arguments.
1. Jimack, op.cit., p.43.
2. Désessartz: An VIII edition, p.vii.
(a) Dr. Jimack does, in fact, discuss two possible points 
of comparison. See op.cit., p.364.
(b) It has also been suggested that Rousseau asked his 
publisher to send him a copy of Désessartz's book 
in October 1761 (letter of 19 Oct. 1761 to Duchesne, 
GU1147). In this letter Rousseau refers to "un
nouveau livre sur l'éducation médicinale des enfants"
which he would like to read. If, in fact, this is 
Désessartz's book, we can certainly say that Rousseau 
did not know his work until after the completion of 
all three existing manuscripts of Emile. See Jimack, 
op.cit.. Note p.363, and the dating of the 
manuscripts pp.15-43.
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he was encouraged to support in the Preface of his 1798
edition an accusation which had already been conveniently
levelled on his behalf. By 1798 he had nothing to lose,
(a)the accused and the witness were both dead. '
Another writer whose name was involved in an 
accusation of plagiarism concerning Emile was Jacques 
Balexserd^^\ whose book on the education of the young 
child, published in the same year as Emile, is said by 
Désessartz in his bibliography to have achieved considerable 
success. This time Rousseau was the accuser not the accused 
In his Confessions he complains:
1. Confessions, Pléiade edition, p.575.
(a) It is interesting to see that, despite his accusation, 
Désessartz openly acknowledged Rousseau's success with 
regard to maternal breast-feeding. See quotation p. 14.
(b) Balexserd and Désessartz are not one and the same person 
as Dr. Tash imagines, op.cit., p.5.
Jacques Balexserd, a Genevan doctor, was born in 1726 
and died in 1774. He is known for two works :
(1) His Dissertation sur l'éducation physique des 
enfants (1762).
(2) A Dissertation sur les causes principales de la
mort d'un aussi grand nombre d'enfants ....
which obtained a prize at the Academy of Mantua 
in 1773.
Jean-Charles Désessartz. a French doctor, was born in 
1729 and died only in 1811 - His works are:
(1) Traité de 1'éducation corporelle des enfants ...
------------------
(2) Mémoire sur le croup. (1807).
(3) Recueil de Discours. Mémoires et Observations de 
médecine clinique^ (l811). [
(4) An edition of Jean-Préderic Carthenser's Matière 
Médicale. [176911
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"Peu de jours avant ou après la publication de 
mon livre; car je ne me rappelle pas bien 
exactement le tems, parut un autre ouvrage sur 
le même sujet tiré mot à mot de mon premier 
volume j, hors quelques platises dont on avoit 
entremêlé cet extrait. Ce livre portoit le 
nom d'un Genevois appellé Balexserd, et il 
étoit dit dans le titre qu'il avoit remporté 
le prix à 1'Académie de Harlem".
He maintains that both the Academy and the prize had been
invented to lend an air of authenticity to a work which
was, otherwise, mere plagiarism. He even goes so far as
to see a whole plot behind it, whereby either his
manuscript had been secretly handed over to Balexserd,
or the story of the prize invented, in order to ruin the
success of Emile. The accusation obviously has its roots
in Rousseau's propensity to see himself surrounded by
plots and enemies, all intent on destroying, or in some
(a)way, harming his Emile.  ^ ^
Records^^^ show that, in 1761, the Société
(a) cf. Bernard Gagnebin's opinion in the Pléiade edition 
of the Confessions, p.1556, Note 3.
(b) Tl^  ^ Verhandelingen nitgegeeven door de Hollandsche 
Maaxschappye derWe/tenschappen. te Haarlem. Vol.III.
Pt.I, Haarlem 17^3 reports: (pp.x-xi),
"Be Vraag in het Jaar 1761, voor de eerstemal opgegeeven 
om beantwoord te worden voor den eersten Maart van het 
Jaar 1762, (wa6 is het beste bestier, het_geen men moet 
houden omtrent het ligehaam der Kinderen, zoo met 
obzicht tot hunne kleeding, voedsel oeffening als anders, 
van hunne geboorte af geduurende hunne kindshekf, om ze 
lang en gezond te doen leeven?) is geoordeeld best 
beantwoord te zyn door den Schryver onder der 
Zinspreuke No. 35. Sartam et tectam ab omnique
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Hollandaise des Sciences (or the Haarlem Academy) did in 
fact hold a competition on the subject: "Quelle est la 
meilleure direction à suivre dans l'habillement, la 
nourriture, et les exercices des enfans depuis le moment 
où ils naissent jusqu'à leur adolescence, pour qu'ils 
vivent longtemps et en Santé", and that, in May 1762, the 
prize was awarded to Jacques Balexsert (or Ballexserd), a 
Genevan doctor in practice in Paris. His essay was 
published in Paris later that year under the title: 
Dissertation sur 1'éducation physique des enfans depuis 
leur naissance .iusqu'a l'âge de la puberté. The same 
arguments apply to both the controversy concerning 
Désessartz and that concerning Balexserd. Although 
Balexserd's work contains marked similarities to Rousseau's 
ideas on child care, it would be difficult to point to a 
definite example of plagiarism, and we must see their 
ideas in the context of a general movement of thought
(b) (Continued)
molestia et incommodo servate prolem inde sanitas. 
robur et longaevitas; waarvan by het openen van 
het billet bleek, dat de Aucteur was Jacques 
Ballexserd, Citoyen de Geneve, demeurant a Paris 
place Dauphine; denwelken derhalven de prys der 
Goude Médaillé is gegeeven".
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developing rapidly during the 1750's and early sixties.
Despite this profusion of theoretical works on 
physical education, there is a striking lack of practical 
effects before 1760. None of the writers claim success. 
Their general attitude is one of criticism of the abuses 
of the century in which they live, and pessimism as to the 
likely impact of their campaign.
In the years immediately following the publication 
of Emile, books on physical education continue in the same 
vein, criticising abuse, recommending reforms, expecting 
success only in the distant future. Rousseau's more 
dynamic approach to the subject appears either to pass 
unnoticed or to be deliberately ignored by the educational 
theorists. This may well be, as has already been suggested 
in the Introduction,^ partly because Emile was a condemned 
book, and partly because Rousseau's reputation as an 
authority on education was as yet unmade.
However, if the physical educationalists ignore 
Emile, this is not so true of the non-specialists. The
1. See p p . .
(a) Bernard Gagnebin (Confessions, p.1556) mentions the 
accusation and interprets it as a mere phantasma of 
Rousseau's imagination.
(b) of. Mercier's insistence on this lack of success, 
op.cit., pp.158-159.
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author of the article on Emile in the Journal des Scavans 
makes two or three comments on Rousseau's ideas in this 
field. He agrees with him on the subject of swaddling 
bands, but disagrees about exposing children to the 
inclemencies of the seasons, regardless of their
i
constitution. He also supports Rousseau's passage on 
maternal breast-feeding, but criticises his approach to 
the subject:
"Ce que l'on sçait encore, et que vous avez 
très-bien prouvé, c'est que la mere est la
nourrice naturelle de son enfant  Mais
n'auriez-vous pas eu raison, quand vous vous 
seriez abstenu de répandre sur la vérité des 
torrens de bile ..."2
In his Anti-Emile of 1763 Eormey also mentions one 
or two points on physical education. He supports the old 
practice of remodelling the child's head, which Rousseau 
had strongly condemned,^ arguing that if the head suffers 
during birth and the original shape is damaged, all the 
midwife does is restore the original s h a p e . H e  is, no 
doubt, implying by this that there is no question of the 
midwife arbitrarily remodelling the child's head in order 
to suit the whims of fashion, which is the point Rousseau
1. Journal des Scavans. Tome LXXI, p.237.
2. Ibid., pp.237-8.
3. Emile, p.9.
4. Pormey, Anti-Emile. 1763, p.27.
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was in fact attacking. Pormey also supports swaddling- 
bands merely on the grounds that there are "good reasons" 
for having them.
Despite silence concerning Emile on the part of 
writers on physical education during the years immediately 
following its publication, it is important to be aware of 
the progress and development of their ideas and comments
during this period. The year after the publication of
2
Emile, another prize essay again set by the Haarlem 
Academy, and the work of a Genevan doctor, David, appeared 
in Paris. The question was entirely restricted to breast­
feeding, and was intended to counteract the dangers to 
which women exposed themselves by not feeding the children 
to whom they had given birth. By this time, the author 
seems to have entirely despaired of achieving any reform, 
and restricts himself to practical remedies:
"Tous les Médecins jusqu'ici se sont récriés 
sur 1'irrégularité de la conduite des femmes 
qui ne nourrissent pas leurs enfans. Ils leur 
ont fait voir tous les accidens qui peuvent 
leur arriver, et on peut dire que c'est sans 
fruit ; en effet nous voyons avec regret qu'elles 
ne deviennent pas plus sages, au contraire le 
mal empire, les accidens se multiplient et les 
secours manquent; c'est pourquoi, sans perdre
1. Pormey, op.cit., p.27.
2. David: Ce qu'il convient de faire pour augmenter.
diminuer, ou supprimer le lait des femmes. Paris. 
—   ------------------------------------------
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de terns à blâmer un abus qu'on ne peut arrêter, 
cherchons, en approfondissant chaque partie de 
la question proposée, des secours contre les 
accidens, qui naissent d'un abus si général".
A topic which gains in importance during the period
after Emile, to such an extent that it can subsequently be
placed alongside the highly discussed problems of maternal
breast-feeding and swaddling-bands, is the question of
cold baths, already recommended by Buffon, and supported
by Rousseau, though with limitations. In 1761, another
Swiss doctor, Tissot, had recommended, not, as Rousseau
does, that the child should be gradually introduced to
cold baths, but that it should be plunged into cold water
only a few days after birth, and without any preliminary 
2
preparations. He recommends this particularly for
delicate children, on the grounds that it will strengthen
them. The first edition of his book, published in Lausanne
in 1761, was apparently so successful that in 1764 he
brought out a second edition, this time published in Lyons,
and containing additions to the section on child-care.
In it he claims that the value of the cold bath has
already been proved by practical examples:
"J'ai le plaisir de voir, que depuis que j'ai
cherché a l'introduire ici (i.e. in Switzerland),
que plusieurs meres, les plus tendres et les plus 
raisonnables, l'ont employé avec le plus grand 
_______ succès".3_____________________________________________
1. David: op.cit., p.28.
2. Tissot: Avis au peuple sur sa santé. Lyon 1764, p.465.
3. Ibid., op.cit., p.466.
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(a)
He makes no reference to Rousseau's ideas on this subject.
Another supporter of cold baths is Madame Anel
Lerebours. In her Avis aux meres qui veulent nourrir (1767)
she advises:
"Dans la belle saison, il faut laver tout le 
corps des enfans avec de l'eau froide: cette .
pratique leur fortifie les joues et les reins".
In winter she considers it sufficient to wash the thighs
alone in cold water. She acknowledges no sources for this
idea, though her references to Tissot on other subjects
suggest that she may be following him.
Lerebours also adds her voice to those who advocate
maternal breast-feeding, though with one important
difference: she now points out that this is already
practised:
1. Lerebours, op.cit., p.68.
(a) Although Tissot makes no reference to Rousseau in the 
later editions of the Avis au peuple, he certainly 
knew Emile. Several letters exist between Rousseau and 
Tissot, in one of which Tissot mentions their similar 
insistence on the importance of observation for 
achieving success in medicine and their differences 
elsewhere:
"Vous verres. Monsieur, dans I'Avis au Peuple 
p.520, que nous pensons presque de même sur 
cette science; si nous différons sur quelques 
articles, cest que j'ai tort sur quelques uns, 
et il ne peut point y avoir de regies générales 
sur quelques autres, nous avons fait nos regies 
particulières pour des cas différents".
AJJR. Vol.VII, 1911, p.21.
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"Je vois, avec plaisir, que la plupart des meres 
désirent de pouvoir nourrir leurs enfans; et ne 
les livrent a des étrangères que par un funeste 
effet de l'usage et des préjugés, que plusieurs, 
malgré les oppositions sans nombre qu'elles ont 
à combattre sçavent braver toutes les difficultés 
et méritent par là le titre de vraies meres ...1
It is impossible to tell, however, whether this minority
group had always existed, whether it is the beginnings
of social change, or whether Lerebours merely thinks this
a more subtle form of persuasion to declare that the first
steps, i.e., the most difficult for the prejudiced reader,
have already been taken. Later evidence suggests, however,
that this is probably the beginnings of social change.
On the subject of maternal breast-feeding, and the
disadvantages of the wet-nurse, she refers her readers to
Tissot, Locke, Montaigne "et plusieurs autres Ecrivains 
2
célèbres", whom she fails to mention individually. She 
includes two long quotations on the subject from 
Bermingham and Pavorinus. There is no reference to Rousseau.
She also joins the old campaign against swaddling- 
bands, which she maintains are already disappearing:
"Je ne m'étendrai pas sur les inconvénients qui 
résultent de l'usage des bandes, parce que je 
vois qu'on en a reconnu les mauvais effets".3 (a)
1. Lerebours, op.cit., p.xv.
2. Ibid., p.55.
3. Ibid., pp.60-61.
(a) Mercier also insists on the disappearance of swaddling- 
bands around this period, p.159.
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She does not attribute this reform to any particular
doctor or writer.
The first writer on physical education to make a
direct reference to Rousseau on this subject seems to be
the Abbé Coyer. In 1770, he brought out a book entitled
Plan d'Education Publique in which he deals with the
question of education, both physical, intellectual and
moral, from birth until adolescence. He complains that,
despite numerous educational projects (he quotes Montaigne
in Prance; Locke and Milton in England), nothing has been
done. In the field of physical education he recommends
(a)Rousseau's ideas^ ' on physical freedom for the young
child, linking his name with that of the already well-
established Locke. He singles them out as authorities
from amongst the crowd of other writers on the same topic:
"Tout ce que dit l'Instituteur d'Emile avec 
1 'Observateur Locke et tant d'autres, sur la 
liberté où on doit laisser le nouveau-né, sans 
maillot, sans bandages, sans ligature, sans 
gêne, sans compression, avec toute la facilité 
de se mouvoir, ... tout cela est d'une vérité 
palpable".^
He makes no attempt to justify Rousseau as an authority on
physical education, which suggests that he is already
1. Coyer: op.cit., p.2.
(a) The fact that he refers to him merely as the
"Instituteur d'Emile" suggests that the book is 
already well-known by 1770.
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accepted by the reading public. Coyer*s tone is not one 
of defence in the face of opposition.
On the subject of maternal breast-feeding Coyer 
merely adds his voice to the general outcry:
"Meres qui n'êtes point Meres, puisque vous 
refusez à vos enfans le lait que la nature 
vous donna pour les nourrir ..."'
emphasising both the general lack of success of the campaign,
and the unlikelihood of it ever achieving success:
"Enchaînés par la coutume, exhortées inutilement 
par de beaux et de bons esprits qui préfèrent 
des ouvrages utiles à des compositions de pur 
agrément; elles n'ont rien fait, elles n'en 
feront rien".2
His proposed solution is the foundation of national schools, 
which should be compulsory from the age of four, and which 
would counterbalance the bad education received at home.
On the subject of cold baths he accepts Tissot's 
suggestion and quotes from him at length.
Since his subject takes him further than the doctors 
solely occupied with child care, he discusses the need for 
a good physical education for school-children. He heartily 
adopts and approves Rousseau's recommendations for 
children's games, and includes a long quotation on this 
topic from Emile.^ Here again he seems to be the first
1. Coyer, op.cit., p.2.
2. Ibid., p.5.
3. ' Ibid., pp.64-66.
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writer to openly support Rousseau on the question of 
physical exercise through suitable games.
In 1771 Pourcroy de Guillerville published a 
collection of letters on physical education which were, 
in fact, written during 1770.  ^ He includes a Lettre d'un 
anonyme au Sieur Godart. sur l'éducation physique des 
Enfans. in which the author recommends, as Rousseau had 
done, the gradual introduction of the child to cold baths.
In his reply, Eourcroy attributes this idea to the "célèbre
2
J.J. Rousseau". Although he maintains that he supports 
many of Rousseau's ideas, he nevertheless disagrees with 
his method concerning cold baths, and even goes so far as 
to ridicule it:
"il avoit une forte distraction quand il a écrit 
cela: car il savoit que le propre de l'eau tiède 
est de ramollir et de relâcher les fibres, ainsi 
que le corps de la peau ... On ne peut même 
s'empêcher de rire, quand on voit cet homme 
extraordinaire vous conseiller de laver votre 
enfant un thermomètre à la main, comme si le 
degré précis de cette eau faisoit quelque chose 
à sa conservation".3
Pourcroy also gives us evidence, (and this is the 
first of its kind), that the idea of the cold bath right 
from birth was being widely attributed to Rousseau. He
1. Pourcroy de G-uillerville: Lettres sur l'éducation 
physique des enfans. Amiens, 1771.
2. Ibid., p.18.
3. Ibid., p.19.
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himself had tried cold baths on his new-born sons, and, 
despite his conscious deviation from Rousseau's method, 
was commonly believed to be bringing up his children 
"à la Jean-Jacques":
"II n'est cependant presque personne qui ne me 
dise que les miens sont élevés à la Jean-Jacques, 
ta^t il est vrai qu'on juge le plus souvent sur 
1'etiquette du sac".^
This is the first evidence we have of the transformation
of Rousseau's ideas on physical education through popular
interpretation and the co-existing, correct interpretation
of an educational theorist.
In 1 7 7 2  another writer, Leroy, draws attention to 
the need for reform in European dress, although he states
o
that this has already been recognised up to a point.
An interesting criticism on his part is that such reform 
as there is is entirely restricted to boys:
"Rous appercevons depuis quelques terns la 
nécessité de nous occuper de l'enfance; mais
iS réforme ne s'étend que sur la moitié de
l'espèce, et l'autre plus belle moitié du 
genre humain reste victime encore de nos 
barbares usages".3
He does not attribute this to the fact that prejudice was
undoubtedly stronger on the question of women's beauty than
on that of men. (In 1767 Anel Lerebours had come to a
1. Pourcroy de Guillerville: op.cit., p.19.
2. Leroy: Recherches sur les habillemens des femmes et des
enfans. Paris, 1772, p.9.
3. Idem.
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compromise on the subject of whale-bone corsets for women
«1
for this very reason.) Although he attributes the 
growing disappearance of the whale-bone corset to Rousseau's 
influence, Leroy at the same time directly reproaches him 
for having concentrated attention in this respect on boys' 
education at the expense of girls':
"Pourquoi l'ingénieux Auteur d'Emile, n'a-t-il 
pas plus insisté sur 1'éducation physique 
nécessaire au beau sexe? Que n'ai-je cette 
énergie d'expression qui le caractérise; car 
la vérité ne triomphe que lorsqu'une bouche 
éloquente 1'annonce"
It is easy to understand that, despite the fact that
Rousseau strongly attacks the use of corsets for women,^
the general distinctions he draws between Sophie's
education and that of Emile may well have led, along
with other factors, to the kind of one-sided reform which
Leroy describes. At all events, this may well have
contributed to the preservation of certain strongly-rooted
prejudices. Leroy's remark suggests that at least one
section of the public had interpreted Sophie's education
as the antithesis of Emile's, and had overlooked Rousseau's
short passages on the disadvantages of corsets and the
advantages of a good physical education for girls.
1. Avis aux meres, pp.82-83.
2. Ibid., p.200.
3. Emile, pp.441-442.
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(a)Leroy indicates elsewhere that Rousseau^  ^ had 
succeeded in convincing the public of "quelques vérités 
utiles". Despite his acknowledgement of Rousseau's success, 
he is quick to censure his criticism of the medical 
faculty, which, Leroy maintains, had Rousseau's ideas 
before Rousseau:
"J'ai vu avec regret ce grand homme payer à la 
nature un tribut de foiblesse en raillant la 
Médecine, dont chaque partie l'occupe tour à 
tour: ce n'est cependant qu' à de légères 
connoissances de cette science qu'il doit le 
petit nombre de vérités qui sont sorties de sa 
plume. Ce n'est pas la premiere fois que les 
gens de lettres ont passé pour les Auteurs des 
opinions qu'ils avoient puisé chez les 
Médecins . ..'*1
This is the first evidence we have of Rousseau's 
growing prestige on a question concerning physical 
education, and his popularity at the expense of doctors 
writing on the same subject. This, together with Coyer's 
and Pourcroy'8 correspondent's recommendations of 
Rousseau's ideas, suggests that the impact of Emile, 
restricted to the issues of physical education, was first 
made on the general public, and only later spread to the 
theorists, who found themselves ultimately obliged to
1. Leroy, op.cit., pp.10-11.
(a) He says: "Un Philosophe moderne est parvenu sous les 
auspices d'un conte ingénieux ...", but the reference 
is obviously to Rousseau "l'ingénieux auteur d'Emile", 
Leroy, op.cit., pp.10 & 200.
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acknowledge his success. It is interesting to note that 
Leroy still insists that Rousseau's success depends on 
his literary style rather than on the strength of his 
ideas.
Leroy too provides us with evidence of the 
misrepresentation of Rousseau's ideas. Already in 1772 
he announces that people had attempted to bring up their 
children after what they thought were the principles of
(a)Emile, and discloses some misunderstanding on their part: '
"J'ai vu ici des enfans qu'on élevoit, disoit-on, 
à la Jean-Jacques. ils portoient des habits serrés 
par une ceinture mal placée, et conséquemment 
dangereuse. Leur tête nue, et dépouillée de 
cheveux, m'inspiroit, malgré moi, l'idée de 
l'esclavage et du deshonneur".^
It is difficult to see where this use of the belt comes
from. Rousseau merely says:
"Ce qu'il y a de mieux à faire est de les laisser 
en jaquette aussi longtemps qu'il est possible, 
puis de donner un vêtement fort large, et de ne se 
point pi<juer de marquer leur taille, ce qui ne 
sert qu'a la déformer"
As for the head, he recommends that the child should go
1. Leroy, op.cit., p.122.
2. Emile, p.123.
(a) Daniel Mornet also notes an anonymous Ecole de la 
vertu of 1772 which complains of "I'abus que font 
les parents des principes de 1'éducation de J.J. 
Rousseau". "L'influence de J.J. Rousseau au XVIIIe 
siècle", p.48.
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bare-headed, but nowhere suggests that the head should 
be shaved:
"Peu ou point de coiffure en toute saison ...
Gomme donc il importe que les os de la tête 
deviennent plus durs, plus compactes, moins 
fragiles et moins poreux, pour mieux armer 
le cerveau non seulement contre les blessures, 
mais contre les rhumes, les fluxions, et toutes 
les impressions de l'air, accoutumez vos enfants 
à demeurer été et hiver, jour et nuit, toujours 
tête nue. Que si, pour la propreté, vous leur 
voulez donner une coiffure durant la nuit, que 
ce soit un bonnet mince à claire-voie, et 
semblable au réseau dans lequel les Basques 
enveloppent leur cheveux".
It is possible that misinterpretation of his ideas 
and the attribution of other writers' ideas to him 
especially that of the cold bath from birth, in part 
caused Rousseau to stress the non-practical intentions 
of Emile, and insist that it was merely a philosophical 
exercise. The fact that his ideas could have dangerous 
results, especially in the hands of extremists, may well 
have been one of the reasons why he subsequently ridiculed
1. Emile: pp.124-5.
(a) "dépouillée" may simply mean that the hair was clipped 
short. However, Leroy says elsewhere: "Les uns ont 
conseillé de laisser découverte celle (i.e. la tête) 
des enfans à leur naissance, les autres ont prescrit 
de la raser" (op.cit., p.116), and likens these 
children to "un jeune arbrisseau, dont on auroit 
arraché le feuillage" (p.122). This and Leroy's 
arguments against attempts to thicken the skull,
(which presumably would not occur if the hair were 
merely cut short; suggests that the head was actually 
shaved.
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(a)his disciples in the practical field. '
Another interesting question which arises from the 
emergence of misinterpretation is the extent to which 
extremism on the part of his followers coincides with the 
delirious enthusiasm of the readers of the Rouvelle 
Héloise. It seems likely that these two reactions may 
be closely connected; enthusiasm for Rousseau the novelist 
might well be coupled with enthusiasm for his ideas as 
expressed in the novel and also in his more serious works.
Leroy also discusses more general aspects of 
physical education. On the subject of cold baths he 
criticises "des Philosophes modernes qui se plaisent à 
marcher dans le chemin des extrêmes", and whose 
inappropriate advice had already led to a number of 
deaths of infants who had been plunged into cold water. 
Rousseau had often been charged with extremism, but it 
is impossible to ascertain whether the reference is to 
him amongst others although earlier comments suggest 
that Rousseau may well have been held responsible for 
the dangerous effects of the cold bath. Leroy in fact
1. Leroy, op.cit., p.325.
(a) J. Lemaitre, for example, mentions the case of a 
M. Ango who had brought up his son according to the 
principles of Emile. On being informed of this, 
Rousseau is reported to have said: "Tant pis. Monsieur, 
tant pis pour vous et pour votre fils." Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, pp.245-246.
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recommends, as Rousseau does, that the child should he 
introduced gradually to cold baths, but he makes no direct 
reference to Rousseau on this subject.
By 1774 Pourcroy de Gruillerville notes another change 
in fashion, this time in favour of maternal breast-feeding:
"On ne peut qu'applaudir à l'espèce de mode qui 
commence à s'introduire chez les Dames, d'allaiter 
elles-mêmes leurs enfans".1 (&)
But, despite this change, reform is obviously far from
being general:
"il en est^par malheur, un trop petit nombre de 
celles -là. Il est étonnant combien a encore 
de force le préjugé contraire".2
Despite his disapproval that Rousseau, a mere 
"philosophe-garçon", undertakes to deal with subjects 
normally the concern of fathers, he has no hesitation 
in attributing a considerable part of the success of the 
campaign, however slight it may be, to Rousseau and his 
Emile, which, he reports, is by now well-known, both for 
its interesting contents and its literary style:
"Le Citoyen de Genève dans son Emile, ne traite 
que par spéculation, du premier période de la 
vie, et des soins qu'il demande. Il est facile 
à un pere éclairé, qui n'a pas quitté ses enfans
1. Pourcroy de Guillerville: Les enfans élevés dans 
l'ordre de la nature. Paris 1783, p.15. Pirst 
edition 1774.
2. Ibid., p.18.
(a) The reasons he gives for their doing so are exactly
the same as those given by earlier writers to encourage 
them to do so. (pp.15-17).
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depuis l'instant de leur naissance, de 
s'appercevoir qu'il en parle en philosophe- 
garçon. et qu'a ce titre il n*avoit aucune 
connoissance des détails du ménage. On voit 
seulement que cet homme de génie, la tête remplie 
de différens systèmes qu'il s'étoit formé, croit 
par-tout en trouver des preuves dans ses 
observations passagères et momentanées sur les 
enfans du premier âge; Malgré tout cela, son 
Livre, qui est fort connu parce qu'il est très- 
intéressant par son sujet et très-bien écrit, a 
détruit une partie des anciens préjugés des 
Nourrices. Il y a meme beaucoup à profiter 
pour ceux qui le liront avec discernement et 
dans cette vue, personne n'ayant mieux démontré 
que lui les avantages réciproques de la lactation 
maternelle pour la Mere et pour l'Enfant. Il a 
sûrement contribué beaucoup à en amener la mode, 
et c'est un grand bien qu'il a fait".1
This indicates fairly clearly the early progress of
Rousseau's reputation: his ideas first adopted by the
general public, and followed to some extent, later
recognised by theorists like Eourcroy, who, though
retaining some of the earlier criticisms of Rousseau,
("cet homme de génie, la tête remplie de différens
systèmes") are, nevertheless, forced to recognise
Rousseau’s growing prestige, and, in turn, acknowledge
the strength of some of his ideas, ("personne n'ayant
mieux démontré que lui les avantages réciproques de la
1. Eourcroy de Guillerville: op.cit., p.29.
(a) Despite his criticisms of Rousseau's ideas on the 
early education of the young child, Eourcroy gives 
his whole-hearted support to Rousseau's educational 
programme for 5 to 12 year olds, op.cit., pp.292-3.
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lactation maternelle
Although, he rates Rousseau higher than the other
advocates of maternal breast-feeding, Pourcroy subordinates
-1
Rousseau's general usefulness to that of Tissot, whom he
follows on various issues, and particularly on the subject
of cold baths, which he continues to support with equal
energy in this later work. He once again draws attention
to its success in the case of his own delicate son. His
report of the way in which his insistence on cold baths
was received in 1770, shows clearly that, by that date,
very few attempts had been made to test the practical
advantages of the cold bath:
"les plus modérés ... étoient ceux qui me 
regardoient comme un téméraire, qui, entêté 
d'un système nouveau dont jamais personne 
n'avoit ouï parler, vouloit se jouer de la 
vie de son fils unique".^
Although Pourcroy daims that his experiments were
completely successful, those who witnessed them refused
to follow him.^
Pourcroy is at pains to point out once again that
he is consciously following Tissot on this point, and that
he is directly opposed to Rousseau's method, which, he
1. Pourcroy, op.cit., p.33.
2. Ibid., p.71.
3. Ibid., p.76.
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(a)maintains, has been adopted by a number of other writers:^ ^
"Oe n'est donc pas, comme on le lit dans Emile 
de J.J. Rousseau ni dans tous les Ouvrages 
modernes où l'on a suivi ses principes, par 
degrés, et un thermomètre à la main, qu'il faut 
accoutumer les enfans insensiblement au lavage 
froid. Tout cet appareil de pure fiction, qui 
montre le peu de nerf de ceux qui l'ont imaginé, 
n'est absolument bon qu'à faire perdre un tems 
précieux ..."1
He does not refer specifically to his earlier correspondence, 
but more generally to objections he has received from those 
who, he maintains, have adopted Rousseau's principles:
"on m'a objecté, d'après Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
que les enfans se ressentant beaucoup de la 
mollesse de leur pere et mere, il convenoit _ 
de les habituer par degrés au lavage froid".
Ail this merely confirms his earlier account, and shows
that misinterpretation of Rousseau's ideas on the cold
bath had not yet reached the educational theorists.
In the following year, 1775, Grivel reports what 
appears to be a considerable return to maternal
1. Pourcroy, op.cit., p.101.
2. Ibid., p.258.
(a) Besides the anonymous writer of the letter to the 
Sieur Godart, Leroy, for example, also recommends 
the gradual introduction to cold baths, although
he makes no direct reference to Rousseau. Pourcroy 
certainly knew this book as he recommends it on the 
subject of dress.
(b) He not only mentions partisans of Rousseau's method, 
he also speaks of another group which supports 
Balexsert's arguments: "D'autres ont pensé avec 
Balexserd qu'on ne devoit laver les enfans qu'après 
le sevrage ... (op.cit., p.258).
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breast-feeding:
"les exhortations réitérées des vrais Citoyens, 
sur un sujet aussi intéressant, se sont fait 
entendre au coeur de plusieurs. J'ai déjà 
vu dans plus d'une Province de France, la 
nature reprendre ses droits, et l'heureuse 
coutume d'alaiter ses enfans, commencer à 
se remettre en vigueur".
However, he does not distinguish Rousseau's role in this
general movement towards reform, but, instead, turns his
attention to Rousseau's recommendation of the cold bath.
He mentions neither Buffon, Tissot nor Pourcroy on this
topic, but expects his readers to attribute the idea of
the cold bath to Rousseau. He also obviously expects to
find opposition to this idea, and, in fact, indicates
that there has already been opposition. This has obviously
resulted from the persistant opinion that here is just
another of Rousseau's "paradoxes", which should not be
taken seriously:
"Ce sentiment sur les bains froids, que bien des 
gens ont improuvé dans d'autres livres d'éducation, 
ne trouvera pas sans doute plus d'indulgence 
auprès d'eux dans cet Ouvrage. Eh quoi! Vous 
adoptez les paradoxes de l'Auteur d'Emile?
De pareilles nouveautés ne sont re commendable s 
que par leur bizarrerie: vous voulez donc faire 
périr ces innocentes créatures; ...
"... Je recommende, ainsi que l'Auteur d'Emile, 
les bains froids comme propre à fortifier le 
corps dans l'âge tendre, parce que la raison 
et 1'expérience en font sentir 1'utilité".^
1. Grivel, Théorie de 1'education. Paris 1783, p.271.
2. Ibid., pp.303-312.
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It is interesting to note that Grivel attaches the idea 
that cold baths will strengthen the child to Rousseau 
when it is, in fact, much more reminiscent of Tissot or 
Pourcroy*s arguments. Rousseau does recommend cold baths 
as part of a plan which will make the child strong and 
healthy, but he recommends it particularly as a means of 
preparing the body to endure every degree of heat or cold;
"Get usage du bain une fois établi ne doit plus 
être interrompu, et il importe de la garder 
toute sa vie. Je le considère non seulement 
du côté de la propreté et de la santé actuelle, 
mais aussi comme une précaution salutaire pour 
rendre plus flexible la texture des fibres, et 
les faire céder sans effort et sans risque aux 
divers degrés de chaleur et de froid. Pour cela 
je voudrois qu'en grandissant on s'accoutumât 
peu à peu à se baigner quelquefois dans les eaux 
chaudes à tous les degrés supportables, et souvent 
dans les eaux froides à tous les degrés possibles. 
Ainsi, après s'être habitué à supporter les 
diverses températures de l'eau, qui, étant un 
fluide plus dense, nous touche par plus de points 
et nous affecte davantage, on deviendrait presque 
insensibles à celles de l'air".'
Grivel himself recommends introducing the child gradually
to cold baths as Rousseau does, but his remarks on the
subject confirm that, while the theorists continued to
correctly interpret Rousseau's ideas, popular opinion,
confusing various arguments on the subject of cold baths,
had attributed this presumably rather strange idea to
Rousseau, as being the only writer capable of such
1. Emile, ^p.32-33.
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singularities. We can assume from this and earlier 
remarks that, in practice, a section of the public, in 
all probability a fanatical minority, had adopted the use 
of cold baths, and were dressing their children and 
shaving their heads as Leroy described, believing that 
they were bringing up their children "à la Jean-Jacques", 
while another was unwilling even to consider the idea of 
cold baths, this being just another strange idea of that 
eccentric author, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Though he often disagrees with Rousseau, Grivel, 
like Coyer, gives his support to Rousseau's programme of 
games for the young child. He quotes Rousseau at length 
on this, and concludes:
"Nous suivrons les conseils contenus dans ce 
passage énergique, en observant la graduation 
indiquée des balles et des raquettes, nous 
rassurerons la tendresse craintive des peres, 
qui 8'alarment sur la moindre apparence au 
sujet de leurs enfans".
In 1776 Sancerotte won a prize offered by the 
Académie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres at Nancy 
for an essay which was published in 1777 under the title 
Examen de plusieurs préjugés et usages abusifs; concernant 
les femmes enceintes, celles qui sont accouchées, et les 
Enfans en bas âge. In it he continued the old campaign
1. Grivel, op.cit., Bk.II, p.19.
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for maternal breast-feeding and against swaddling-bands, 
though he admits, as others before him had done, that as
far as the latter is concerned:
"les gens sans prévention ont déjà secoué ce 
préjugé de la mode ... depuis quelques années
qu'on en a proscrit en partie la pernicieuse
coutume d'emmaillotter, on voit moins d 'enfans 
incommodés qu'auparavant"•^
Although he does not attribute this reform to any particular 
writer, he attributes a closely connected change, that of 
the whale-bone corset, to, amongst others, and presumably 
above them, "l'éloquent Orateur de Genève":
"Cette pernicieuse mode n'est à la vérité plus 
autant^en vigueur depuis que 1'éloquent Orateur 
de Genève, et plusieurs autres amis de l'espèce 
humaine l'ont foudroyée".^
He adds, however, that this reform has not yet reached the
bourgeoisie. This testimony supports Leroy's earlier
attribution of success to Rousseau on the question of the
whale-bone corset.^
By 1780 Rousseau's success concerning the return
to maternal breast-feeding is quite obviously firmly
established. Landais in his prize essay of 1779:
Dissertation sur les avantages de 1'allaitement des enfans
par leurs meres. which was subsequently published in 1781,
1. Sancerotte, op.cit., pp.69-70.
2. Ibid., p.84.
3. See p.
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notes that:
"Jean-Jacques Rousseau a contribué sans doute, 
et contribué pour beaucoup à accréditer et 
étendre la pratique de l'allaitement des enfans 
par leurs meres"(s.)
Landais, however, himself a doctor, tries to draw attention
to the original impact of the Paris medical faculty on the
question of maternal breast-feeding. His attitude suggests
that Rousseau is now considered as the key figure in this
reform. To counterbalance Rousseau's prestige, he maintains
that the reform had already been set in movement before the
publication of Emile, and attributes the initial impulse to
Antoine Petit (to whom Balexsert had dedicated his work)
and his disciples, whose work had passed unrecognised
alongside Rousseau's growing reputation:
"Les Médecins avoient senti et annoncé les 
.avantages de l'allaitement maternel long­
temps avant que Rousseau eût écrit; et M.
Antoine Petit enseignoit à Paris, ou plutôt 
démontroit d'une manière bien intéressante 
toute la bonté de cette méthode, qui dès-lors 
commençoit à prendre faveur, ensorte que guidées
1. Landais, op.cit., p.viii Note 1.
(a) On the 25th February 1779, the Correspondance secrète 
de Métra published an article on Rousseau which 
confirms his influence in the field of education by 
this date:
"Accordez cela avec l'influence prodigieuse que 
J.J. a eut) sur le changement de nos moeurs en 
quelques parties, par exemple relativement a 
l'Education". P.-P. Plan: Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
raconté par les gazettes de son temps, Paris 1912.
Note, p.182.
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par les conseils de ce savant Médecin, et par 
ceux de ces Elèves, déjà un grand nombre de 
femmes, tant à Paris qu'en Province, nourrissoient 
leurs enfans au moment que l'Emile parut. Je 
pourrois dire la même chose avec la même vérité 
des autres parties de l'éducation physique des 
enfans; des Médecins avoient discuté et approfondi 
ces matières, long-tems avant que Jean-Jacques en 
eût parlé".'
This is an obvious attempt to encourage the reading public
to see Rousseau's significance in perspective, not only
on the question of breast-feeding, but also on all the
questions of physical education popularly attributed to
him at that time. Nevertheless, despite this attempt,
Landais strongly recommends Rousseau's remarks on the
abuses of eighteenth century education:
"O'est dans 1'immortel Auteur de l'Histoire de 
la Nature qu'il faut lire les dangers du maillot; 
c'est dans l'Emile de l'éloquent Rousseau qu'il 
faut voir les abus de notre éducation risible et 
contradictoire".2
He also ends his book with a quotation from "1'auteur si
célèbre de l'Education" (i.e. Rousseau) which encourages
the return to maternal breast-feeding.^ By 1780 Rousseau's
reputation as a serious thinker on physical education is
obviously made.
De Beaurieu, author of L'Elève de la Nature, 
published in 1782 a work entitled: De 1'allaitement et
1. Landais, op.cit., p.viii. Note 1.
2. Ibid., p.51.
3. Ibid., p.55.
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de la première éducation des enfans. In it he follows 
Tissot on the subject of cold baths, quoting him at length. 
On swaddling-bands and whale-bone corsets he is content to 
state merely that these subjects have already been 
adequately discussed by "de dignes vengeurs des droits 
de la nature". He makes no reference to Rousseau on 
either of these subjects, but refers his readers to books 
by Macquart and Winslow.
However, on the subject of education as distinct 
from child care, he considers that this has been adequately 
discussed by Locke, Rousseau and Balexserd. He speaks of 
all three as if their ideas were by this time accepted, 
and their reputations firmly established. Towards the 
end of his essay, however, he includes a letter previously 
published in the Journal de Paris in 1782, in which the 
author, like Landais, tries to curb Rousseau's growing 
prestige on the subject of physical education:
"L'illustre Citoyen de Genève n'aurait éclairé 
personne, malgré tout le feu de son éloquence, 
si le funeste bandeau n'avait déjà été tant 
soit peu abaissé de dessus nos yeux par les 
mains de quelques autres zélateurs de la nature 
et de la raison"
He attempts to describe the impact of Rousseau's Emile,
1. De Beaurieu, op.cit., p.34.
2. Ibid., p.63.
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which, though striking, could not completely break down 
traditional prejudices and habits. Although he does not 
say explicitly that the new interest in physical education, 
and particularly the return to maternal breast-feeding, 
is beginning to look like a mere passing fashion, his 
reference to persistant prejudice, coupled with his use 
of the past tense (Past Historic not Perfect) and the 
phrase "nous eûmes le courage de regarder un moment la 
vérité", suggests obviously enough, that this is so:
"II nous pénétra d'un trait de flamme: nous
• e ^ e s  le courage de regarder un moment la 
vérité, et nous allions voler dans son sein; 
mais nous étions, et nous sommes encore, 
retenus par tant de chaînes honteuses, que 
nos élans furent trop faibles pour les rompre.
"Les femmes, sur-tout, furent frappées de la 
lumière que répandirent les Ecrits de J.J.
Rousseau .... Elles virent avec effroi la 
multitude de maux qu'elles attiraient et sur 
leurs enfans et sur elles-mêmes, elles 
voulurent s'acquitter des devoirs délicieux 
et sacrés que la Nature impose aux meres, 
et dont elle les récompense si bien".1
Madame de Genlis, in her Adèle et Théodore of 1782
also insists on Rousseau's popularity with women:
"O'est aux femmes qu'Emile a dû ses plus grands 
succès; toutes les Femmes en général ne louent 
Rousseau qu'avec enthousiasme".^
1. De Beaurieu, op.cit., pp.63-64.
2. Mme. de Genlis: Adèle et Théodore. 2nd edition, 1785, 
Vol.I, p.190.
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She also gives us evidence of the fashionable 
nature that maternal breast-feeding had acquired. One 
of her characters in Adèle et Théodore. Madame d'Ostalis, 
is impressed by what Rousseau says about breast-feeding. 
The baroness agrees that this is a woman's natural duty 
to her child, but warns against trying to combine it with 
a social life:
"... j'en connois même plusieurs qui alloient 
aux bals après dîner, et qui y dansoient; je 
les rencontrois sans cesse aux spectacles ou 
faisant des visites, bien parées, avec des 
paniers, des corps, etc. Croyez-vous que les 
enfans de ces élégantes nourrices, n'eussent 
pas été plus heureux dans le fond d'une 
chaumière avec une bonne paysanne assidue 
à son ménage ".^
She also points out the ostentation which accompanied
some of the returns to breast-feeding:
"Je me souviens que pendant un hiver je dînois 
souvent dans une maison où je rencontrois 
toujours une jeune femme qui nourrissoit son 
enfant ; elle arriveit coëffée en cheveux, mise 
à peindre^ & à peine étoit-elle assise, qu'elle 
avoit déjà trouvé le secret de parler deux ou
trois fois de son enfant;  devant sept ou
huit hommes, elle lui donneit a teter: je 
voyois ces hommes rire entr'eux & parler bas,
& tout cela ne me paroissoit qu'indecent & 
importun".2
She contrasts this with a more sincere attempt to fulfil 
the duties of motherhood:
1. Mme. de Geniis, op.cit., p.155
2. Ibid., p.156.
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”j*allois quelquefois chez Madame d*Ar .... 
qui remplissoit alors le même devoir, mais 
avec cette simplicité que la vraie vertu 
porte toujours dans ses actions les plus 
sublimes, car on n* est orgueilleux de faire 
le bien qu*à proportion des efforts qu’il 
en coûte et du peu de plaisir qu’on y trouve.
Je voyois Madame d ’Ar .... au milieu de sa 
famille & de ses amis, & j’éprouvois 1 ’émotion 
la plus douce en la contemplant, tenant son 
enfant dans ses bras, cet enfant, auquel elle 
sacrifioit sans effort, comme sans vanité, & 
le monde & tous les plaisirs qu’il peut offrir!”
By 1783, their arguments accepted, their differences
obscured, Locke, Buffon, Tissot, Fourcroy, Rousseau,
Balexserd etc. are represented as a well-established
school of thought. Philipon de la Madeleine in his
Vues patriotiques sur l ’éducation du peuple insists
especially on the general recommendation of cold baths,
ignoring the existence of different views on this matter:
’’Ainsi l ’ont pensé tous ceux qui se sont occupés 
de l ’éducation physique des enfans. Tous (and 
he lists the writers mentioned above) regardent 
l ’usage des bains d ’eau froide dans l ’enfance 
comme le meilleur préservatif contre les maux 
du corps, et comme le plus sur garant d ’une 
forte santé” .^
In 1785 Roze de l ’Epinoy is yet another writer to 
insist on Rousseau’s role in the return to maternal breast­
feeding. Although he refers to ”un Philosophe” 'only, it 
is nevertheless obvious in the light of what we already
1. Mme. de Geniis: op.cit., pp.156-7.
2. De Beaurieu: op.cit., p.91.
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know, that he is referring to Rousseau:
”Un Philosophe, à qui ce siècle sera redevable 
à jamais d ’avoir fait revivre les droits de 
la nature, est déjà parvenu à persuader aux 
mere8, qu’elles ne sauroient se dérober à 
1 ’allaitement, sans se rendre coupables. Les 
raisons qu’il en a données, il les a puisées 
dans le coeur et dans le devoir des meres; 
aussi son éloquence persuasive a-t-elle 
réussi auprès d ’un grand nombre” .^
This reform is, however, far from being general:
"malheureusement 1 ’indifférence pour ce devoir, 
la répugnance pour la contrainte, et plus que 
tout, l ’attrait puissant du plaisir, détournent 
encore beaucoup de meres d ’allaiter leurs 
enfans”.1
De l ’Epinoy too insists on Rousseau’s success where 
others had failed, this time not regretting his impact, 
but according him the place of honour:
”Les Médecins dès long-tems pénétrés des avantages 
physiques et moraux que la société retireroit, 
si les meres allaitoient elles-mêmes leurs enfans, 
avoient en vain conseillé ce devoir le plus sacré.
Il étoit réservé à l ’Auteur d ’Emile d ’abolir les 
préjugés et d ’être l ’oracle de son siècle”
But although de l ’Epinoy does not grudge Rousseau his
success, he is, nevertheless, very critical of the effect
his book has had. He considers it a mistake to have
encouraged each and every mother to feed her own child,
regardless of her suitability, and to have created a mere
1. Roze de l ’Epinoy: Avis aux meres qui veulent allaiter. 
1785, p.ii.
2. Ibid., pp.1-2.
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fashion instead of a moral re-hirth:
"ce Philosophe a rendu trop général un devoir 
que nécessairement souffre des exceptions.
Pour avoir voulu rappeler les meres à leur 
devoir, on a trop échauffé leur imagination; 
et ce qui n ’auroit dû être que le fruit de 
la tendresse, est devenu 1 ’ouvrage de la 
mode qui outre tout".
This prompts de l ’Epinoy to attempt to restrict maternal
breast-feeding, and virtually reverse the progress of the
earlier campaign. Now, in contrast to the earlier
encouragement to sacrifice worldly pleasures in favour
of the more certain happiness of fulfilling one’s duty,
he advocates the occasional sacrifice of what is now
considered a pleasant duty:
"Lorsque par des raisons pressantes une mere 
se détermine à sacrifier ce plaisir au bien 
de son enfant, ce sacrifice qui souvent coûte 
beaucoup de regrets à sa tendresse, etc.....
It is interesting to note that the Approbation, signed by
Desbois de Rochefort, and dated 21 July 1785, supports
de I ’Epinoy’s campaign for moderation in maternal
breast-feeding:
"II seroit à désirer que les préceptes qui y 
sont sagement énoncés, et qui sont appuyés 
sur une pratique suivie, arrêtassent un usage 
fondé, à la vérité, sur la nature, mais que 
beaucoup de raisons puisées dans une mauvaise 
habitude physique et morale devroient contredire 
souvent, sur-tout dans les grandes villes ...”3
1. Roze de l ’Epinoy, op.cit., pp.2-3.
2. Ibid., p.3.
3. At end of text. No page number.
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The remarks of all these writers on physical
education allow us to draw certain conclusions about the
nature of Rousseau’s reputation during the period 1762 to
about the mid 1780’s.
In the first place, Rousseau’s reputation in the
field of child care and physical education seems to have
been restricted to a handful of topics. Some writers
acknowledge his success concerning maternal breast-feeding;
some his effective arguments against corsets; others see
him as an authority on cold baths, but there are few direct
references to his ideas on teething-rings, the use of wine,
a vegetarian diet, etc. In fact, as we might expect, his
reputation seems to have depended entirely on the issues
in which he appeared to gain most success, or the questions
(a)which most interested his contemporaries.  ^ '
Secondly, his reputation appears to have developed 
through various stages. During the years immediately 
following the publication of Emile (1762-1770) we find 
complete silence concerning Rousseau on the part of the 
educational theorists, coupled with an apparent lack of 
success of the campaign, and a growing interest in the 
beneficial effects of the cold bath starting from birth,
(a) Samuel S.B, Taylor has recently pointed out the 
selective nature of Rousseau’s prestige in the 
educational field. Op.cit., p.1555.
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an idea which seems to have come to the fore as a result 
of Tissot*s Avis au peuple rather than Rousseau’s Emile.
It is not until 1767 that Anel Lerebours indicates a 
slight return to maternal breast-feeding.
Rousseau is first mentioned as an authority on 
physical education only in 1770 when Coyer recommends 
his ideas on physical freedom and sensibly graduated 
exercises and games. Fourcroy’s collection of letters, 
however, shows that, by this date, Emile had already gained 
a reputation for itself with the general public, and was 
being subjected to a certain amount of misinterpretation 
on the question of cold baths. Two years later, Leroy 
presents us with information which shows quite clearly 
that Rousseau’s reputation had been growing amongst the 
general public, while completely ignored by the theorists. 
Leroy announces the disappearance of whale-bone corsets, 
which he attributes unhesitatingly to Rousseau’s influence, 
at the same time accusing him of having, through Emile, 
concentrated attention on boys’ education at the expense 
of girls’. Rousseau’s success concerning the whale-bone 
corset, (and this is the only reform which does not appear 
to have achieved any success independently of Emile), is 
attested again in 1776, this time by Sancerotte.
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Leroy also gives us evidence of Rousseau’s growing 
prestige at the expense of doctors writing on the same 
subject, and additional information showing that popular 
enthusiasm had distorted some aspects of Rousseau’s 
original ideas (the belt and the shaving of the head). 
Fourcroy’s later work, and also that of Grivel, confirm 
that this was still happening on the subject of cold baths, 
which continued to be as much a topic of popular criticism 
as of popular enthusiasm.
In 1774, Fourcroy announces a definite return to
maternal breast-feeding, the success of which he attributes
to Rousseau. By 1779 Landais acknowledges Rousseau’s
significant role in a considerable return to maternal
breast-feeding, at the same time attempting to encourage
the enthusiastic public to see Rousseau’s significance in
perspective. From what he says, it is obvious that most
of the ideas on child care currently in vogue were being
popularly attributed to Rousseau, who, by this point, had
been generally acknowledged as the leader of the movement
(a)
towards reform.^  ^ In 1782, Madame de Genlis supports the
(a) That Rousseau continued to be considered as the leader 
of the reform, despite later attempts to put his work 
into perspective, is obvious from L.S. Mercier’s;
Be J.J. Rousseau considéré comme l ’un des -premiers 
auteurs de la Revolution, published in Paris in 1791. 
He maintains that:
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reports of Rousseau’s success concerning breast-feeding, 
and describes the fashionable quality this had acquired. 
Throughout this period comment is varied. Recommendation 
and criticism are both to be found, although the theorists’ 
opinions are generally subordinated to recognition of 
Rousseau’s success where their predecessors had failed.
By about 1782, however, two things become clear. 
Firstly, the popular image of Rousseau, eloquently and 
successfully persuading his public to fulfil their 
neglected duties, appears to give way to a more stable 
picture of Rousseau as an accepted authority on physical 
education. Be Beaurieu speaks of him, along with Locke 
and Balexserd, as if he were an established authority on 
the subject. Popular enthusiasm now seems to give way 
(and this may be seen particularly in the first signs of 
a lapse in the fashion of breast-feeding) to esteem and 
general acknowledgement of Rousseau’s ideas and the role 
he has played in the reform, both on the part of the
(a) (Continued)
"Quand on a vécu avant l ’apparition de l ’Emile, on 
ne peut plus de nos jours voir un enfant se jouer 
au milieu de nous sans se dire; c ’est Rousseau qui 
lui a restitué la liberté, les graces, la joie 
naïve du premier âge; c ’est lui qui l ’a désentravé 
des ridicules liens qui le garrottoient, emblème des 
servitudes innombrables dont on devoit bientôt 
opprimer ses facultés intellectuelles". (Vol.I, p.13).
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general public and the theorists, although this is still
(a)subject to some limitations.  ^ This change in the quality 
of his reputation may, in fact, coincide with his death in 
1778. It is, however, quite definitely connected with 
the achievement of success in the practical field, and a 
general acceptance of the belief that the basic principles 
of the reform are right.
Secondly, it becomes obvious that the various 
misinterpretations which had grown up around the reputation 
of Emile, especially the idea of cold baths from birth, had 
become permanently associated with Rousseau’s name, and by 
1783 had even spread to the theorists. Although the popular 
image of Rousseau changed, the new image retained the ideas
(a) This recognition is further attested by, for example,
(i) the bas-relief of the tombstone at Ermenonville 
which depicts a mother, holding a copy of Emile in 
one hand, while she breast-feeds her child and 
happily watches her older children playing. Another 
child sets fire to swaddling-bands, and others jump 
about and play with a bonnet, the symbol of freedom. 
(1780). Described by H. Buffenoir: Le prestige de 
J.J. Rousseau. Paris 1900, p.329.
(ii) a print by E. Voysard, after a drawing by Borel, 
which depicts a group of mothers feeding their 
children, and contains two inscriptions; one on a 
statue of Humanity, which says: "Secours pour les 
meres nourrices", and the other on a house falling 
in ruins, which says: "Prison pour les mois de 
nourrice" (1784). Description in J.J. Rousseau: 
Genèse et rayonnement de l ’Emile: Musée pédagogique, 
Paris 1956, p.71. (Catalogue of exhibition)
Exhibit No. 318.
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which, had been gradually attributed to Rousseau throughout 
the years, probably as comment and discussion replaced a 
more precise examination of the text.
Although on minor issues, there are few direct
references to Rousseau during this period, nevertheless
on the subject of whether the new-born child should be
washed in wine and water or water alone, we find several
remarks which suggest that the author has Rousseau in mind.
The problem remains unquestioned, except by Rousseau,
until 1767 when Anel Lerebours states simply that:
"I’eau suffit; le vin qu’on y mêle ordinairement 
est inutile".'
She offers no authority for this statement.
In 1774, Fourcroy recommends Tissot’s advice that
the child should be washed in wine and water, though he
feels that "I’eau toute seule dégourdie au feu, ou l ’été
2
au soleil, peut suffire". Both Fourcroy and Rousseau
have basically similar reasons for believing this, although
they express them somewhat differently. Rousseau rejects
wine because:
"Comme la nature ne produit rien de fermenté, il 
n ’est pas à croire que l ’usage d ’une liqueur 
artificielle importe à la vie de ses créatures".
1. Lerebours, op.cit., p.62.
2. Fourcroy, op.cit., p.154.
3. Emile, p.32.
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Fourcroy says:
"l’art et ses apprêts n ’étant pas nécessaires 
dans un objet aussi peu important
I would suggest that Fourcroy’s statement is directly or
indirectly inspired by Rousseau’s.
Balexserd, who had previously recommended a mixture 
of wine and water, merely recommends, in his later work of 
1775:
"une eau tiède savonneuse ou aromatisée".
In 1775 Grivel rejects the French habit of washing the child 
in wine and recommends pure water. The subject seems to 
have been shelved shortly after this, as subsequent writers 
continue to recommend a mixture of wine and water.
This slight change in the attitude towards the use 
of wine for washing the new-born child coincides with a 
climax in the development of the ideological concepts of 
art and nature, which we discussed earlier in connection 
with the position of Emile.
Although, already in 1762 and 1763, Désessartz and 
Balexserd are more obviously convinced supporters of 
physical nature than, for example, Brouzet had shown 
himself to be, they are not, however, entirely opposed 
to the artificial. Neither of them oppose mixing wine
1. Fourcroy, op.cit., p.154.
2. Balexserd, op.cit., p.35.
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with the water used for washing the new-horn child, and 
Balexserd supports the re-modelling of the child’s head 
in cases of deformity. Also in 1763, Tissot sees nothing 
contradictory in washing the child in wine.
Anel Lerebours is perhaps the first writer on 
■physical education after Rousseau to support nature 
consistently, although on the whole she does not use the 
opposition of art and nature to support her arguments.
It is with Coyer, a strong supporter of Rousseau, 
that we find the first outstanding example of conviction 
in his support of nature and the natural. In this respect 
his remarks are very similar to those of Rousseau, and, 
because of his support of Rousseau’s ideas elsewhere, I 
would suggest that they are directly inspired by Emile.
On the subject of school entrance at the age of four, he 
argues:
"Plutôt, ce serait forcer la nature. Plus tard, 
ce serait la retarder".^
Or again, he suggests:
2
"Secondons la nature ...."
He criticises medicine on the grounds that:
"on a sacrifié ... la nature à l ’art; et ... 
cet art compliqué, bizarre, incertain, ressemble 
à certains champs plus fertiles en poisons qu’en 
remedes".3
1. Coyer, op.cit., p.5.
2. Ibid., p.24.
3. Ibid., p.39.
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He believes that:
"la Nature en donne le germe; mais c ’est à 
chaque individu à le développer",^
an idea very similar to Rousseau’s conception of art helping 
original nature. Like Rousseau, Coyer would use only 
natural methods in order to do so. All these remarks 
could be paralleled with passages from Emile. and show a 
conscious conception of the opposition of art and nature, 
emphatic support of all that is natural, and a belief that 
art might help original nature, all of which is remarkably 
similar to Rousseau’s ideas as expressed in Emile.
Conscious opposition to Rousseau’s support of nature 
against art in the form of medicine is found in Leroy’s 
Recherches sur les habillemens des femmes et des enfans 
of 1772. We have already seen his criticism of Rousseau’s 
attitude towards the medical profession. He extends his 
argument to the opposition of art and nature :
"les Philosophes modernes en exaltant le pouvoir 
de la nature,' croient déprimer celui de ses 
ministres; mais cette nature dont ils vantent 
tant la bienfaisance, admet souvent en aveugle 
les instrumens de sa ruine ; ce n ’est quand on le 
considère de près, qu’un agent nécessaire qui 
cause les maladies comme il les expulse; c ’est 
donc à l ’art à diriger les opérations de la 
nature, et tel est l ’emploi de la Médecine "
Leroy only supports art, however, in as much as it implies
1. Coyer, op.cit., p.48.
2. Leroy, op.cit., p.12.
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medicine. Most of his arguments reveal a basically 
naturalistic philosophy:
e.g. "ne la (1’enfance) conduisez que dans le 
chemin qu’t  tracé la nature".1
In 1774 Fourcroy presents us with information which 
suggests that the cult of nature had spread considerably 
during the years 1767 to 1774. It had, moreover, given 
rise to various different interpretations of the term 
’nature*. He criticises the changes which Anel Lerebours 
had made in some of her arguments in the second edition 
of her Avis aux meres which appeared in 1770. He reproaches 
her^adoption of an extreme naturalistic philosophy, which 
had prompted her to suggest, for example, that the new-born 
child should be kept warm in the mother’s bed. Such 
arguments, he maintains, are based on a false analogy of 
man with the animal world, which has led writers like 
Lerebours to imagine they are following the laws of nature 
when, in fact, they are ignoring completely the particular 
qualities which constitute the definition of human nature. 
Any analogy which exists between man and the animal world 
must be of a very general and universal order, and not 
restricted to any particular species. Man as a distinct 
species, he argues, requires a unique education "justement
1. Leroy, op.cit., p . 195.
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approprié à sa nature", and only the adoption of such an
education can be correctly interpreted as following nature.
Fourcroy himself is an ardent supporter of what he considers
to be correctly defined nature:
"la Nature en liberté ne produit rien que de 
parfait".
He is consciously opposed to the interference of art:
"Tant qu’on voudra s ’écarter de cette simplicité 
naturelle, en y mettant de l ’art, des préjugés 
ou de 1 ’entêtement, on préparera à ses enfans 
des maux et des accidens sans n o m b r e " , 3
and even goes so far as to interpret illness as being,
in part, a natural remedy necessary to restore the basic
equilibrium of the body. Because of this he recommends
"la Médecine observatrice" in preference to "la Médecine
a g i s s a n t e " His one inconsistency in an otherwise
completely naturalistic philosophy, is his acceptance of
purging. His excuse for this discrepancy is that m o d e m
man is perhaps too far from the natural state for the
mother’s first fluid to be sufficient. However, he shies
away from the use of wine as a purgative, and instead
5
favours Tissot ’ s mixture of chicory and honeyed v/ater.
1. Fourcroy, op.cit., p.91.
2. Ibid., p.37.
3. Ibid., p.45.
4. Ibid., pp.53-56.
5. Ibid., pp.60-62.
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Fourcroy’s basic attitude is strikingly similar to 
that of Rousseau,, i.e., he believes that natural methods 
can and should help original nature. He recommends that 
parents should:
"faciliter chez les enfans les opérations de la 
nature, en détruisant tous les obstacles qui 
pourroient les retarder".^
Grivel too supports nature in what concerns physical 
education:
"Plus les hommes s ’éloignent de la nature, plus 
ils s ’éloignent de la perfection".^
For this reason he recommends a simple diet, since in this 
way:
"on éloignera moins les enfans de la nature, dont 
les goûts les plus simples sont les plus 
universels ..."3
In 1775, another educational theorist, Nicolas, 
calls his book Le cri de la nature. In it he consistently 
follows what he considers to be the natural order, with 
one exception. This is with regard to teething:
"Ce seroit cruellement s ’abuser que d ’attendre, 
dans tous ces cas (i.e. of difficult teething), 
un triomphe complet de la n a t u r e " .4
On this question he stands in direct opposition to an 
earlier recommendation by Fourcroy that teething should 
be left entirely to nature.
1. Fourcroy, op.cit., p.140.
2. Grivel, op.cit., p.289.
3. Ibid., p.378.
4. Nicolas, op.cit., p.133.
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It is not until about the year 1780 that any real 
break in the naturalistic tradition becomes apparent.
This does not take the form of a conscious reaction, but 
merely makes room for the re-introduction of earlier 
discussions and suggestions. We have already noticed the 
absence of discussion about wine and water during this 
period. The change is also emphasised by a new discussion 
of the merits of animal milk and the panade. Although 
criticism of the bouillie had never relaxed, consideration 
of animal milk as an alternative to human milk faded from 
discussion during the 1770s. Now, with Baudeloque’s 
L ’art des accouchemens. it reappears, although the author 
warns his readers that this has rarely been successful. 
Baldini, in his Manière d ’allaiter les enfans à la main 
au défaut de Nourrices, which was first published in 1784, 
and translated into French in 1786, discusses at length 
the frequent need to use artificial methods of feeding.
This réintroduction of the discussion of artificial 
feeding strikingly coincides with De Beaurieu’s report 
that maternal breast-feeding is merely a passing fashion, 
and De I ’Epinoy’s attempts to restrict breast-feeding 
to suitable mothers only. I would suggest that support 
of nature as opposed to art reached its climax at the time 
when the return to maternal breast-feeding and preoccupation
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with various aspects of physical education were at their 
height. This also coincides with a growth in Rousseau’s 
prestige as the acknowledged leader of the reform. It is 
probable that not only did the success of Emile amongst 
the general public prove the sparking point for subsequent 
reform, but that Rousseau’s very obviously naturalistic 
philosophy also provoked an increase in the support of 
nature in opposition to art.
The cult of the natural loses ground at the same 
time as maternal breast-feeding wavers and as Rousseau’s 
reputation loses the aura of excited enthusiasm which had 
surrounded it during the seventies, and enters its more 
assured phase of authoritative respectability. I suggest 
that basically the authority of nature remains (viz., 
official approval of De I ’Epinoy’s thesis that maternal 
breast-feeding, though based on nature, must unfortunately 
be sometimes forbidden), but that it loses the atmosphere 
of campaign which had previously surrounded it and which 
had led to somewhat extreme naturalistic philosophies and 
the need to omit entirely consideration of the artificial. 
Now, by 1785, on the one hand the rights of nature seem 
assured, and fresh consideration of human interference in 
the natural order can be safely discussed, and on the 
other, new abuses resulting from the reform become apparent,
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and, in fact, necessitate a new consideration of the 
artificial. It is at this point that, the basic principles 
of the reform established, a new kind of criticism appears, 
which seeks to limit the uncontrolled development of reform.
Rousseau’s reputation is intricately connected with 
the progress of reform in the practical field. His ideas 
provoke the reform and the growth in the cult of nature.
As the reform gathers ground he is enthusiastically hailed 
as its leader both by the general public and the 
educational theorists. Once the principles of reform 
are accepted, his reputation in turn becomes more firmly 
established though his success in the practical field 
begins to wane. Once criticism of some aspects of the 
reform are introduced, they naturally affect his reputation 
in so far as he is held responsible for the initiation of 
the reform, and is the obvious scape-goat for any abuses 
which its development may entail.
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CHAPTER II
PRIVATE and PUBLIC EDUCATION
The gradual transition from the Mediaeval concept,
still strong in the seventeenth century, of a moral code
entirely dependent on religious faith, to the secular,
social morality of the eighteenth century, which was fast
developing into the patriotic and civic spirit of the early
Revolution, constitutes one of the most striking episodes
in the history of ideas. Between Massillon’s:
"Je dis ... que la probité humaine, sans la crainte 
de Dieu, est presque toujours fausse, ou du moins 
qu’elle n ’est jamais sûre ..."1
and Voltaire’s:
"Il faut que l ’on soit homme avant d ’être Chrétien"
a revolution has taken place in public opinion.
The original tendency in secular morality, that of
the Libertins, was towards egoistic hedonism, but the
realisation that the pleasures and happiness of civilised
man are completely dependent on his relationships with his
fellow-men, and that the happiness of others is an essential
1. Massillon: Petit-Carème^ Paris, 1785 edition, pp.149-150
2. Voltaire: Oeuvres completes. Gamier edition, 1877,
Vol.9, Discours en vers sur l ’homme. Cinquième Discours,
p.409.
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factor in the happiness of the individual, is to be found 
as early as the Histoire de Cale.java. Gilbert states quite 
simply that :
"Un homme qui raisonne juste voit bien qu’il ne 
peut trouver son plaisir qu’en en procurant aux 
autres, et qu’il ne sauroit être heureux, si dans 
son bonheur les autres ne trouvent le leur: il 
faut donc pour être heureux, rendre les autres 
heureux aussi".^
This idea is closely linked in Gilbert, and in other writers,
with the idea that general utility is the criterion of all
morality:
"Toutes les vertus ne sont telles qu’à cause p 
qu’elles apportent quelque utilité aux hommes"
Since individual happiness can only be attained by means
of universal happiness, so individual utility must be
sacrificed to the common good. This idea had been expressed,
on a practical level, as early as Boisguillebert’s Traité
des grains:
"II est aisé de voir que pendant que chaque homme 
privé travaille à son utilité particuliers, il 
ne doit pas perdre 1 ’attention de 1 ’équité et du 
bien général puisque c’est de cela qu’il doit 
avoir sa subsistance ..."3
This development of a philosophy based on what is
1. Cl. Gilbert: Histoire de l ’Ile de Calejava. 1700, p.85.
2. Idem.
3. Boisguillebert: Traité de la nature, culture, commerce 
et intérêt des grains. Exact date of composition 
unknown, but posterior to 1697. Reprinted in 
Economistes-Financiers du XVIII siecle. Paris 1843, 
p.355.
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ultimately a universalistic hedonism, and different only
in emphasis from nineteenth century utilitarianism, is
the key to much subsequent eighteenth century thought.
It led, on the one hand, to the cosmopolitan character
of many eighteenth century French writers. For others,
however, a general desire for the common good of mankind
gave way to a much more particularised notion of the good
of one’s fellow citizens. This trend can be explained by
the political and economic development of France during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Men gradually
became aware of the flagrant abuses of the old system,
and slowly found courage to criticise. Fenelon, for
example, protesting against the incessant wars waged by
Louis XIV, which were slowly draining the country’s
resources, declared that:
"Le bien des peuples ne doit être employé qu’à 
la vraie utilité des peuples mêmes.
By as early as the 1720s a significant number of French
thinkers were writing and speaking as citizens and patriots,
transposing the theory of the common good to that of the
(a)
good of their fellow-citizens.^ ^
1. Fénelon: Oeuvres complètes. Paris 1850, Vol.VII,
Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté, 
p. 90.
(a) cf. G. Lanson: "Le role de 1 ’expérience dans la formation 
de la philosophie du XVIIIe. siecle en France", La Revue 
du Mois. Vol.IX, Jan. to June 1910, pp.5-28 and 409-429.
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In his recent thesis, Dr. Annandale traces the 
development of this new patriotic or civic spirit, based 
on concern for the general welfare of the State, 
distinguishing it from the old, nationalistic patriotic 
spirit, based on loyalty to the king and French institutions. 
He points to the increasing use of the terms patrie and 
citoyen during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
leading to a conscious attempt to define these terms and 
the nature of patriotism during the 1750s. This he 
correlates with the undertone of developing civic 
consciousness of many of the political and economic
p
theorists of the first half of the eighteenth century.
This development of a civic or patriotic conscience 
intimately concerned the question of education. If the 
individual were to act as a conscious member of society, 
he must be educated with his future role of citizen in 
view. This was obviously not possible in the context of 
traditional schools and colleges, still dominated by 
mediaeval tra^j^ditions and, if interested at all in the 
modern world, orientated towards producing subjects fitted 
for life in a hierarchical society where the highest values
1. E.T. Annandale: The civic and patriotic spirit in the 
French theatre in the eighteenth century. Ph.D. (London)
2. See especially pp. 22-50 and 101-130.
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were honneur and gloire. Such ideas of public service as 
were conveyed tp college pupils came from the latizn authors 
of prescribed^texts.
With the educational reformer, Rollin, there is a 
change of emphasis. Since man is destined to live in 
society:
"Pour peu qu’on examine la nature de l ’homme, 
ses inclinations, sa fin, il est aisé de
reconnoitre qu’il n ’est pas fait pour lui
seul, mais pour la société",^
he must receive a moral education which will prepare him
for his social position in a society based on the doctrine
of the common good:
"O’est la vertu seule qui met les hommes en état 
de bien remplir les postes publics ... C ’est la 
vérité ... qui lui inspire l ’amour de la patrie, 
et les motifs pour la bien servir, qui lui 
apprend de préférer toujours le bien public au 
bien particulier"
To achieve this, teachers would have to aim at producing
an ’honnête homme’ rather than a ’savant’; they would have
to be less concerned with making their pupils ’habiles’
than with making them ’vertueux; bons fils, bons peres,
bons maîtres, bons amis, bons citoiens’.^
1. Rollin: De la manière d ’enseigner et d ’étudier les 
belles lettres par rapport a l ’esprit et du coeur. 
172é. This edition, Amsterdam, 1732, p .13.
2. Ibid., p.14.
3. Ibid., p.15.
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The arts and sciences would not have to he entirely- 
neglected, but could be used as a means of achieving the 
ultimate goal:
"Elies (les lettres et les sciences) n ’ont pas 
pour objet immédiat la vertu, mais elles y 
préparent ..."1
Twenty-five years later, ideas like Rollin’s were 
to spread considerably amongst educational reformers.
In 1750 Duclos wrote his Considérations sur les moeurs, 
in which he criticised the unpatriotic character of 
contemporary French education, and, at the same time, 
suggested a new education based on the theory of the 
common good:
"On trouve parmi nous beaucoup d ’instruction et 
peu d ’éducation ... On y^forme des savants, 
des artistes de toute espèce; chaque partie des 
lettres, des sciences et des arts y est cultivée 
avec succès, par des méthodes plus ou moins 
convenables. Mais on ne s ’est pas encore avisé 
de former des hommes c ’est-à-dire de les élever 
respectivement les uns pour les autres, de faire 
porter sur une base d ’éducation générale toutes 
les instructions particulières, de façon qu’ils 
fussent accoutumés à chercher leurs avantages 
personnels dans le plan du bien général et que 
dans quelque profession que ce fût^ils 
commençassent par être patriotes."
In 1755, the Abbé Coyer suggested that the education 
of the citizen should take precedence over education for
1. Rollin: op.cit., p.17.
2. Duclos: Considérations sur les moeurs. ed.F. Green, 
1939, p.20.
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a particular profession:
"Pourquoi^ne pas inculquer à ce jeune homme qui 
prend 1 ’épée pour faire son chemin, qu’il fera 
quelque chose de mieux, le bien public, et à 
cet autre qu’on éleve pour juger les citoyens 
que la patrie le jugera. Si dans ces maisons 
où l ’on forme des ministres pour la religion, 
on leur disoit qu’ils sont à la patrie avant 
que d ’être aux autels, pense-t-on que les 
autels en seroient moins bien servis?"1
So far the accent was on the need for a reformed 
education, which would subordinate individual interest to 
the achievement of the public good, but little attention 
had been paid to the question of whether this might best 
be carried out by means of a private or a public education. 
A later writer, Philipon de la Madeleine in fact maintained 
that Rollin’s refusal to choose between the two meant that 
he dared not commit himself in favour of a system of 
education which entailed so many disadvantages. Other 
writers, however, insisted, in the 1750s on the need for 
a reformed public education, this being the only sure way 
of producing socially conscious citizens.
The Abbé de Saint-Pierre had suggested the need for 
a truly public education as early as 1728.^ He believed
1. Coyer: Dissertation sur le vieux mot de patrie.
La Haye, 1775, p.32.
2. Philipon de la Madeleine: Vues patriotiques sur 
1 ’éducation du peuple. Lyon, 1783, Note, p.30.
3. C. de Saint-Pierre: Ouvrages de morale et de politique. 
Rotterdam, 1738, Vol.XVI. Réflexions sur l ’éducation, 
pp.359-77.
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that, in order that children might he successfully prepared 
for society, they should receive a public education, which 
would oblige them to spend their school-years away from 
home in a boarding-school, with no holidays. In this way 
they would learn to live together in a miniature society 
which would prepare them for adult society later on. In 
1755, Morelly planned, in his Code de la Nature, a similar 
public education for the children of his imaginary republic:
"A 1*âge de cinq ans, tous les Enfans dans chaque 
Tribu, seront rassemblés, et les deux sexes 
séparément logés et nourris dans une Maison 
destinée à cela; leurs alimens, leurs vêtemens 
et leurs premières instructions seront par-tout 
uniformément les mêmes, sans aucune distinction 
selon les règles, qui seront prescrites par le 
Sénat. ’* '
These children would be taught the laws of their patrie and 
learn to respect them. At the age of ten they would leave 
the "commune demeure paternelle" for the workshop of their 
choice, where, at the same time as they were trained for 
their future trade, they would also receive a moral training
based on the principle of "le bonheur particulier,
 ^ 2
inséparablement attaché au bien commun". This education
would prepare them for a future society where the entire 
social order would be ranked according to "les degrés de 
zèle, de capacité, ... l'utilité des services de chaque 
citoyen".^
1. Morelly: Code de la Nature, ed. Chinard, 1950, pp.314-5.
2. Ibid., p.317.
3. Ibid., p.171.
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All these writers are representative of the new 
spirit that was slowly penetrating every branch of French 
thought during the first half of the century. In comparison, 
Rousseau's decision to give Emile a private education, 
apparently designed to make him independent of his fellow- 
men, rather than prepare him for life as an active member 
of a corporate group, seems, superficially at least, to be 
reactionary and almost anachronistic. However, his position 
on this subject is a complex one, and demands closer 
examination.
He discards the idea of public education for two 
reasons. The most obvious of these in fact amounts to a 
direct criticism of what Duclos, Morelly and others were 
attempting to do. Rousseau believes that it is impossible 
to educate men to become citizens and patriots in a society 
which is not designed for civic and patriotic behaviour:
institution publique n'existe plus, et ne peut 
plus exister, parce qu'où il n'y a plus de patrie, 
il ne peut plus y avoir de citoyens. Ces deux 
mots patrie et citoyen doivent être effacés des 
langues modernes."1
But the fact that a truly public, patriotic education is 
not possible in the hierarchical system of the Ancien Régime, 
where a public education would mean educating men to accept
1. E m i l e : p.6.
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and carry out the notions of inequality and injustice of 
which Rousseau refused to approve, is not the sole reason 
for his choice of a private education for Emile. This is 
also the result of his attitude towards a basic philosophical 
problem: that of the definitions of natural and social man 
and their respective positions.
The gradual secularisation of moral thought had not 
only focussed attention on man's position in society, it 
had also encouraged discussion about the nature and origin 
of morality. The problem revolved around an essential 
question; is morality entirely relative to society, or 
does it spring from natural laws? Hence, can natural man 
be virtuous, or is this an entirely social attribute?
The educational writers already mentioned differed 
only slightly in their attitude to this question. The Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre, for example, believed that human life 
represented a continual movement from chaos to perfection. 
This meant that man's original state, which he assumed to 
be that of Nature, was necessarily the worst, since it 
merely represented man's first step towards perfection.
He saw it as a state of chaos and destruction, from which
1. C. de Saint-Pierre: Ouvrages ..., Vol.II, Projet pour 
rendre les livres et autres monuments plus honorables 
pour les auteurs futurs et plus utiles a la postérité, 
p.248.
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men were saved only by their innate capacity to progress. 
This led them to form a society, the interests of which, 
as distinct from those of its individual members, were to 
be safe-guarded by a social contract. The formation of 
the social contract represented the first introduction of 
morality, which had not existed in the natural state.
This innate tendency of man to progress from chaos to 
perfection by passing from a state of amorality to one of 
morality, meant that the social state was necessarily 
superior to the natural. Such a system was, moreover, 
in keeping with the traditional view. The abbé concentrated 
his attention entirely on the formation of social man, 
disregarding any question of the possible rights and 
interests of natural man.
Eollin did not discuss man's original state in his 
educational treatise, but, as we have seen, portrayed him 
as primarily destined for Society:
"Pour peu qu'on examine la nature de l'homme, 
ses inclinations, sa fin, il est aisé de 
reconnoitre qu'il n'est pas fait pour lui 
seul, mais pour la société. La Providence 
l'a destiné à y remplir quelque emploi. Il 
est membre d'un corps, dont il doit procurer 
les avantages: et comme dans un grand concert 
de musique, il doit se mettre en état de bien 
soutenir sa partie pour rendre l'harmonie 
parfaite.
1. Rollin: op.cit., p.13.
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In this way, the natural and social states become one, the 
question of individual interests is excluded, and man can 
be educated as a purely social being, whose interests and 
happiness only exist in relation to the interests and 
happiness of the total society.
Duclos, too, implied that man is naturally sociable, 
and that the individual should only exist in his relation 
to the whole;
"on ne s'est pas encore avisé de former des 
hommes c'est-à-dire de les élever respectivement 
les uns pour les autres, de faire porter sur une 
base d'éducation générale toutes les instructions 
particulières, de façon qu'ils fussent accoutumés 
a chercher leurs avantages personnels dans le plan 
du bien général, et que, dans quelque profession . 
que ce fût, ils commençassent par être patriotes".
It is obvious from his final remark that he did not merely
mean that man should be educated to take his place as a
member of the general human society, but, more specifically,
that he should be educated to take his place as a member of
the state in which he lived. He says this more explicitly
elsewhere:
"Quelques anciens peuples tels que les Egyptiens 
et les Spartiates, n'ont-ils pas eu une éducation 
relative à l'état et quL en faisoit en partie la 
constitution? .... il est donc constant que dans 
1 'éducation que se donnoit à Sparte on s'attachoit 
d'abord à former des Spartiates. C'est ainsi qu'on 
devroit, dans tous les états, inspirer les sentiments 
de citoyen, former des François parmi nous, et, pour 
en faire des François, travailler à en faire des 
hommes.
1. Duclos: op.cit., p.20.
2. Ibid., pp.21-22.
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This means that the formation of social man (whom he 
defines simply as "1*homme") is merely the preliminary 
stage in the achievement of the ultimate goal, i.e. the 
formation of the citizen.
For Rousseau the problem is more difficult to solve. 
His belief in the goodness of man's essential nature is 
not limited to the hypothetical, primitive state of the 
Discours sur 1'inégalité. He believes that natural man 
still exists and is manifest, on the one hand, in the 
position of the child before contact with society, and 
on the other in man's innate tendency to fulfil his 
natural needs and desires. In the state of nature, where 
man is responsible only to himself, this is right and good, 
but in the social state, it conflicts with man's relation­
ship to his fellow-men. The social state is also a 
natural development, which stems from man's innate 
tendency towards compassion for the other members of his 
species. Rousseau correlates this development with the 
physical development of the child, who, at adolescence, 
is prompted to reach beyond himself and attempt to form 
relationships with his fellow-men. Both the state of 
nature and that of society are good and desirable, but, 
the rights of natural man, which Rousseau equates with 
those of the individual in society, necessarily conflict
131
with those of social man, who exists only in his relationship 
to other men. Rousseau discusses this conflict at the 
beginning of Emile.
In the first place there is natural man;
"L*homme naturel est tout pour lui; il est 
1 'unité numérique, l'entier absolu, qui n'a 
de rapport qu'a lui-meme ou à son semblable."'
His needs and desires spring from purely natural sources;
"Nous naissons sensibles, et, dès notre naissance, 
nous sommes affectés de diverses manières par les 
objets qui nous environnent. Sitôt que nous 
avons pour ainsi dire la conscience de nos 
sensations nous sommes disposés à rechercher 
ou à fuir les objets qui les produisent, d'abord, 
selon qu'elles nous sont agréables -en 
déplaisantes ..."2
Consequently, his happiness, and any questiqn of morality 
in the form of rights and obligations are^to himself alone, 
and constitute the fulfilment of his natural desires and 
needs.
In the second place there is social man, or more 
precisely the citizen:
"L'homme civil n'est qu'une unité fractionnaire 
qui tient au dénominateur, dont la valeur est 
dans son rapport avec l'entier qui est le corps 
social."3
Social man's relationships with his fellow-men imply a 
relative morality, no longer based on the achievement of
1. Emile: p.5.
2. Ibid., p.4.
3. Ibid., p.5.
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individual happiness, hüt on the happiness of all the 
members of the social group.
This opposition between the two states means that it 
is impossible to produce a man who can fulfil the demands 
of both the natural and the social state, since the creation 
of social man inevitably demands the destruction of natural 
man:
"Les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles 
qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme, lui 
ôter son existence absolue pour lui en donner 
une relative, et transporter le moi dans l'unité 
commune; en sorte que chaque particulier ne se 
croie plus un, mais partie de l'unité, et ne 
soit plus sensible que dans le tout."1
If man tries to reconcile the two, he achieves neither one
nor the other:
"Celui qui, dans l'ordre civil veut conserver la 
primauté des sentiments de la nature ne sait ce 
qu'il veut. Toujours en contradiction avec 
lui-même, toujours flottant entre ses penchants 
et ses devoirs, il ne sera jamais ni homme ni 
citoyen; il ne sera bon ni pour lui ni pour les 
autres."2
This is the case of the current system of French education, 
which fails because it confuses the two possible goals, 
and therefore attains neither:
"Entraînés par la nature et par les hommes dans 
des routes contraires; forcés de nous partager 
entre ces diverses impulsions, nous en suivons 
une composée qui ne nous mène ni à l'un ni à
1. Emile: p.5.
2. Ibid., p.6.
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l'autre but. Ainsi combattus et flottants 
durant tout le cours de notre vie, nous la 
terminons sans avoir pu nous accorder avec 
nous, et sans avoir été bons ni pour nous 
ni pour les autres."1
The educator's job is, therefore, to choose between the two:
"Forcé de combattre la nature ou les institutions 
sociales, il faut opter entre faire un homme et 
faire un citoyen: car on ne peut faire à la fois 
l'un et l'autre."2
These two alternatives are reached by two essentially
different systems of education, the one, private and
individualistic, the other, public and universalistic.
Having compelled himself to choose between the two 
Rousseau now brings in his second argument, which will 
sway the balance in favour of private education. Since 
the form of government essential to his conception of 
public education does not exist in eighteenth century 
France, since the ideas of patrie and citoyen have lost 
their original definitions, he cannot choose public 
education. This would imply a corresponding political 
reform, which he does not seem to envisage in Emile.
His conclusion is that all that can be done is to protect 
the child from the corrupting influences which surround 
him, and to do this he separates the child from his family
1. Emile: p.7.
2, Ibid., p,4.
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and educates him in a state of relative isolation. In 
this way, he believes he can preserve the child's original 
tendencies, which are good, and which would otherwise have 
been stifled by the corrupting influences of modern society. 
In La Nouvelle Hëloise he offers a similar solution, that 
of educating the child privately in a suitable environment, 
in this case, the Wolmar household, which, although it is 
a little society, is one in which "natural" affections 
have been preserved.
But, in fact, he is not content to let the question
remain a simple choice between the preparation of natural
man, which he has defined as the goal of private education,
or that of the citizen, prepared by public education.
Emile in fact represents an attempt to resolve the dichotomy
which he considers exists between the two situations:
"Si peut-être le double objet qu'on se propose 
-pouvoit se réunir en un seul, en ôtant les 
contradictions de l'homme on ôteroit un grand 
obstacle à son bonheur."1
In Emile Rousseau attempts this double, yet completely
harmonised education of both natural and social man. Emile
is educated from birth until adolescence in complete
ignorance of social relationships. He is regarded, for
the sake of argument, as a completely a-moral, a-social,
1. Emile: p.7.
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a-sexual being, whose only relationships are to the physical 
world, and whose only responsibilities are the fulfilment 
of his natural needs and desires. Any relationships which 
he does contract with his fellow-men are based on self- 
interest (amour de soi), and have no abstract, moral 
connotations. Neither do they demand any knowledge of 
society as an organisation.^ At adolescence a physical 
and emotional crisis occurs which precipitates him out 
of the security of his natural, physical environment into 
a moral, social environment in which he must take an active 
pant. From now on he becomes a moral, social, sexual being, 
whose relationships are of a moral order, and whose 
responsibilities must be seen in their relationship to 
his fellow-men. Emile must be integrated into society, 
but at the same time he must retain his natural aptitudes 
and independent opinions. This transition from the natural, 
isolated position of the child to the relative social 
position of the adult, which must, however, respect the 
rights and duties of the individual to himself as well as 
to his fellow-men and to the society as a whole, constitutes 
a formidable difficulty, which Rousseau, in fact, does not 
hope to solve satisfactorily.
1. See Books I-III.
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Emile's entry into human society as a whole is seen 
as part of a natural process which leads the adolescent 
first to a desire for relationships with his fellow-men 
on a general scale and subsequently to the particular 
relationship of sexual union:
"Le premier sentiment dont un jeune homme élevé 
soigneusement est susceptible n'est pas l'amour, 
c'est l'amitié. Le premier acte de son 
imagination naissante est de lui apprendre 
qu'il a des semblables, et l'espèce l'affecte 
avant le sexe."1
His first affections will be for those around him, but his
own experience of affection and the desire for friendship
will gradually make him aware of the affections of others.
In this way his affections will gradually be extended to
the whole of society.
But how is he to take his place in the particular 
social order to which he belongs? Rousseau first introduces 
him to society through history, then through actual 
experience. He also arranges for him to find a suitable 
wife. From what we know of Rousseau's original intentions 
concerning the plan of Emile, it seems that he intended 
Emile's integration into the social order to be effected 
either through politics or through marriage. In the final 
version he has chosen marriage. But before this, Emile
1. Em i l e : p.248.
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must choose the position he will adopt when, as husband 
and father, he becomes, not merely a member of human society, 
but of the particular society in which he lives:
"En devenant chef de famille vous allez devenir 
membre de l'Etat. Et qu'est-ce qu'être membre 
de l'Etat? le savez-vous? Vous avez étudié 
vos devoirs d'homme, mais ceux de citoyen, les 
connaissez-vous? savez-vous ce que c'est que 
gouvernement, lois, patrie? Savez-vous à quel 
prix il vous est permis de vivre, et pour qui 
vous devez mourir? Vous croyez avoir tout 
appris, et vous ne savez rien encore. Avant 
de prendre une place dans l'ordre civil, 
apprenez à le connaître et à savoir quel rang 
vous y convient."1
In order to acquire this knowledge Emile visits various
countries where he studies their respective systems of
law and government, and from which he returns, disappointed
by what he has seen of human institutions and apparently
intent on retaining his freedom as a natural man within
the social order:
"Riche ou pauvre, je serai libre. Je ne le serai 
point seulement en tel pays, en telle contrée; 
je le serai par toute la terre. Pour moi toutes 
les chaînes de l'opinion sont brisées; je ne 
connais que celles de la nécessité. J?appris à 
les porter dès ma naissance, et je les porterai 
jusqu' à la mort, car je suis homme; et pourquoi 
ne saurais-je pas les porter étant libre, puisque 
étant esclave il les faudrait bien porter encore, 
et celle de 1'esclave pour surcroît?
"Que m'importe ma condition sur la terre? 
que m'importe où que je sois? Partout où il y 
a des hommes, je suis chez mes frères: partout
1. Emile: p.554.
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où il n*y en a pas, je suis chez moi. Tant 
que je pourrai rester indépendant et riche, 
j'ai du bien pour vivre, et je vivrai. Quand 
mon bien m'assujettira, je 1'abandonnerai sans 
peine: j'ai des bras pour travailler, et je 
vivrai ...." 1
Emile, in fact, does not achieve the desired integration 
into the civil order. It is his tutor who reminds him of 
his duties to the State even in an unreformed society, and 
who attempts the final synthesis:
"où est 1'homme de bien qui ne doit rien à son 
pays? .... Tes compatriotes te protégèrent 
enfant, tu dois les aimer étant homme. Tu dois
vivre au milieu d'eux, ou du moins en lieu d'où
tu puisses leur être utile, et où ils sachent 
où te prendre si jamais ils ont besoin de toi".
This does not mean, however that he must lead an active
public life. His tutor's ideal is, in fact:
"ta vie patriarchale et champêtre, la première 
vie de l'homme, la plus paisible, la plus 
naturelle et la plus douce à qui n'a pas le 
coeur corrompu".3
But, in the midst of this, he must not forget his duties 
as a citizen:
"Souviens-toi que les Romains passaient de la 
charrue au consulat. Si le prince ou l'Etat 
t 'appelle au service de la patrie, quitte tout 
pour aller remplir, dans le poste qu'on t'assigne,
1 'honorable fonction de citoyen."4
1. Emile: pp.585-6.
2. Ibid., p.587.
3. Ibid., pp.587-588.
4. Ibid., p.588.
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That Rousseau, despite this attempt at synthesis, 
in fact preferred ideally public education to private, 
becomes apparent from some of his remarks in Emile and in 
his other writings. For him, although natural man is happy 
and free, he cannot be virtuous. His ignorance of moral 
relationships prevents him from achieving virtue, and 
allows him to attain only a kind of worthless goodness.
Since he has no knowledge of evil, he cannot commit evil.
He can only follow his natural inclinations, and these, 
Rousseau maintains, are "good" in the natural order.
Natural man is well-inclined towards his fellow-men, and 
is capable of compassion, but there is no question of his 
having to dominate his natural inclinations in order to 
achieve the "good", which is entirely relative to his own 
preservation and that of his species. This is the privilege 
of social man who must consciously subordinate himself to 
the community as a whole. He alone can achieve virtue, and 
this Rousseau places above any form of natural goodness:
"où est l'homme de bien qui ne doit rien à son 
pays? Quel qu'il soit, il lui doit ce qu'il 
y a de plus précieux pour l'homme, la moralité 
de ses actions et l'amour de la vertu. Né dans 
le fond d'un bois il eût vécu çlus heureux et 
plus libre; mais n'ayant rien a combattre pour 
suivre ses penchants il eût été bon sans mérite, 
il n'eût point été vertueux, et maintenant il 
sait l'être malgré ses passions. La seule 
apparence de l'ordre le porte à le connaître, 
à l'aimer. Le bien public, qui ne sert que de
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prétexte aux autres, est pour lui seul un motif 
réel. Il apprend à se combattre, à se vaincre, 
à sacrifier son intérêt à 1'intérêt commun".1
The best preparation for this is obviously through public 
education, which teaches man to see himself as a fraction 
of the whole right from the start. Rousseau had already 
advocated this in his article De l'Economie Politique which 
he wrote for the Encyclopédie. But it is important to note 
that he attached it to a particular form of political 
system, denying that it was possible in eighteenth-century 
France:
"L'éducation publique, sous des règles prescrites 
par le gouvernement, et sous des magistrats 
établis par le souverain, est ... une des maximes 
fondamentales du gouvernement populaire oïl légitime. 
Si les enfants sont élevés en commun dans le sein 
de 1'égalité, s'ils sont imbus des lois de l'état, 
et des maximes de la volonté générale, s'ils sont 
instruits à les respecter par-dessus toutes choses, 
s'ils sont environnés d'exemples et d'objets qui 
leur parlent sans cesse de la tendre mère (i.e. 
la patrie) qui les nourrit, de l'amour qu'elle a 
pour eux, des biens inestimables qu'ils reçoivent 
d'elle, et du retour qu'ils lui doivent, ne 
doutons pas qu'ils n'apprennent ainsi à se chérir 
^naturellement comme des frères, à ne vouloir 
jamais, que ce que veut la société, à substituer 
des actions d'hommes et de citoyens au stérile 
et vain babil des sophistes, et à devenir un jour 
^es défenseurs et les pères de la patrie dont ils 
auront été si longtemps les e n f a n t s . "2
1. Emile: p.587.
2. Oeuvres complètes. ed. Petitain, Paris 1839, Vol.IV, 
De l'Economie Politique, p.239.
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He was to express this idea again in his project for the 
Polish government. Here again he paralleled the need for 
political r e f o m  with the need for educational reform:
"L'éducation nationale n'appartient qu'aux hommes 
libres; il n'y a qu'eux qui aient une existence 
commune et qui soient vraiment liés par la loi.
Un François, un Anglais, un Espagnol, un Italien, 
un Russe, sont tous à peu près le même homme; il 
sort dy college déjà tout façonné pour la licence, 
c 'est-a-dire pour la servitude. A vingt ans un 
Polonois ne doit pas être un autre homme; il doit 
être un Polonois. Je veux qu'en apprenant à lire 
il lise des choses de son pays."^
2
Professor J.S. Spink has already pointed out the significance 
of Rousseau's position on this subject in La Nouvelle Héloise 
and Emile in comparison to what he says elsewhere. Aware 
that the ideas, expressed by writers like Duclos and Morelly, 
on the need for a public education, based on concern for 
the general good and love of one's country, were incompatible 
with the existing régime in France, he found himself 
compelled to declare that a good education, whether private 
or public, was impossible in France. Mme d'Epinay reports 
a conversation of 1757 in which Rousseau is said to have 
maintained that to obtain a good education "il faudroit 
commencer à refondre toute la société".^ Current education
1. Oeuvres complètes, ed. Petitain, Vol.IV. Considérations 
sur le gouvernement de Pologne, p.439.
2. John S. Spink: "Les premières expériences pédagogiques 
de Rousseau" AJJR. Vol.XXXV, pp.97-103.
3. Lalive d'Epinay: Mémoire, ed. Paul Boiteau, Paris 1865, 
Vol.II, p.277.
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as he saw it consisted in teaching maxims of good conduct 
which had no relation to the practices of adult society 
and which were merely abandoned in later life.
"On n'ose leur dire qu'il faut être menteur, 
faux et méfiant, mais on sent très-bi^ qu'il 
faudroit qu'ils le fussent. V^/Blà 1 'embarras 
de l'éducation. "1
However, as we have already seen, Rousseau does not insist
on political reform in either La Nouvelle Héloise or Emile.
Instead he evolves another solution, whereby the child is
removed from the political sphere and educated, either in
the a-political atmosphere of the Wolmar household,
carefully situated in the Vaud, where a family of
aristocratic standing would not be involved in the
political organisation of the state, or in the contrived
isolation of Emile.
To what extent Rousseau's contemporaries and successors 
appreciated his position in Emile remains to be seen. Did 
they merely regard it as a treatise on private education, 
or did they realise that it was, in fact, a direct criticism 
of the ideas which had been rapidly gaining ground during 
the 1750s and which implied that the republican notions of 
citizenship, virtue, or the common good could be applied 
to the existing social order of inequality and injustice?
1. Lalive d'Epinay: op.cit., p.277.
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Did they understand the attempt to synthesise the formation 
of natural and social man, to preserve the integrity of the
individual without pitting him against the total community?
Above all, did they accept or reject these ideas?
Firstly what stage had been reached in the arguments
on educational reform by 1762? An anonymous work published
-I
that year under the title De l'Education Publique contains 
ideas very similar to those of Duclos or Morelly. Believing 
public education to be essential if knowledge is to spread, 
the author defines its aim as the formation of virtuous, 
patriotic citizens. He does not envisage a parallel 
political reform, but places his trust in the efficacy 
of educational reform alone.
By 1763, however, a slight change occurs. The 
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1762 prompts a number of later 
writers to see the divorce of religious control from 
education as the first step towards the practical 
achievement of ideas expressed by the earlier reformers. 
This, however, seems positively to discourage any emergence 
of ideas concerning coincidental political and educational 
reform. The disappearance of religious authority from the 
field of education seems, for a short time, sufficient in
1. Usually attributed to J.B.L. Crevier.
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itself to make practicable the idealistic suggestions of
earlier writers.
La Chalotais, commissioned to write a plan of public
education after the expulsion of the Jesuits, is the first
to put his faith in the simple substitution of State for
religious control. In his Plan d'Education Nationale of
1763 he shows that a truly public education can emerge now
that individual interests which conflict with the general
good have been removed:
"Ce n'est donc qu'en nous délivrant de cet esprit 
monacal qui depuis plus de deux siècles embarrasse 
les Etats policés, par des entraves de toute 
espece, qu'on peut parvenir à établir une base 
d'éducation générale sur laquelle porte toutes 
les instructions particulières."1
This general education will be orientated towards "la plus
grande utilité publique", which can only be achieved by
"une éducation qui ne dépende que de l'Etat".^ Similar
ideas were to be expressed by other writers during the
following decade.
The first writer to comment on Rousseau's position
is the author of the article on Emile in the Journal des
Sçavans. Although he does not discuss the relative merits
of private and public education, he nevertheless criticises
1. Caradeuc de la Chalotais: Essai sur 1'éducation 
nationale. 1763, p.22.
2. Ibid., p.3.
3. Ibid., p.17.
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the principle upon which Rousseau's position is based,
i.e., that of the basic opposition between natural and
social man. He refuses to accept Rousseau's definition
of natural man as "1'unité numérique, l'entier absolu",
maintaining that if natural man comes into contact with
his fellow-men, he will inevitably lose his absolute
character, but will not for that lose his "naturalness".
This is because he sees society as a natural development
which affords no real opposition to the desires and needs
of the individual. For him, Rousseau's dilemma is already
solved. Social man has two functions: one is to seek his
own preservation and well-being; the other is to seek the
good of the community, since without this he could not
justify his claim to individual happiness. The fact that
these two functions do not conflict is because the individual
possesses an innate dislike of disorder which restrains him
from acting against the interests of his fellow-men. He
believes that Rousseau's mistake is that he had confused
corrupt, contemporary society with original society which
2
is a natural and rightful institution.
His criticism of Rousseau's ultimate insistence on 
the formation of natural man, instead of concentrating his
1. Journal des Sçavans. Vol.LXXI, pp.233-234.
2. Ibid., p.233.
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attention on that of social man, reveals the prevailing 
preoccupation of the intellectuals with the formation of 
social man, and prepares us for later interpretation and 
comment. If, he says, Rousseau had limited himself to 
criticising what man has become, and showing how he could 
have been better within the social order, he would have 
been supported generally:
"mais ces reproches ont été faits mille fois . / \ 
au genre humain: il vous falloit du nouveau".
The first writer to mention Rousseau's ideas on
private and public education is the author of a work
entitled Principes généraux pour servir à l'éducation des 
2
enfans. Anxious to draw his readers' attention to the 
fact that, despite marked similarities to parts of Emile, 
his book was composed quite independently of it, he adds 
a foreword to his book, in which he compares the two works.
In this foreword, he reveals an interesting point of what 
appears to be misinterpretation. For him, a basic difference 
exists between the two books. Whereas Rousseau is only
1. Journal des S ç a v ^ s . Vol.LXXI, p.231.
2. [ ] Principes généraux pour servir à l'éducation des
enfans. p^ticulierement de la noblesse française. 
Paris, 1763 (attributed to Poncelet by Barbier).
(a) He does, however, realise that Rousseau is attempting
to synthesise the formation of natural and social man.
His criticism is that the formation of natural man 
could well have been omitted.
147
concerned with the formation of natural, solitary man, 
independent of all social ties, he, Poncelet, is dealing 
with the formation of useful, sociable citizens. Confident 
in the political and religious climate of Prance, he attempts 
what a realistic appraisal of the situation had prompted 
Rousseau to avoid. But, in emphasising the opposition 
between Rousseau's system of private education and his own 
proposal of a public education, he overlooks the fact that 
the difference is one of method rather than ultimate goal, 
and entirely misses the complications involved in Rousseau's 
decision to isolate his pupil during the period of his 
education only to reintegrate him into the social order 
at a later date. Poncelet says:
"... Persuadé qu'il y a une Patrie et une Religion, 
je me suis proposé pour objet de mon travail de 
former non des Robinson Orusoé, mais des Citoyens 
utiles; non des Hommes purement naturels, mais des 
Chrétiens raisonnables; non des Misanthropes, mais 
des Hommes amis des Hommes."1
This statement suggests that he has understood Rousseau's 
reason for removing Emile from corrupt society, and that 
he either fails to understand the further development of 
Rousseau's system or simply refuses to see it. The latter 
would in fact be a natural enough reaction to a book which 
sets out to attack contemporary society. An author wishing
1. Poncelet, op.cit., p.ix.
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to defend this same society would naturally he ^ unwilling 
to recognise the full implications of Emile, and would he 
quite likely to use only those aspects which he could 
most easily criticise, and which would be most likely to 
coincide with current attitudes. At all events, he draws 
attention to one aspect of Emile at the expense of the 
system as a whole.
Poncelet himself, unlike Duclos and Morelly, seems 
to appreciate the need to educate children for the society 
in which they live, but his final position is scarcely an 
advance on theirs. He merely arranges his system of 
education to fit the existing pattern of French society 
wherever possible, and completes it with impracticable 
suggestions for educational reform wherever he cannot 
fully accept existing social institutions:
"J'ai conformé mes préceptes aux moeurs dominantes, 
quand elles m'ont paru supportables; et je m'en 
suis écarté quand elles m'ont paru vicieuses."1
It is interesting to see that he consciously avoids any
question of political reform, which, he maintains, is not
the concern of private citizens. To those who seek reform
outside the educational field, he issues a warning:
"Philosophes de toutes les espèces, suivez 
l'impétuosité de votre verve indiscrette!
Ecrivez sur la Nature, sur l'Esprit, sur les
1. Poncelet, op.cit., p.x.
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Loix, sur les Grouvernemens, sur les Moeurs, 
sur les Sciences, sur la Religion; bouleversez 
les idées communes; détruisez, renversez, vous 
serez admirés des uns, blâmés des autres: mais 
parce que vous nous transportez dans les espaces 
imaginaires, dans la région des songes, tout le 
monde ira son train."1 Ta)
A similar reaction to Emile is found in Eormey's 
Anti-Emile of 1763. Though not himself an educational 
theorist, Pormey nevertheless comments on various aspects 
of Rousseau's arguments concerning public and private 
education, natural and social man. The fact that he 
discusses these topics in detail with reference to Emile 
makes his ideas worth examining at some length, although, 
as we shall see, many of his remarks which are interesting 
at the outset, tend merely to demonstrate the fact that 
his basic ideas are different from Rousseau's, and offer 
no constructive criticism.
Starting from different first principles, Pormey 
refutes Rousseau's statement that the educator must choose 
between forming a man or a citizen. Basing his argument 
on the a priori belief that man is naturally sociable,
1. Poncelet, op.cit., p.xi.
(a) He presumably includes Rousseau in this. He says
elsewhere when commenting on Emile : "Je ne sçais même 
si 1'Ouvrage du Citoyen de Genève exige une Critique 
en règle; ce qu'il contient de faux, de dangereux, ou 
de suspect, se réfute à la simple lecture, et ce qu'il 
offre de bon, d'utile, d'agréable, se fait sentir.
Tout y est clair, tout y est frappant: le Pyrrhonisme,
1'irréligion, 1'indépendance d'une part, les vertus 
civiles, le bonlieur philosophique de l'autre." op.cit., 
p.vii.
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he equates the role of natural and social man (by which he
means civil man, the citizen) in much the same way as
Duclos had done:
"8i l'on ne fait pas le citoyen en faisant l'homme, 
on dénature l'homme, on le détourne de sa 
destination. La nature n'est que l'aptitude à 
recevoir les institutions sociales; en la tournant, 
en la fléchissant du côté opposé, on la détruit."1
i.e., man must be educated in order to be true to his own
nature, which is that of a social being. He strengthens
his argument elsewhere when he criticises Rousseau's
statement:
"II faudroit .... connoitre 1'homme naturel."
Any knowledge of human nature which can be gained from a
study of natural man can, he maintains, only serve to help
in the formation of social man (because natural man
social man) and even if the two were different, our
knowledge of natural man should only be used to form
social man (because, presumably, in this case, Formey
would rank social man as superior to natural man):
"Cette connoissance (de l'homme naturel) ne peut 
et ne doit servir qu’à former l'homme s o c i a l ."2 (a)
1. Formey: Anti-Emile. 1763, p.23.
2. Ibid., p.25.
(a) He stresses man's sociability again by contradicting 
Rousseau's statement that "tant qu'on ne connoit que 
le besoin physique, chaque homme se suffit à lui-même." 
Formey maintains that this is impossible even with the 
best of educations. Op.cit., p.109.
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In this way Formey avoids the difficulties which Rousseau 
had encountered by distinguishing between the essential 
qualities of natural and social man, and merely shows that 
his basic tenets are very different from those of Rousseau.
For Formey, the "natural", or rather the original, 
pre-social state of man is very similar to the state of 
chaotic destruction which Saint-Pierre describes. He 
himself uses one of Hobbes* definitions to describe it:
"Sans les loix et la société, les hommes ne
seroient que ces enfans robustes dont parle
Hobbes,semblables aux sauvages qui, malgré 
la prédilection de M.R. pour eux, sont une 
fort vilaine engeance."1
This does not mean however, that he supports the ideal 
of a social order based on concern for the public welfare
put forward by Rousseau*s predecessors and contemporaries.
His attitude is much more that of Poncelet, reaction to 
Rousseau's attack on society, and his own support of it.
His admiration for human society in general is in fact 
coupled with admiration for the same existing social 
system of eighteenth century France which Rousseau was 
attacking, and which Formey himself is quick to defend:
1. Formey: op.cit., p.61.
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"’les Rois les Grands, Les Riches, s'ils ont 
des principes et des vertus, bien loin d'être 
foibles, ont un excédent de forces, qu'il faut 
tourner au profit de la société; c'est ce qui 
fait le prix des dignités et des trésors."1 (a)
The same spirit prompts him to support the existing system
of education which prepares men for life in a hierarchical
society. Here he supports Locke's gentleman in order to
refute Rousseau's Emile;
"O'est (le gentilhomme de Locke) un homme qui est 
élevé comme il lui convient de l'être. Autre 
sera 1'éducation d'un Menuisier. Autre celle 
d'un Sauvage."2 (b)
It is for this same reason, and not from any attempt to 
reinstate a new ideal of public behaviour^ that he combats
1. Formey: op.cit., p.61.
2. Ibid., p.117.
(a) He says elsewhere that inequality of fortune is part of
Providence's and society's plan. He shows his approval
of this by supporting the idle rich:
"on peut contribuer au bien public par l'usage
légitime de ses richesses ... Celui qui s'occupe 
de la culture de son esprit, qui éleve sa famille, 
qui entretient l'ordre dans sa Maison, qui 
soulage les pauvres ne touchât-il jamais aucun 
outil, n'est point un Citoyen oisif, beaucoup 
moins un fripon." Op.cit., p.115.
Both this remark and the one above are, of course, 
disguised by his insistence on the correct use of one's 
advantages, but in fact they merely indicate Formey's 
satisfaction with the existing hierarchical system.
(b) He also supports the colleges which represent the current 
French system of public education. His attitude is that 
they are not responsible for all the pupils they produce, 
and even if they give rise to some criticism they stand
a better chance of producing pupils than anyone who 
undertakes to bring up a child "à la sauvage ou même 
à l'Emile." Op.cit., p.25.
153
Rousseau's remark that the terms citoyen and patrie should 
be banished from modern languages, since the concepts they 
represent no longer exist. Formey maintains that they need 
not be restricted to a particular political system, and 
suggests that they be retained with the definitions which 
now apply to them, i.e. in the context of absolute monarchy:
"Un François qui aime sa patrie, son Roi, sa 
ville, sa famille et qui agit en conséquence, 
est un bon Citoyen, meilleur peut-être que le 
Romain et le Spartiate, chez qui il y avait 
. plus d 'illusion et d'enthousiasme, que de 
jugement et de réflexion."1
None of these remarks provide a very interesting 
comment on Rousseau's arguments. They merely illustrate 
the attitude of a reactionary, content to support the 
established order, to some of Rousseau's attacks on 
contemporary society, and in this he seems to be echoing 
Poncelet's earlier interpretation of Emile.
Formey also shows interest in the more specific 
problem of contact, or rather, lack of contact with society. 
He criticises Rousseau's insistence that Emile should be 
totally ignorant of society as an organisation until he 
reaches an age when he will be able to understand social 
relationships. Formey believes that, although the child 
is not a full member of society, he is, nevertheless,
1. Formey: op.cit., p.24.
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attached to society in certain respects, and must learn 
about those relationships which affect him from an early 
age:
"Si un enfant n ’est pas membre de la société 
dans le même sens ou sur le même pied qu’un 
homme, il l ’est à divers égards, et par 
plusieurs relations dont il importe qu’il , . 
se fasse de bonne heure de justes idées.
This argument is closely connected with Rousseau and Formey*s
different conceptions of the birth of reason and the child’s
capacity to comprehend social morality. Whereas Rousseau
maintains that the child should not be made aware of any
moral notions before the age of about fifteen in order
that he may not form false notions of them, Formey
obviously believes that the child should be acquainted
with them, at least to a certain degree, from a much
earlier age. He does not discuss the possibility of this
leading to the formation of false ideas. Here again he
merely shows that he disagrees with Rousseau’s basic ideas.
It is also apparent from his attitude on this point that
he fails to understand Rousseau’s complex position on the
question of Emile’s isolation from the corrupting influences
of contemporary society. However from what we know of
1. Formey: op.cit., p.106.
(a) This would presumably only be desirable for Rousseau 
in a "just" society.
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Formey’s attitude elsewhere, it is obvious that had he 
fully understood Rousseau’s position, he could never have 
supported the decision to isolate Emile from a social order 
which he himself supported.
He also quibbles with several minor points connected 
with this question. He criticises Rousseau’s choice of 
Robinson Crusoe as a model for Emile, pointing out, in 
practical fashion, that the positions of Crusoe and Emile 
are totally different. Brought up and educated in society, 
Crusoe knew what he needed and how to set about obtaining 
it.^ This criticism overlooks the fact that Rousseau’s 
idea is not one of total isolation (an idea which was to 
appear later in Be Beaurieu’s B ’Eleve de la Nature), but 
of contacts directed by one human being, the tutor, through 
whom the child can learn everything which concerns himself 
and his physical needs.
However, Formey does touch on one difficult point 
in Rousseau’s educational plan, that of the integration 
of Emile into society. Unfortunately he restricts his 
discussion to a rather superficial point, that of the 
introduction of Emile into eighteenth century polite 
society. The question as he sees it is not how will
1. Formey; op.cit., p . 108.
156
society affect Emile, but rather, will society accept him? 
He uses the episode in which Emile is taken to a banquet 
to illustrate his point:
"Emile a done des relations, il voit le grand 
monde.Mais y est-il présentable lui qui n ’est 
qu’un être physique?"1
Just as he had earlier supported the established political
order now he gives his support to established social
conventions. Rousseau, he maintains, simply cannot afford
to allow Emile to show his disapproval of social habits;
for example, the distinction between men’s behaviour
towards women and towards other men:
"La fausse politesse et l ’usage du monde sont 
deux choses différentes. En préservant un 
éleve de la première, on ne peut se dispenser 
de 1 ’instruire de l ’autre et de le lui faire 
pratiquer."2 (a)
Above all, Formey cannot understand Rousseau’s 
attempt at synthesis. He sees his idea of integrating 
natural man into the social order as destined to lead to 
an eternal contradiction: either society will not accept
1. Formey: op.cit., p.111.
2. Ibid., p.112.
(a) Formey also ridicules what he considers to be Rousseau’s 
illusion that Emile will philosophize about society on 
his first introduction to it. op.cit., p.111. Here he 
overlooks two points (i) that Rousseau thinlcs he can 
introduce Smile to society through history before actual 
contact with his fellow-men (ii) that Emile’s education 
is not one of complete isolation and lack of training.
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the uncivilised Emile, or Emile will be forced to become 
like his fellow-men in order to be accepted. To Rousseau’s:
"Emile n ’est pas un sauvage à reléguer dans les 
déserts; c ’est un sauvage fait pour habiter 
les villes",
he replies:
"S’il demeure sauvage, il sera le jouet ou le 
rebut des villes; s ’il s ’apprivoise, ce ne 
sera plus Emile."1
At a practical level this is perhaps Formey’s most valid
comment.
Despite his remarks concerning Emile’s introduction 
to society, Formey seems to have believed that the basic 
aim of Emile is the formation of natural, solitary man.
He finds Rousseau’s statement that any man who wishes to 
see himself as an isolated being can never be anything 
but unhappy as a complete contradiction of what he has 
been attempting to do in all his works :
"puisque dans tous ces Ouvrages il ramene, 
autant qu’il est possible, les hommes à 
l ’état originaire, et à 1 ’égalité primitive"
Formey’s comments contain the mistakes common to 
the kind of criticism he attempts. Because he picks on 
isolated statements rather than analysing the author’s 
ideas as a whole, his remarks tend to remain at a
1. Formey: op.cit., p.123.
2. Ibid., p.113.
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superficial level, and prevent him from fully understanding 
the complexities of Rousseau’s thought. Although 
potentially interesting, his remarks are generally 
disappointing in their lack of depth and elaboration, 
though they probably give us a fairly accurate picture 
of early reactions to Emile. Startling points of view, 
or simply ideas with which the reader does not agree, are 
extremely likely to stimulate criticisms of individual 
points at a first reading, when the total contents of 
the book have not been fully digested. Moreover, much 
of Emile must have proved difficult reading even for the 
most enlightened of readers.
After these first reactions to the apparently anti­
social orientation of Emile’s education, little attention 
seems to have been paid to the book by writers on public 
education. In 1764 neither Guyton de Morve au nor Maubert 
de Gouvest so much as mention Emile, and Gamier, in his 
De 1 ’éducation civile of 1765 remains equally silent. 
G a m i e r ’ s work merely represents a continuation of the 
older ideas that education should form "hommes d ’Etat" 
and "Citoyens vertueux", based on the belief that men are 
naturally sociable, but with no reference to the difficulty 
of achieving this without complete social change.
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In 1763, however, an amazing novel was published,
which dealt much more comprehensively with Rousseau’s
system than Poncelet and Formey’s comments had done.
This was Gaspard de Beaurieu’s L ’Eleve de la Nature.
Despite its exaggeration and sentimentality, which
immediately condemn any possible appeal it might have
for the modern reader, this book went through eight
separate editions during the years 1766 to 1794.
From the start the author acknowledges the fact
that he is following Emile, although he does not mention
either the book or the author by name. He merely says:
"Un Ecrivain célébré a dit depuis peu, que le 
seul Roman qu’un jeune homme dût lire, étoit 
Robinson."
and declares that the present work is by "quelqu’un qui 
paroît avoir travaillé selon ses vues"
1. Gaspard Guillard de Beaurieu: L ’éleve de la nature.
La Haye et Paris, 1763.
2. De Beaurieu: op.cit., this edition Amsterdam and 
Paris, 1766, p.iii.
(a) Later, in his suggestions for education, he acknowledges 
his debt to Emile. After describing his method of 
correcting stealing, he says: "V(il91a, me diront les 
personnes qui ont lu Emile, une mauvaise et maladroite 
imitation de la scène de Jean-Jacques, d ’Emile et du 
jardinier Robert. Je conviens que c ’en est une 
imitation; je conviens avec plaisir et avec 
reconnoissance, que je prends pour maître l ’Auteur 
d ’Emile, et ici, et dans tous les endroits où de grands 
motifs ne m ’obligent pas de abandonner." Part III,
1771 edition. Note p.114.
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De Beaurieu’s book is outstanding in that it 
consciously adopts the double formation of Emile and 
Rousseau’s method of obtaining it, though this is grossly 
exaggerated and transformed. In the Preface the author 
states that his system of education has two goals, the 
first to form "un honnête homme heureux par lui-même", 
the second to "rendre cet honnête homme encore plus 
heureux, en en faisant un bon citoyen". Despite similarity 
to Emile, a basic difference is obvious even from this 
point. The author is not attempting a synthesis of natural, 
independent man and the citizen, but rather a progression 
through the natural state to the superior state of social 
co-operation. This becomes more apparent as the story 
unfolds.
The formation of individual and independent man is
attempted by completely isolating the pupil from all
contact with human society. The hero spends the first
part of his existence in a wooden cage until, at about
the age of fifteen, he is shipped off to a desert island,
(a)where he is to be educated by Nature alone.^  ^ Although
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit., p.iv.
(a) Despite the exaggeration of this early negative education, 
the general tone of the book gives us no reason to 
suppose that it is a parody of Emile. Both sentimental 
and naive, the book is, nevertheless, always serious.
161
on this island he learns to enjoy the universe uniquely 
in terms of physical pleasure, and in its relationships 
to himself alone, he also begins to feel the need for 
contact with his own species. The sight of other creatures 
together makes him acutely aware of his isolation:
"Ces plantes, ces fleurs, ces arbres, s ’ils ne 
se font point de caresses, parce que cela 
n ’est pas nécessaire à leur bonheur, ont au 
moins le plaisir de se voir, d ’être ensemble; 
et moi je suis seul. Est-il possible d ’être 
heureux, quand on est seul?"'!
De Beaurieu bases this desire for contact with human 
society on an insatiable desire for a female companion, 
unlike Rousseau, who places a general desire for human 
society prior to the more particularised desire for a 
companion of the opposite sex. The pupil’s subsequent 
meeting with a shipwrecked pair, father and daughter, 
satisfies both these desires, and leads to the formation 
of an idyllic society, in which De Beaurieu’s hero, who
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit., Pt.I, p.54.
(a) (Continued)
and suggests conviction on the part of the author.
What we know of De Beaurieu himself confirms this 
opinion. His eccentric costume and life, and his 
fanatical support of nature, suggest that he was quite 
capable of taking seriously the idea of keeping the 
pupil in a cage for the first fifteen years of his life 
in an attempt to preserve him from error and vice. 
Moreover, the details he includes during this period 
are dealt with too seriously to suggest parody, 
of. E. Legouis: Un disciple compromettant de Rousseau: 
Gr.G. de Beaurieu et son élève de la nature. Taylorian 
Lecture, Oxford 1925, p.24.
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by this time has been named Ariste, is shown to be much 
happier than he had been in his former solitary state;
"Depuis plus de deux mois j’avois le bonheur 
de vivre avec Euphémon et sa fille; je 
jouissois de tous les vrais plaisirs de la 
société."1
De Beaurieu uses this to show that man is naturally sociable. 
When Ariste’s father and friends return to fetch him, Ariste 
expresses man’s innate longing for society:
"j’étois si aise de voir beaucoup d ’hommes 
ensemble que j’aurois passé dans le feu pour 
les aller rejoindre. Ce fut bien en ce 
moment que je sentis que nous aimons 
naturellement la s o c i é t é " . 2
Ariste is now commanded to return to Europe and 
visit contemporary society, just as Emile is commanded 
to follow his tutor and study human society before he 
becomes an active member of it. But, unlike Rousseau, 
de Beaurieu emphasises Ariste’s impact on society as much 
as what society will teach him:
"Viens prouver aux hommes par ton exemple, qu’ils 
naissent bons, sensibles, vertueux, que l ’éducation 
la plus parfaite n ’est point celle qui leur donne 
ce qu’on peut appeler des talens et des vertus à 
grand bruit ; mais celle qui éloigne d ’eux les 
vices de la société, qui les rapproche de la Nature, 
et qui les remet pour ainsi dire, entre ses mains."3
1. De Beaurieu, op.cit., Pt.I, p.157.
2. Ibid., Pt.I, p.193.
3. De Beaurieu, op.cit., Part II, 1771 edition, (Lille),
p.130.
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So far, the ideas of consciously removing the child 
from the corrupting influences of society, and preserving 
his natural goodness, (though "vertueux" goes further than 
Rousseau’s "bonté"), by allowing him to be educated by 
physical nature alone, are, despite the exaggerated 
treatment they receive, very close to some of the basic 
ideas of Emile. The break in the development of natural 
and social man is also very similar to Emile. Ariste in 
fact only feels the need for society at adolescence just 
as Emile does. However, De Beaurieu moves away from 
Emile with Ariste’s introduction to society. He returns 
to Europe where he finds difficulty in making contact with
his fellow-men, particularly in the polite society of Paris.
De Beaurieu’s insistence on this point bring to mind 
Formey’8 fears for Emile much more than Emile itself:
"J’avois I ’air sauvage, l ’air d ’un homme qui 
se trouve déplacé, qui craint tout, qui se 
méfie de tout; j’etois gauche, maladroit; je 
n ’avois aucun usage du monde; mes manières 
contrastoient autant que mes moeurs, avec 
celles des autres hommes. Je leur déplaisois,
et ils ne me déplaisoient pas moins ... Nous
partîmes enfin et j’en eus la plus grande joie", ‘
Now, however, unlike Emile, Ariste is not expected 
to remain in unreformed society, and reconcile his 
independent upbringing with his role as a member of society.
1. De Beaurieu, op.cit., Pt.II, p.172.
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De Beaurieu carefully avoids the problems which Rousseau 
had encountered in attempting to do this. Ariste is 
allowed to make a complete break with the old society, 
and return to his island, where with his family and 
several like-minded companions, he founds a new society 
based on laws acceptable to natural man.
The foundation of a new society brings Ariste 
closer to Morelly’s imaginary republic than to Emile. 
Although many of the details contained in Ariste’s new 
system of education are taken directly from Emile, they 
are, nevertheless, elements of Emile transposed into the 
context of public education. Row that a society exists 
in which the laws of nature are respected, and in which 
the question of environmental corruption cannot arise, 
Ariste can turn his attention to a system of public, 
society-centred education in which the children are 
prepared for their future role as citizens. He entirely 
subordinates the formation of the individual to the 
formation of the citizen:
"la Nature qui nous a faits pour la société, 
puisque nous 1 ’aimions avant même que de la 
connoître, veut que nous commencions de bonne 
heure à être humains et sociables, à être 
citoyens sinon de tel ou tel pays, au moins 
du monde".1
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit., Part III, p.. 101.
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De Beaurieu obviously understands the basic structure 
of Emile much more clearly than either Poncelet or Formey 
had done, or, at least, he is more eager to support its 
implications than they. It seems, however, that he did 
not fully appreciate Rousseau’s attempt to harmonise the 
contradictory situations of natural and social man, and 
merely used the two-stage education of Emile to support 
his own belief that, although nature must provide the 
basis to human society, any anti-social tendencies it 
may produce in the individual must be ultimately 
subordinated to the good of society as a whole. His 
novel is especially interesting in that it remains 
sufficiently close to certain ideas in Emile to be 
associated with it in the mind of an uncritical reader, 
while, at the same time, it rejoins some of the more 
utopie treatises of Rousseau’s predecessors. To what 
extent Emile was known to eighteenth century readers only 
through this perhaps more palat^able form of De Beaurieu’s 
Eleve de la Nature is impossible to assess. All we can 
say is that one edition had already been published under 
the name of Rousseau when De Beaurieu himself drew 
attention to this mistake in the 1771 edition of his book.
(a) Rousseau’s reaction to De Beaurieu’s book is interesting 
to note. Despite an initially complimentary remark:
(Note continued on page 166)
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President Rolland in 1768 is perhaps the first 
educational reformer to understand that educational and 
political reform must he closely linked, but he makes no 
reference to Emile on this subject. He understands^ that 
a new, well-educated generation will inevitably demand 
better laws, but he does not appear to envisage any problem 
concerning the integration of these children into a social 
order for which they have not been prepared. He may, of 
course, although he does not say so specifically, imagine 
that this would automatically lead to revolution and 
subsequently to the establishment of an entirely new 
social order.
Apart from Poncelet’s brief remarks, the Abbé
2
Coyer seems to be the first pedagogical writer to deal 
with Rousseau’s ideas on private and public education.
1. Rolland: Plan d ’éducation. Paris, 1783 (Compte-rendu 
du 13 Mai 1768), p.23.
2. Coyer: Plan d ’éducation publique. Paris 1770.
(a) (Continued)
"J’ai déjà commencé par 1 ’Eleve de la nature : on 
ne peut pas en effet penser avec plus d ’esprit, 
ni dire plus agréablement ..." 
he goes on to exclaim scathingly:
"Je lui conseille toutefois de s ’attacher toujours 
plus aux sujets qu’on peut traiter en descriptions 
et en images, qu’à ceux de discussions et d ’analyse, 
et qu’en général aux matières de raisonnement.
Un traité d ’agriculture sera tout à fait de son 
genre". CG., Vol.II, No.0291, p.82. Rousseau to 
Panckoucke, 25 May 1764.
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Although he supports various ideas expressed in Emile, 
(mainly those on physical education), he nevertheless 
criticises Rousseau’s attitude towards the problem of 
public education. Coyer himself strongly supports public 
education, although he is aware of the disadvantages of 
the current system in France. He is convinced however, 
that a reformed public education will soon manifest its 
obvious superiority over private tuition, the more so 
since, unlike private education which is only available 
to the privileged few, public education can be enjoyed 
by all:
"Si 1 ’Education Publique reste telle qu’elle 
est dans nos Colleges, le cri général décide 
contr’elle. Mais si on l ’élève au degré de 
perfection dont elle est susceptible, elle 
reprendra bientôt la supériorité qu’elle mérite ; 
et ce qui doit terminer la question, c ’est que 
l ’Education privée ne pouvant convenir qu’à un 
petit nombre de familles opulentes, l ’Education 
Publique est absolument nécessaire au corps de 
la Nation. En effet, tout Etat policé en a 
une, quelle qu’elle soit. Le point vraiment 
intéressant, est de l ’avoir bonne".'!
It is because of this that he criticises those, 
like Montaigne, Locke and Fleury, who have restricted 
their valuable ideas on education to the field of private 
education, and especially Rousseau, who, although he
1. Coyer: op.cit.., p.vii.
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realises the abuses of the French colleges, has nevertheless 
concentrated on private education, and the formation of 
natural rather than social man:
"Pourquoi l ’Auteur d ’Emile, sifflant ces risibles 
Etablissemens qu’on appels Colleges, ... au lieu 
d ’appliquer ses forces à l ’Education privée, ne 
les a-t-il pas consacrées à 1 ’Education Publique? 
Pourquoi encore, au lieu de s ’occuper uniquement 
de l ’homme de la Nature, ne s ’est-il pas attaché 
à la formation de l ’homme de la société?"1
It is clear from this statement that Coyer completely 
fails to see that Emile is ultimately destined for society, 
and to appreciate both Rousseau’s dilemma concerning 
public education in an unreformed society, and his attempt 
to combine the formation of natural and social man, while 
respecting the rights of each. He is, in fact, continuing 
the misinterpretation of Poncelet and Formey, although 
his basic attitude is not at all similar to theirs.
Whereas they are criticising the anti-social orientation 
of Emile because they support both society in general and 
the particular form of society of eighteenth century 
France, Coyer is merely criticising Rousseau for apparently 
refusing to deal with the most pressing problem of the 
time, i.e. the reform of public education.
Coyer himself oversimplifies the question of
1. Coyer: op.cit., p.ix.
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educational and political reform. He avoids the 
difficulties which Rousseau encounters, and which he 
apparently fails to see, by not raising the question 
of parallel reform, and the difficulties involved in 
a one-sided reform. He nevertheless goes further than 
Duclos and Morelly by realising that children must be 
removed from the corrupting influences of their environment, 
and plans to place them in state boarding-schools from the 
age of four:
"le mal ne sera pas sans remède. Les enfans 
ont-ils quatre ans; la Patrie les demande 
pour en faire des hommes".1
However, he does not discuss the question of the 
reintegration of these children into a society for which 
they had not been prepared. This idea of a public 
education conducted in isolation from corrupt society 
makes its first appearance with Coyer, but it is impossible 
to say whether this is in any way inspired by Emile. At 
all events. Coyer makes no reference to Rousseau on this 
point. His subsequent plan of public education is 
interesting in that, like De Beaurieu, he introduces 
elements from Emilj  ^into the context of public education.
In 1773 Helvétius* De l ’Homme was published
V
1. Formey: op.cit., p.5.
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posthumously. In it he criticises a number of ideas 
expressed in Emile and the letter on education of the 
Nouvelle Héloise. Many of his criticisms are concerned 
with psychological and philosophical concepts, but he 
does also deal with some minor aspects of Rousseau’s 
general educational ideas, including the question of 
private education.
Helvétius does not discuss the question of the total
isolation of Emile, but deals with the private education
described in La Nouvelle Héloise. and which he seems to
extend to Emile. His main criticism is that much that
Rousseau suggests is impracticable in the home. How, he
asks, can one ensure that no undesirable environmental
r
influences affect the child? How can the tutoÿ and servants 
control their behaviour for long hours at a time in order 
that the child may not receive unwanted impressions and 
experiences? In addition, how can a private individual 
afford the salary which a good tutor demands? All this, 
he argues, only becomes possible in the context of public 
education, the advantages of which he extols elsewhere.
We can conclude very little concerning Emile from 
these remarks, except that like Poncelet, Formey and Coyer, 
Helvétius seems to see Emile as a treatise on private 
education. He makes no reference to Rousseau’s discussion
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of public and private education. However, the most 
interesting aspect of his ideas on education is that, 
apparently independently of Emile, he expresses quite 
clearly the need for parallel political and educational 
reform:
"Les préceptes de cette éducation nouvelle 
sont-ils en contradiction avec les moeurs 
et le gouvernment? ils sont toujours réputés 
mauvais. En quel moment seroient - ils 
adoptés? Lorsqu’un peuple éprouve de grands 
malheurs, de grandes calamités, et qu’un 
concours heureux et singulier de circonstances, 
fait sentir au Prince la nécessité d ’une réforme. 
Tant qu’elle n ’est point sentie, on peut, si 
l ’on veüt, méditer les principes d ’une bonne 
éducatiop. Leur découverte doit précéder leur 
établisspent. ailleurs plus l ’on s ’occupe
d ’une science, plus on y apperçoit de vérités 
nouvelles, plus on en simplifie les principes.
Mais qu’on n ’espere pas les faire adopter."1
Apart from Holland’s vague suggestions Helvétius is the
first after Rousseau to put forward this opinion boldly.
But here the similarity ends, for Helvétius does not adopt
a system of private education as a temporary expedient.
For Le Mercier de la Rivière, the author of a
2
treatise on public education published in. 1775, Bmile 
again seems to spring to mind when he thinks of private 
education. Although he is writing about the need for 
public education. Le Mercier in fact prefers private, and
1. Helvétius: De l ’homme, Londres 1773, Bk.II, p.368.
2. Le Mercier de la Riviere: De 1 ’instruction publique. 
1775.
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insists on the value of the early impressions to add 
support to his own idea that the best first impressions 
are to be received in the parental home:
"Quelque utilité cependant qu’on se promette 
de ces Institutions (i.e. des écoles publiques) 
on doit en attendre une plus grande encore de 
1 ’Instruction domestique, de celle que donnent 
journellement aux enfants les exemples et les 
discours de leurs parents; on peut même les 
regarder comme la base, comme le germe de 
toute autre instruction: les premieres 
impressions que nous recevons dans notre 
enfance, se gravent en nous si profondément, 
qu’il est bien rare de les voir s ’effacer; nous 
devons dire au contraire, avec l ’Auteur d ’Emile, 
qu’elles décident presque toujours de notre 
caractère moral pour le reste de notre vie."'! (a)
1. Le Mercier de la Rivière: op.cit., p.113.
(a) This is a misinterpretation of Rousseau’s definition of 
the ’caractère moral’. For him this is inherent not 
acquired. In La Nouvelle Héloise he says:
"Chaque homme apporte en naissant un caractère, un 
génie, et des talens qui lui sont propres"
[Pléiade edition. Part V, Letter III, p.566) 
and this principle is also followed in Emile. Education 
does not form the individual temperament or character, 
since this is present from the start, but sets out to 
develop this to its full capacity. External impressions 
can, however, cause the formation of false ideas, and 
affect the child’s character, but this does not imply 
the original formation of the individual temperament. 
Julie says, for example:
"je n ’ai pas tardé de connoitre qu’en se faisant 
un droit d ’être obéis les enfans sortoient de l ’état 
de nature presque en naissant, et contractoient nos 
vices par notre exemple, les leurs par notre 
indiscretion". (ibid. p.571).
The determination of character by early impressions is 
the method of Helvétius and the other environmentalists. 
Moreover, Le Mercier’s system of examples given by the 
parents is not in accordance with Rousseau’s methods of 
education in Smile.
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Despite this fairly general feeling that Emile is 
concerned with private education, the outstanding work on 
private education of the time Condillac’s Cours d ’étude 
pour 1 ’instruction du prince de Parme of 1775, makes no 
reference to it. This is, however, most probably because 
Condillac is more concerned with the practical issues of 
teaching and studies than with the theoretical aspects of 
education. Moreover, Condillac had nothing to learn from 
Emile on the association of ideas in education. On the 
contrary, Rousseau learns from him on such matters.
It is not until Philipon de la Madeleine’s work on 
public education in 1783 that we find any further references 
to Emile on this question. This means that, during the 
1770s when considerable attention was being paid to 
Rousseau’s ideas on physical education, relatively little 
was said about the position of Emile and its relation to 
one of the main preoccupations of pedagogical writers, the 
question of a reformed public education. Grivel, though 
he mentions Emile on other points fails to mention it on 
this. His own attitude remains close to the old idea of 
a public education based on a desire for the common good, 
and although he seems to realize the difficulty of putting 
a reformed public education into practice, he looks for
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the achievement of this to a moral regeneration of the 
adult population rather than to political reform. Borelly 
does not mention it either, hut it is interesting to see 
that he talks explicitly about forming children for the 
society in which they are to live. In his case, however, 
the question of necessary political reform does not arise, 
since his book^ was composed with the reformed political 
situation of Poland in view. This book in fact coincides 
with Rousseau’s Projet in which he was committing himself 
in favour of public education as being the solely acceptable 
form of education under a popular government. Although 
Borelly does not mention Emile on public education, he 
does recommend Rousseau’s ideas on physical and moral man 
to be included in a comprehensive study of man, which would 
form part of the syllabus in his proposed scheme of public 
education.
Be la Madeleine, then^revives the question of 
Rousseau’s position on public and private education in 
Emile in 1783. Although he himself insists on the need 
for a good public education for the masses, he in fact 
prefers private education. However, he criticises Rousseau’s 
refusal to grant education to the poor, arguing that their 
position is not, as Rousseau suggests, unalterable, but that,
1. Plan de réformation des études élémentaires. La Haye,
rîW.
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with education, they can, even under the present form of 
government, improve their social position.
Philipon does not refer directly to Emile as a work 
on private education, but he nevertheless mentions Rousseau 
in such close connection to Locke that it is very probable 
that he places him amongst those who prefer private to 
public education. He describes Emile as a vulgarisation 
of the ideas of Locke and Montaigne:
"Get intéressant sujet (l*éducation des enfants) 
n*a été vraiment bien traité que par Locke,
Montaigne et Rousseau, qui n ’a presque fait 
autre chose, que de commenter, développer, 
rapprocher du commun des hommes les idées des 
deux premiers, et sur-tout leur donner ce 
coloris vif et séduisant, qui fait un livre 
agréable d ’un livre infiniment solide.”1
In the same note he quotes Locke’s assessment of public
education and his preference for private:
"les défauts d ’une éducation domestique valent 
infiniment mieux que toutes ces belles 
acquisitions (i.e. les petits avantages que 
procure 1 ’éducation publique). Puisque la 
vertu est la grande et la principale fin qu’on 
doit se proposer dans 1 ’éducation, le meilleur 
est qu’un jeune homme soit élevé dans la maison 
de son pere .... "1
It seems fair to conclude from this that he thinks of
Emile as yet another treatise on private education.
It is interesting to notice in passing that, like
Coyer and De Beaurieu, Philipon refers to Rousseau as an
1. Philipon de la Madeleine: op.cit.. Note, p.29.
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authority on physical education, and includes details of 
what, by now, would be recognised as similar to ideas in 
Emile, e.g. fresh air, hard beds, healthy diet, etc. in 
the context of public education. This habit of mentioning 
Emile in a work on public education, and either not 
mentioning Rousseau’s position with regard to public 
education, or counting him as a writer on private education, 
seems, judging by the authors already mentioned, to have 
been a fairly common occurrence.
-I
In 1785 Proyart gives us a different kind of 
information concerning Emile. He reports that some 
teachers have adopted certain aspects of Emile and attempted 
to fit them into the school curriculum; i.e. they have been 
using ideas from a treatise ostensibly on private education 
in the context of public education, though Proyart himself 
does not in fact make this distinction. This, he maintains, 
has been a failure, and, in the practical field, suggests 
that the system of the University of Paris might be more 
successful than Emile;
"Où sont, je le demande, les sujets de marque 
sortis des écoles de nos mentors modernes?
J ’ai beau chercher de toutes parts l ’Emile de 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, je ne le trouve que dans 
son livre; au lieu, que les Emiles formés par
1. Proyart: Oeuvres complètes, Paris 1819, Vol.VI, 
De l ’éducation publique.
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l ’Université de Paris, je puis les montrer 
à la tête du clergé et de la Magistrature, 
je puis les montrer se distinguant de la 
foule dans tous les états et toutes les 
conditions de la société."1 (a)
Proyart himself seems to understand the connection 
between public morality and education and thinks that the 
time has come to reform what he considers to be the main 
sources of social corruption. However, his ideas on 
education are centred around the basic idea of children 
educated together in a miniature republic where they will 
forget their original social inequalities. He makes no 
effort to resolve the problem of subsequent contact with 
the inequalities of the existing social order, or rather, 
he does not even seem to be aware of the problem.
It is only with the Revolution in 1789 that the
connection between political and educational reform seems
to crystallise in the minds of the reformers. Madame
Molinier in one of her articles on pedagogical ideas
2
during the Revolution emphasises their political 
character, and this seems to be true right from the start.
1. Proyart: op.cit., p.233.
2. M. Molinier: "Les plans pour une nouvelle éducation
sous la Constituante." Dossiers documentaires.
September 1963.
(a) Dr. Tash’s interpretation of this passage as a complaint 
on Proyart’s part that the University does not form
Emile^ (op.cit., p.100) is not borne out by the rest
of his essay which is a panegyric of the University’s 
achievements.
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Villier’s Nouveau plan d ’éducation et d ’instruction publique 
of 1789 for example, illustrates this sudden crystallisation, 
showing at the same time that the point of emphasis changes. 
The question is no longer as Rousseau and Helvétius had 
seen it: how can a new, public-spirited education be 
possible without a new, public-spirited régime, but, as 
one would expect after the event of political revolution: 
can the new régime be expected to last without a 
corresponding reform in education? As Villier puts it:
"Vos réglemens les plus sages, vos meilleures 
loix, resteront sans exécution, si vous n ’avez 
soin de travailler à former une génération 
capable d ’en sentir l ’utilité ...."1
De la Cour in his Ecoles nationales of 1790 devises a
practical plan of education based on the idea of "la
nécessité d ’élever, pour de nouvelles loix, une race
d ’hommes toute n o u v e l l e " D e s r a i ^ r  appeals for educational
reform to the National Assembly, which, he declares, is
already:
"vivement persuadée que c ’est de la réforme de 
l ’éducation que dépend la régénération, la 
gloire et le sort de la Nation".3
None of these writers, however, look back to Emile as
having first formulated the need for both political and
educational reform.
1. Villier: op.cit., p.v.
2. De la Cour: op.cit., p.1.
3. Desram^r: L ’Université à l ’agonie. 1790, p.4.
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References to Emile's position with regard to
public and private education, natural and social man are
extremely rare at this time. One writer, Jean-Erançois
Major brings up the old complaint that Emile is too
concerned with private education to be practicable in the
field of public education. He heads his essay with one
of Rousseau’s criticisms of the existing French Colleges:
"Parmi les diverses sciences qu'ils (les collèges) 
se vantent de leur enseigner, ils se gardent bien 
de choisir celles qui leur soient véritablement 
utiles."1
but he is far from thinking of Emile as an alternative to
the existing system. His main criticism, and he maintains
that this is a commonly held criticism, is that much of
the teaching method of Emile is only suitable for private
education. Of Rousseau's attempt to let the child l e a m
from his own experience. Major says:
"Oe qu'un gouverneur fait pour Emile, un professeur 
ne peut le faire pour 30 ou 40 eleves: il n'a
pas toujours des hommes pour les faire agir."2
and this he repeats again, despite his admiration for Hrm'i p
in principle. Major also criticises the way in which
Rousseau restricts his pupil to academic pursuits at an
age when he thinks the child could be socially useful:
1. J.F. Major: Tableau d'un college en activité, presented 
to the Rational Assembly, 22 Dec. 1790, Frontispiece.
2. Ibid., Rote, p.77.
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"M. Rousseau veut-il que les jeunes gens 
conmiencent l ’étude des langues à seize ans?
Je dis qu’ à cet age ils pourront faire des 
choses plus utiles pour eux-mêmes et pour 
la société."1
This is very close to the earlier criticisms of the anti­
social orientation of Emile.
It is interesting to see how, in fact, the points 
which catch other writers’ attention vary according to the 
time and circumstances of composition. Whereas Helvétius, 
intent on obtaining a system of public education, criticises 
various aspects of Emile as being impossible in private 
education. Major, faced with the practical possibility of 
introducing a new system of public education, criticises 
those aspects of Emile which he finds unsuitable for public 
education.
In contrast to Major’s comments which link up easily 
enough with earlier criticisms, Degranthe, the author of 
an essay entitled; Abus de 1 ’ancienne éducation, dévoilés 
et réformés par les progrès de la raison, picks on an 
aspect of Emile, which had so far passed unnoticed. He 
heads his essay with the following quotation from Emile;
"Peu lui importe à qui -tombe un plus grand 
bonheur en partage pourvu qu’il concoure au 
plus grand bonheur de tous; c ’est le premier 
intérêt du sage après 1 ’intérêt privé ; car
1. Major: op.cit., p.78.
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chacun est partie de son espece et non d ’un 
autre individu•"1
Exactly to what extent Degranthe had understood Rousseau’s
discussions on the relationship of the private and public
man, or the individual and the member of a social group,
is not clear from this one quotation, but it does suggest,
however, that Degranthe had understood Rousseau’s position
much better than his predecessors had done. It is also
interesting to see that he is dealing with a point which
had attracted no attention from the pre-Revolutionary
writers.
In contrast to the dearth of comments on Emile and 
private and public education etc. during the first two 
years of the Revolution, most of the essays on public 
education of this period incorporate details from Emile, 
or praise Rousseau in the course of their recommendations. 
Villier, for example, agrees with Rousseau that botany 
should be taught at school, and recommends that Rousseau’s 
works, should be studied along with those of Boileau, 
Molière, Corneille and Voltaire as fine examples of the 
beauties of the French language. Many of his ideas 
obviously owe much to Emile although the author does not 
draw attention to this fact. For example, he situates his
1. Degranthe: op.cit.. Frontispiece.
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school out in the country, so that the curriculum can 
include long walks, and he refers to the present French 
colleges as "ces risibles établissements",  ^ a phrase 
obviously taken from Emile♦ Desran^r describes his picture 
of an ideal education, which also seems to owe many of its 
details to Emile. although in Desrai^er’s plan the social 
destination of the pupils is emphasised much more than in 
Emile:
"Qu’ils (i.e. the chosen teachers) soient 
responsables des dispositions, des qualités, 
des talens que la nature a mis en chacun de 
nous. Qu’ils nous rendent le corps robuste 
et agile; qu’ils ornent notre esprit de 
connoissances utiles et agréables, et notre 
coeur de toutes les vertus sociales. Qu’ils 
nous excitent à chérir de plus en plus notre 
patrie, à répandre courageusement notre sang 
pour la défendre contre ses e n n e m i s . "2
His belief that the profession of teacher is "le plus
important, le plus honorable de tous"^ is also very
reminiscent of Rousseau’s attempts in Emile to raise the
status of the tutor. The Abbé Auger too in his collection
of eenferences held during 1790 emphasises the need in any
good education to follow Nature: "dont les plus belles et
les plus importantes productions sont lentes".
1. Villier: op.cit., pp.115-6.
2. Desranfer: op.cit., p.6.
3. Idem. ^
4. Auger: Organisation des écoles nationales. 1791.
5. Ibid., pp.iv-v.
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Despite the frequency of ideas which seem to have 
received their original impetus from Emile, relatively few 
are actually attributed to Rousseau. Above all, the authors 
of these essays have no objection to taking details from 
what before the Revolution was generally seen as a treatise 
on private and somewhat anti-social education and placing 
them in their own treatises on public, society-centred 
education. Like their predecessors, they are uniquely 
concerned with educating children for society, and are 
totally unconcerned about the individualistic elements of 
Emile’s education. Most of them hardly seem to notice 
these aspects any more. Jean-François Major, as we have 
seen, criticises the anti-social orientation of Emile, 
but he seems to have been an exception at this time. In 
contrast to Major another writer, Fèvre du Grandvaux seems 
to think that his essay on public education is in fact a 
realisation of the ideas of Emile.
Fèvre’s Plan d ’Education, which was first read to 
the Constituante early in 1791 and later published under 
the title of L ’Emile réalisé acknowledges its debt to Emile 
much more directly than the others had done. Despite this, 
it remains very close to the other early Revolutionary plans
1. Fèvre du Grandvaux: L ’Emile réalisé ou Plan d ’éducation 
générale. Gorfou An VII.
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of education, in that its basic aim is the formation of 
socially-conscious, patriotic citizens, and that to do this 
it proposes a system of communal education which will be 
open to all. Some of its ideas are, however, perhaps closer
to the basic ideas of Emile than the others had been.
The author hopes to produce a regeneration of human 
society by basing education on the laws of nature. This 
does not entail a return to an earlier state, but the 
rational achievement of the essential virtues of an earlier 
state in which man was directed towards a state of 
instinctive goodness:
"En les instrljyQsant, je veux reléguer de cette 
terre les préjugés qui nous avilissent, et 
dissiper l ’ignorance, la source des plus grands 
maux. C ’est alors que nous ferons par raison
ce que, dans l ’état de nature, nous faisions
par instinct; c ’est alors que plus rapprochés 
de cette même nature, nous retrouverons enfin 
notre premier bonheur."1
This is, in fact, very similar to Rousseau’s idea 
of the superiority of the social state, in which man can 
achieve virtue by rational choice, in contrast to the 
natural state, in which ignorance of the moral situation 
prevents man from achieving morality and, hence, virtue.
Like Rousseau, Fèvre also sees a state based on the laws 
of environmental nature as a desirable state, capable of
1. Fèvre du Grandvaux: op.cit., p.1.
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satisfying man’s desire for happiness.
Fèvre’s plan, however, though it shares many details 
with Rousseau’s ideas on the physical environment of the 
child; school in the country, vegetarian diet, breast­
feeding (although this is to be done by carefully selected 
wet-nurses, not the mother), gardening etc. together with 
some of Rousseau’s educational methods; training in 
workshops, no religion until adolescence, also contains 
the egalitarian, society-centred ideas common to the other 
revolutionary essays on education. Fèvre teaches his pupils 
about society, and trains them to fill specific offices in 
it. He also provides them with a moral code based on their 
duties towards society, which is to take the place of the 
varying moral codes of religion:
’’on leur recommandera à tous d ’etre bons et justes, 
de gagner l ’estime de tout le monde en se rendant 
utiles et en faisant du bien, chacun selon son 
pouvoir: car c ’est là la meilleure et même 
l ’unique religion.’’1
Fèvre’s plan, like many others at this time, demands 
a complete break with the old system in order to be effective. 
Children are to be educated in a separate, self-supporting 
community, the ’’Berceau de la Nation’’, from which they will 
proceed to the national schools. Their only contact with
1. Fèvre du Grandvaux: op.cit., p. 12.
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the outside world will he on visiting days when they will 
meet their parents in the presence of their nurses and 
teachers. No-one who leaves the "Berceau" or a national 
school will be allowed to re-enter it.
This idea of isolating children from corrupt society 
by placing them in state boarding-schools was already 
fashionable by the time Fèvre du Grandvaux uses it. Villier 
had also planned to isolate his pupils from the corrupting 
influences of society by placing them in state boarding- 
schools. Discussing the danger of children receiving a bad 
education before they are old enough to enter the new 
boarding-schools, he says:
"J’ai tari cette Source inépuisable de désordres; 
je n ’admets point d ’enïans au-dessus de six ans.
A cet âge, il y a toujours de la ressource 
J ’exige de plus, que les enfans de six ^ s ,  une 
fois entrés dans mon établissement n ’en sortent 
que pour n ’y plus revenir, ou après leur éducation 
finie. Avec toutes ces précautions, je suis assuré 
de leur conserver des moeurs pures - d e  les rendre 
utiles à leur patrie, à l ’humanité."'
The Abbé Audrein in his Mémoire sur 1 ’éducation 
nationale française, given to the National Assembly in 
December 1790, also insists on the corrupting influence 
of the parental home and advocates the establishment of 
egalitarian boarding-schools open to all. He criticises
1. Villier: op.cit., p . 113.
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the isolation of private education, because it fails to 
produce public-spirited citizens, and substitutes for it 
the communal isolation of the state boarding-school.
It is impossible to say how much this idea of 
isolation owes to Emile. It had already been expressed 
by Coyer in 1770, and in fact goes back as far as Saint- 
Pierre’s idea of a separate, school community. It also 
seems to be a natural enough solution in a situation where 
a new political and legal system had just been enforced, 
and which could not seriously be expected to represent a 
moral re-birth of the population as a whole. Moreover, the 
problem of reintegrating these children into a corrupt social 
order should, theoretically at least, no longer exist, since 
these children are now to be educated to fit the new social 
system in Prance. The authors of these plans on public 
education are, in fact, extending the idea of isolation 
from corrupt society of Emile, and transposing it into the 
plural, but none of them seems to associate their decision 
with Rousseau’s earlier suggestion.
The only writer who comes close to the dual formation 
of Emile, i.e., the combination of natural and social man, 
at this time, is Jean Debry, who completed his Essai sur
1. Audrein: op.cit., p.35.
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l ’éducation nationale in November 1790. Unfortunately, 
the first part of his essay is unobtainable, but the second 
part illustrates fairly clearly the essential contents of 
the first. Debry is concerned with an education in two 
stages: the first deals with the child uniquely in relation 
to himself and culminates in a "fete de 1 ’ingénuité"; the 
second represents a complete break with the first and is 
concerned with the formation of the citizen:
"L*enfance est ecoulée, nous touchons à 
l ’adolescence; il n ’y a pas un instant à 
perdre, formons le citoyen; car à mesure 
que les considérations sociales et harmoniques 
gagnent d ’étendue, il importe que les affections 
individuelles diminuent d ’énergie."1
This educational programme in two stages is quite 
obviously following Rousseau’s division of Emile’s education 
into a pre-social, a-moral phase followed by a social and 
moral period. Like De Beaurieu, however, Debry misses the 
synthetic quality of Emile’s education and gives his pupils 
first an education which is concerned only with themselves 
and their individual talents, and then subordinates this 
to their formation for society in which they are only 
considered in their role as citizens and in their relation­
ship to the patrie. Prom adolescence, everything in 
Debry’s plan gains a communal character, which is directed
1. Debry: op.cit., Pt.II, p.7.
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towards the group, not the individual:
"dirigés par les leçons que devancent leurs 
penchants, bientôt ils aspireront après 
1 ’instant mémorable où le sentiment qui les 
lie à leurs condisciples les embrasera d ’amour 
pour la société".1
The patrie is to give them wives, whom they can only obtain
by proving themselves to be worthy citizens. Their education
will reach its climax in a public festival, the "fete de
l ’amour et du patriotisme".
Very little of Rousseau’s ideas on the relationship 
of nature and society, natural and social man, the individual 
and the citizen, private and public education, seems to have 
come across to the writers of the pre-revolutionary and 
early revolutionary period. The early years show a reaction 
to the apparently anti-social orientation of Emile, and 
support for the current régime. Many writers on public 
education ignore Emile or comment briefly on other aspects 
of it. Only De Beaurieu seems to have understood the 
basic structure of Emile’s education, and even then he 
gives it a twist of his own, which overemphasises man’s 
social role at the expense of his rights as an individual.
In the 1770s, Emile seems to have been generally interpreted 
as a treatise on private education, and criticised as such.
1. Debry: op.cit., p.38.
2. Ibid., p.39.
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though those who criticise it on this point adopt other 
aspects of the book and incorporate them in their own 
essays on public education. By the time the Revolution 
comes Emile is obviously popular, but hardly any comments 
are made on this particular question.
The fact is, that those who write about education 
during the second half of the eighteenth century are no 
more interested in private education and the individual 
than Duclos and Morelly had been. They fail to understand 
Rousseau’s difficulty concerning the need for parallel 
political and educational reform, although this idea does 
seem to emerge little by little before it finally 
crystallises at the Revolution, but it does so apparently 
independently of Emile. At first, the educationists 
criticise Emile’s individualistic education; by the time 
the Revolution arrives they ignore it. Only Major raises 
the old objection, and even then this is on practical 
issues, rather than on the system as a whole.
If the Revolutionary plans seem to owe a great deal 
to Emile, most of it is to the now popularised ideas of 
physical education and teaching methods. These had been 
gradually incorporated into works on public education, 
and, according to Proyart, had even been tried out in
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schools, and the Revolutionaries simply incorporate them 
en masse in their own plans for reformed public education.
The question of isolation from corrupt society is 
more difficult to place. It may owe a great deal to Emile, 
but in 1789 and 90 this is not directly recognised by the 
educationists. Fèvre du Grandvaux may in fact think this 
is one of the elements of Emile he is putting into practice, 
but he makes no point of saying so. It would be interesting 
to see if the later Revolutionary plans for public education 
make any more direct references to Rousseau on the question 
of isolation, and if, in fact, they realise the transforma­
tion which has taken place.
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CHAPTER III 
THE FORMATION OP THE PERSONALITY
Rousseau’s handling of philosophical, or what we 
might term, early psychological questions in Emile represents 
yet another attempt at synthesis; this time of traditional 
philosophy, as developed by Descartes and Malebranche, and 
the more modern system of Sensationalism.
Traditional philosophy defines man as a combination 
of two substances, a material body and an immaterial soul.
The material element attaches man to the animal world of 
the senses and passions, while the immaterial element raises 
him towards the purely spiritual nature of God. The 
rational faculties of the human soul, intellect and will, 
are to be understood in their relationship to the divine.
They are immaterial and need no bodily organ for their 
performances, although, in this life, they depend on the 
senses for their activities. They are capable of cognizing 
the universais, and reflecting on their own performances.
Man is conscious of his existence through the exercise of 
his rational faculties (Descartes: Cogito ergo sum). and 
is distinguished from the animal world by his use of reason 
and free will. (According to Descartes animal reactions 
are purely mechanistic.)
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Malebranche continued Descartes’ definition of the 
dualism of human nature. For him,^ the- body ^ is merely
I'
"l’étendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur; et toutes 
ses propriétés ne consistent que dans le repos, et le 
mouvement, et dans une infinité de figures différentes"^
i.e. it is a purely passive faculty, whereas the soul is 
an active faculty "moi qui pense, qui sent, qui veut: c ’est 
la substance où se trouvent toutes les modifications dont 
j’ai le sentiment intérieur, et qui ne peuvent subsister 
que dans l ’ame qui les sent".
These two substances are closely connected by means 
of fibres which communicate with the brain. The senses and 
mind are not, in fact, separate, since perceptions through 
the senses must be conscious perceptions (i.e. one cannot 
have pain without feeling it, and hence perceiving it) and, 
in this way, we can say that the senses merely allow us to 
perceive gross, material objects which are present, and the 
impressions these make on our senses are immediately 
communicated to the brain. Absent objects are perceived 
by another faculty, the imagination, while intellectual 
concepts, like a perfect circle or perfection, are perceived
1. Malebranche: De la recherche de la vérité. Paris, 1772, 
Vol.I, p.110.
2. Ibid., Vol.I, p.m.
194
by the understanding alone, independently of the senses.
These degrees of perception are subjected to two kinds of 
judgement, the one, passive and mechanical (e.g. the eyes 
automatically adjust and record according to distance, etc., 
and demand no real judgement) and the other, an active 
principle which judges and reasons, causing sensations 
within itself. This according to Malebranche, can only 
be the effect of "une intelligence et d ’une puissance 
infinie". That is to say, everything is organised and 
brought into effect by God. Even the sensations which are . 
the occasion of our ideas are caused by him. Purely 
intellectual ideas are seen only in God (i.e. we see a 
round disc in our imagination, but a circle is seen in God). 
Judgements based on pure intellections can never be wrong, 
unlike those based on sensation. Error comes about when 
volonté (will, the active judgement faculty) depends too 
much on knowledge received from entendement (understanding, 
the passive examining faculty) which has been occasioned by 
the senses. The only way to avoid error is by never agreeing 
to information provided by entendement until all aspects are 
examined and we can do so without pricks of conscience.
Man’s ultimate guides towards truth are the voice of God
1. Malebranche: op.cit.. Vol.I, p . 106.
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and conscience, which direct us towards the general good.
The Sensationalists, on the other hand, do not define 
intellect in its relation to the divine, hut rather, reverse 
the situation, and hase the judgements of the intellect 
entirely on knowledge acquired through the senses. For the 
Sensationalists everything from man’s consciousness of his 
existence to his formation of complex, abstract ideas comes 
from sensation (cogito ergo sum becomes sentio ergo sum).
The first thinker to completely dispense with a 
higher influence in man’s being, and reduce consciousness 
and the formation of ideas to a purely sensory basis is 
Condillac. In his Essai sur 1 ’origine des connaissances 
humaines he states that, since the Fall:
"Nous n ’avons point d ’idées qui ne nous viennent 
des sens"1
and works out a system in which all the operations of the 
mind develop from the initial stage of perception which is 
occasioned in the mind by an action of the senses, resulting 
from impressions on the senses. Unlike Descartes, he grants 
animals the same capacity as man for forming ideas, the sole 
distinction being that animals are only capable of the first 
stages in the thought mechanism. They cannot, as man can,
1. Corpus général des philosophes français, ed. R. Bayer, 
Paris 1947, Vol.XXXIII, Oeuvres philosophiques de 
Condillac. Vol.I. Essai sur 1 ’origine des connoissances 
humaines I,I>?8, p.7.
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control their imagination or attach their ideas to arbitrary
signs, and this prevents them from carrying out the higher
operations of thought.
Despite the close relationship of sensation to ideas
in Condillac's system he, nevertheless, carefully
distinguishes between them. Sensation is "l'impression
qui se produit en nous à la presence des objets en tant
qu’elle vient par les sens", while ideas are formed from
sensations "lorsque la reflexion nous les fait considérer
2
comme images de quelque chose".
Buffon too insists on a similar process of thought,
and a similar distinction between idea and sensation, though
he denies that animals are capable of forming ideas.
Talking about the formation of ideas, he says:
"ils (les animaux) ont des sensations, mais il 
leur manque la faculté de les comparer, c ’est- 
à-dire la puissance qui produit les idées: 
car les idées ne sont que des sensations 
comparées, ou, pour mieux dire, des associations 
de sensations".3
More extreme Sensationalists, however, dropped the
distinction between sensation and idea and equated the
operations of feeling and judging. Helvétius, for example,
defines the ability to receive impressions caused by external
1. Condillac: op.cit.. I, III, § 16, p.40.
2. Ibid., I, IV, 2, § 18, p.45.
3. Buffon: op.cit.. Vol.IV, Discours sur la nature des
animaux, p.41.
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objects as "sensibilité physique", and the ability to retain 
this impression, memory, as "une sensation continuée mais 
affaiblie".  ^ The two are, in fact, one and the same 
principle, sensation:
"Lorsque par une suite de mes idées, ou par 
1 ’ébranlement que certains sons causent dans 
l ’organe de mon oreille, je me rappelle l ’image 
d ’un chêne, alors mes organes intérieurs doivent 
nécessairement se trouver à peu près dans la 
même situation où ils étaient à la vue de ce 
chêne. Or, cette situation des organes doit 
incontestablement produire une sensation: il 
est donc évident que se ressouvenir, c ’est 
sentir".2
He extends the power of sensation to the exercise of 
judgement :
"Quand je juge la grandeur ou la couleur des 
objets qu’on me présente, il est évident que 
le jugement porté sur les différentes impressions 
que ces objets ont faites sur mes sens, n ’est 
proprement qu’une sensation; que je puis dire 
également : je juge ou je sens que, de deux 
objets, l ’un que j’appelle toise, fait sur moi 
une impression différente de celui que j’appelle 
pied; que la couleur que je nomme rouge. agit sur 
mes yeux différemment de celle que je nomme jaune; 
et j’en conclus qu’en pareil cas, juger n ’est 
jamais que sentir."3
In this way he defines man’s ability to think as a completely
passive function, mechanically operated by the capacity to
1. Helvétius: Oeuvres complètes. Paris, 1818, Vol.I,
De l ’Esprit, pp.1-2.
2. Ibid., p.7.
3. Ibid., p.9.
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distinguish between sensations.
A similar definition appeared in the Encyclopédie 
article "Evidence" - The author equates the capacity to 
see two different objects with the capacity to judge that 
they are different:
"un grand bâton et un petit bâton vus ensemble, 
font naître la sensation du grand bâton et la 
sensation du petit bâton ....
"Ainsi juger .... qu’un bâton est plus grand 
qu’un autre, n ’est autre chose que sentir ou 
appercevoir ces sensations telles qu’elles sont.
Il est donc évident que ce sont les sensations 
elles-mêmes qui produisent les jugemens".1
The resulting concordance of sensations constitutes a purely
passive function of the sensitive being. All the operations
of the brain are reducible to the basic corporeal mechanism
of sensation:
"les causes sensibles qui agissent sur nos sens, 
et qui sont les objets de nos sensations, sont 
eux-mêmes les objets de nos connoissances, et 
la source de notre intelligence, puisque ce 
sont eux qui nous procurent les sensations par 
lesquelles nous sommes assurés de l ’existence 
et de la durée de notre être sensitif, et de 
1 ’évidence de nos raisonnemens".^
Or again:
"1’exercise de nos sens est le principe de toute
-certitude, et le fondement de toutes nos 
connoissances".3
1. Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des 
arts des métiers. Paris 1751-7. Vol.YI. "Evidence",
p.148, 20.
2. Ibid., p.150, 26.
3. Idem.
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It is against this extreme form of Sensationalism, 
the reduction of the mind to one passive faculty, sensation, 
and not against the mere basing of knowledge on the 
experience of the senses, that Rousseau is writing in Emile. 
His own system of education is, in fact, based on the 
acquisition of knowledge through the senses, and is a 
striking example of what is essentially a Sensationalist 
method, learning through experience and observation of the 
concrete, physical world. The whole of Books I and II is 
based on the idea that, since the senses are the first 
organs to develop in the child, they must be exercised 
first, and that it is through them that the intelligence 
will be able to develop:
"Exercer les sens n ’est ças seulement en faire 
usage, c ’est apprendre a bien juger par eux, 
c ’est apprendre, pour ainsi dire à sentir; car 
nous ne savons ni toucher, ni voir, ni entendre,
que comme nous avons appris........N ’exercez
donc pas seulement les forces, exercez tous les 
sens qui les dirigent ; tirez de chacun d ’eux 
tout le parti possible, puis vérifiez l ’impression 
de l ’un par l ’autre. Mesurez, comptez, peser, 
comparez. N ’employez la force qu’après avoir 
estimé la résistance; faites toujours en sorte 
que 1 ’estimation de l ’effet précédé l ’usage des 
moyens. Intéressez l ’enfant à ne jamais faire 
d ’efforts insuffisants ou superflus. Si vous 
1 ’accoutumez à prévoir ainsi l ’effet de tous ses 
mouvements et à redresser ses erreurs par 
l ’expérience, n ’est-il pas clair que plus il 
agira, plus il deviendra judicieux."^
1. Emile: p . 131.
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Rousseau’s definitions of sensation and the formation 
of ideas are also very close to the Sensationalists* 
definitions:
"de la comparaison de plusieurs sensations 
successives ou simultanées, et du jugement 
qu’on en porte, naît une sorte de sensation 
mixte ou complexe que j’appelle idée".1
This judgement is, however, not the uniquE, passive faculty 
of Helvétius and the author of "Evidence", but a dual 
mechanism, one operation of which is passive, the other 
active:
"Les idées simples ne sont que des sensations 
comparées. Il y a des jugements dans les 
simples sensations aussi bien que dans les 
sensations complexes, que j’appelle idées 
simples. Dans la sensation, le jugement est 
purement passif, il affirme qu’on sent ce qu’on 
sent. Dans la perception on idée, le jugement 
est actif; il rapproche, il compare, il détermine 
des rapports que les sens ne déterminent pas*"2
In the Profession de Foi Rousseau continues his 
refutation of the levelling tendencies of "Evidence".
Using the example of the two sticks, he writes:
"Voir deux objets à la fois, ce n ’est pas voir 
leurs rapports ni juger de leurs différences ; 
apercevoir plusieurs objets les uns hors des 
autres n ’est pas les nombrer. Je puis avoir 
au même instant l ’idée d ’un grand bâton et d ’un 
petit bâton sans les comparer, sans juger que 
l ’un est plus petit que l ’autre, comme je puis 
voir à la fois ma main entière, sans faire le 
compte de mes doigts. Ces idées comparatives.
1. Emile: p.228.
2. Idem.
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plus grand, plus petit, de même que les idées 
numériques d ’un, de deux, etc., ne sont 
certainement pas des sensations, quoique mon 
esprit ne les produise qu’à 1 ’occasion de mes 
sensations.
Rousseau’s arguments in the Profession de Roi do not, 
however, merely constitute a refutation of the passivity of 
the thinking faculty. Unable to divest himself of an inner 
conviction that God exists, and that the human soul and its 
rational faculties, despite their dependence on the senses, 
are ultimately connected through conscience to the divine, 
he brings back the old arguments of the independence of 
reason, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of 
the soul. He finds in man not only an active faculty of 
judgement, but also an active, creative force, the will, 
which enables man to control his actions, and combat the 
lowering influences of sense and passion:
"En méditant sur la nature de l ’homme, j’y crus 
découvrir deux principes distincts, dont l ’un 
1 ’élevait à l ’étude des vérités éternelles, à 
l ’amour de la justice et du beau moral,aux 
régions du monde intellectuel dont la contemplation 
fait les délices du sage, et dont l ’autre le 
ramenait bassement en lui-même, 1 ’asservissait à 
1 ’empire des sens, aux passions qui sont leurs 
ministres, et contrariait par elles tout ce que 
lui inspirait le sentiment du premier. En me 
sentant entraîné, combattu par ces deux mouvements 
contraires je me disais: Non l ’homme n ’est pas un: 
je veux et je ne veux pas, je me sens à la fois 
esclave et libre; je vois le bien, je l ’aime, et
1. E m i l e : p.315.
202
je fais le mal; je suis actif quand j’écoute 
la raison, passif quand mes passions 
m ’entraînent ; et mon pire tourment quand je 
succombe est de sentir que j’ai pu résister.
It is this activity of the judgement and will (both of
which stem from the same active principle, the "faculté
intelligente":
"si l ’on comprend bien que l ’homme est actif dans 
ses jugements, que son entendement n ’est que le 
pouvoir de comparer et de juger, on verra que sa 
fierté n ’est qu’un pouvoir semblable, ou dérivé 
de celui-là; il choisit le bon comme il a jugé 
le vrai; s ’il juge faux, il choisit mal"2)
that constitutes man’s freedom and immateriality:
"Le principe de toute action est dans la volonté 
d ’un être libre: on ne saurait remonter au delà 
.... Supposer quelque acte, quelque effet qui ne 
dérive pas d ’un principe actif, c ’est vraiment 
supposer des actes sans causes, c ’est tomber dans 
un cercle viçieux. Ou il n ’y a point de première 
impulsion, obLtoute première impulsion n ’a nulle 
cause antérieure, et il n ’y a point de véritable 
volonté sans liberté. L ’homme est donc libre 
dans ses actions, et, comme tel, animé d ’une 
substance immatérielle ..."3
But, although he is free, he is nevertheless able to know
what is right and good through the exercise of conscience,
a faculty which is independent of the senses and in direct,
spiritual contact with the divine will:
"La suprême jouissance est dans le contentement 
de soi-même; c ’est pour mériter ce contentement 
que nous sommes placés sur la terre et doués de
1. Emile: p.326.
2. Ibid., p.328.
3. Ibid., p.329.
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la liberté, que nous sommes tentés par les 
passions et retenus par la conscience."1
Despite the lowering influences of the senses and passions,
Rousseau reaffirms his faith in the sureness of knowledge
through the senses. It is not sensation which causes error,
but the active faculty of jugement:
"la vérité est dans les choses et non pas dans 
mon esprit qui le juge, et ... moins je mets du 
mien dans les jugements que j’en porte, plus je 
suis sûr d ’approcher de la vérité"
This attempt to combine a belief in the sureness of 
knowledge through the senses with an intuitive knowledge of 
what is right and good, and the whole idea of, on the one 
hand, basing the intellect on the senses and, on the other, 
of tracing its relation to the divine, creates various 
difficulties in Rousseau’s conception of the working of 
the child’s mind and the necessary teaching methods it 
implies. Emile’s early education, as we have seen, is 
based entirely on education through the senses, and demands 
merely a capacity to associate sensations and form simple 
ideas. This Rousseau terms "la raison puérile ou sensitive". 
At about the age of twelve, however, Emile develops the 
capacity to compare the simple ideas he already has and form 
complex, abstract ideas, and about the age of fifteen he
1. Emile: p.329.
2. Ibid., p.316.
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acquires his full rational faculties and a sense of 
conscience. These various faculties do not in fact develop 
naturally from the basic principle of sensation, and seem 
to have a different, independent source. Rousseau merely 
seems to imagine that they will develop automatically in 
conjunction with the child’s physical development.
This combination of Cartesian and Sensationalist 
ideas was unlikely to satisfy either the Cartesians or the 
Sensationalists, and a lengthy criticism of Rousseau’s ideas 
did in fact appear. This was by the man whom Rousseau thought 
he was refuting when he re-established the active thinking 
faculty, Helvétius, the author of De 1 ’Esprit. His 
refutation of some of Rousseau’s ideas in Emile was published 
posthumously and forms part of his second major work.
De l ’Homme, in which he attempts to justify some of his 
basic ideas which he had already put forward in De 1 ’Esprit.
As he sees the problem, the main differences between 
his philosophy and Rousseau’s depend on the acceptance in 
Rousseau’s case, and the non-acceptance in his own, of two 
fundamental premisses: the first, that the inequality of 
individual minds is the result of the greater or lesser
(a) As a detailed analysis of Helvétius’ criticisms of 
Rousseau does not exist, I have decided to include 
a detailed examination of his points in this section.
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perfection of the sensory organs, and the second, that our 
virtues, like our views, are innate.
Let us examine the first of these. Although, as we 
have seen, Helvétius believes that sense and mind are one 
and the same thing, he nevertheless believes, as Malebranche 
had done, that the perfection of the mind is independent of 
the perfection of the senses. In De l ’Esprit he argues:
"Si la toise, par exemple, est aux yeux d ’un tel 
hoime plus petite, la neige moins blanche, et 
1 ’ébène moins noire qu’aux yeux de tel autre, 
ces deux hommes appercevront néanmoins toujours 
les mêmes rapports entre tous les objets: la 
toise, en conséquence, paraîtra toujours à leurs 
yeux plus grande que le pied; la neige, le plus 
blanc de tous les corps; et 1 ’ébène, le plus noir 
de tous les bois.
"Or comme la justesse d ’esprit consiste dans la vue 
nette des véritables rapports que les objets ont 
entre eux .... j’en conclus que la plus ou moins 
grande perfection de 1 ’organisation, tant 
extérieure qu’intérieure, ne peut en rien 
influer sur la justesse de nos jugemens.
In De l ’Homme he repeats this point of view, this time taking
his arguments on to a more practical level:
"l’Expérience .... n ’est pas sur ce point d ’accord 
avec le raisonnement : elle démontre bien que c ’est 
à nos sens que nous devons nos idées, mais elle ne 
démontre point que l ’esprit soit toujours en nous 
proportionné à la finesse plus ou moins grande de 
ces mêmes sens. Les femmes, par exemple, dont la
1. Helvétius, De l ’Homme, Londres, 1773, Vol.II, p.2.
2, Helvétius, De l ’Esprit. Vol.I, pp.234-5.
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"peau plus délicate que celle des Hommes, leur 
donne plus de finesse dans le sens du toucher 
n ’ont pas plus d ’esprit qu’un Voltaire ...."1
Helvétius in fact endows all men with the necessary
sensitivity to form ideas equally well. For him, the
inequality of individual minds stems from an unequal
capacity for attention, which is itself stimulated by the
strength of the passions. However, all men are equally
capable of attaining the same degree of attention. Any
inequality which exists between individuals in this respect
is ultimately the result of their environmental education:
"1’inégalité d ’esprit aperçue dans les hommes 
que j ’ appelle communément bien organisés, ne 
dépend nullement de 1 ’excellence plus ou moins 
grande de leur organisation, mais de 1 ’éducation 
différente qu’ils reçoivent, des circonstances 
diverses dans lesquelles ils se trouvent, enfin 
du peu d ’habitude qu’ils ont de penser, de la 
haine qu’en conséquence ils contractent, dans 
leur première jeunesse, pour 1 ’application, 
dont ils deviennent absolument incapables dans 
un âge plus avancé".2
Rousseau, on the other hand, as we have already seen, 
considers the training of the senses to be vital to the 
subsequent development of the mind:
"Voulez-vous donc cultiver 1 ’intelligence de 
votre élève;cultivez les forces (i.e. the 
senses) qu’elle doit gouverner!"3
1. De l ’Homme. Vol.I, pp.128-9.
2. De 1 ’Esprit. Vol.I, p.397.
3. Emile: p.111.
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However, Helvétius, in criticising this, overlooks other 
aspects of Rousseau’s definition of the mind, and fails to 
draw attention to Rousseau’s attempt to unite an education 
based on the senses with a belief in the combination of the 
material and immaterial substances of the human soul. 
Rousseau, in fact, says nowhere that the intelligence is 
always entirely dependent on the development of the senses, 
although, given his method of education based on the senses, 
and carried out by means of concrete examples, his pupil 
could only benefit from an intensive preparatory sense and 
physical education. Helvétius is perhaps over accentuating 
Rousseau’s insistence on this point, and emphasising the 
Sensationalist aspects of Rousseau’s system at the expense 
of its Cartesian elements.
Diderot was later to rally to Rousseau’s side on the 
question of the influence of the sensory organs on the 
capacity of the mind. He, in fact, shifts the emphasis 
of the problem from the perfection of the training of the 
senses to the detrimental effect of bodily illness or 
indisposition on the intellectual faculties. In his 
refutation of Helvétius’ De l ’Homme, he argues:
"... Quelle correspondance plus rigoureuse que 
celle de l ’état de mon corps avec l ’état de 
mon esprit? Quelle est la vicissitude, si 
légère qu’elle soit, qui ne passe de mon
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"organisation à mes facultés intellectuelles?
J ’ai mal dormi, je pense mal; je digère mal, 
je ^ pense mal ....
"l’état sain ou malsain des organes, durable 
ou passager, pendant un jour ou pendant tout 
le cours de la vie, depuis 1 ’instant de la 
naissance jusqu’au moment de la mort est le 
thermomètre de 1*esprit".1
With what concerns the supposedly false second premise,
Helvétius finds Rousseau to be self-contradictory. The first
quotation he chooses to illustrate this reveals an obvious
eenvi-eti^n on Rousseau’s part to regard individual
temperamental differences as innate and fundamentally
unchangeable:
"Pour changer les caractères il faudrait pouvoir 
changer les tempéramens; vouloir pareillement 
changer les esprits, et d ’un sot faire un homme 
de talens, c ’est d ’un blond vouloir faire un 
brun. Comment fondroit-on les coeurs et les 
esprits sur un modèle commun? nos talens, nos 
vices,^nos vertus et par conséquent nos 
caractères, ne dépendent-ils pas entièrement 
de notre organisation?"2 (a)
This he contrasts with another of Rousseau’s statements in
1. Diderot: Oeuvres complètes, ed. Assézat, Paris 1875,
Vol.II, Refutation suivie de l ’ouvrage d ’Helvétius 
intitulé l ’Homme pp.405-6.
2. De l ’Homme. Vol.II, p.3. Paraphrased version of 
La Nouvelle Héloise. p.566.
(a) This is in fact a quotation from the letter on education 
in La Nouvelle Héloise. However, since Helvétius 
considers this letter as "un extrait de 1 ’Emile fait par 
l ’auteur lui-même" (De l ’Homme II, p.289) I shall 
include his criticisms of it with his criticisms of 
extracts taken directly from Emile.
209
which he appears to he saying the opposite, i.e. that certain 
characteristics at least, are not innate, hut acquired:
"Lorsqu’on nourrit les enfans dans leur premiere 
simplicité, d ’où leur viendraient des vices dont 
ils n ’ont pas vu d ’exemple, des passions qu’ils 
n ’ont nulle occasion de sentir, des préjugés 
que rien ne leur inspire?"1
Helvétius himself accepts the second of these.
In La Nouvelle Héloise Rousseau’s position on this 
question is, indeed, somewhat ambiguous. Wolmar opposes 
Saint-Preux (who represents Helvétius’ point of view) on 
the question of innate or acquired characteristics.^
He argues that it is impossible to change the individual’s 
natural dispositions, which must be allowed to develop 
freely. Consequently, education must be individualistic 
and not universalistic as Helvétius suggests:
"C’est done en vain qu’on prétend^roit refondre 
les divers esprits sur un modèle^commun. On 
peut les contraindre et non les changer: on 
peut empêcher les hommes de se montrer tels 
qu’ils sont, mais non de les faire devenir 
autres... Or avant de cultiver le caractère il 
faut 1 ’étudier, attendre paisiblement qu’il 
se montre."2
1. De l ’Homme & La Nouvelle Héloise. pp.583-4.
2. La Nouvelle Héloise, p.56ë.
(a) It must be remembered that Julie and Wolmar are 
only characters and do not necessarily represent 
Rousseau’s point of view. Emile is a surer guide 
to establishing his real opinions.
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i.e., the educator can suppress characteristics, but he 
cannot create new ones. This basic principle of the 
uniqueness of character is applied throughout Emile. One 
of Rousseau’s main points is that the tutor should study 
and know the particular potentialities of the child before 
trying to educate him in one direction rather than another:
"il faut bien connaître le génie particular de 
chaque enfant pour savoir quel régime moral 
lui convient".1
It is this proposition much more than any question of self- 
contradiction that Helvétius is attacking. He cannot accept 
the idea of the génie particulier or tempérament, and himself 
represents the opposite line of thought, which is that of 
the environmentalists:
"Né sans idée, sans vice et sans vertu, tout 
jusqu’à l ’humanité est dans l ’homme une 
acquisition; c ’est à son éducation qu’il doit 
ce sentiment."2 (a)
The differences which divided Rousseau and Helvétius on 
this subject were to become even more pronounced in the 
arguments over tempérament and milieu in the nineteenth 
century.
1. Emile, p.78.
2. De l ’Homme. Vol.I, Note (b) pp.102-103.
(a) Diderot also supports the idea that characteristics are 
innate in his Réfutation (pp.406-7): "1’homme ne naît 
rien, mais chaque homme naît avec une aptitude propre 
à une chose".
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However, Helvétius’ first quotation specifically 
includes the question of good and had qualities ("nos vices, 
nos vertus") in the category of innate characteristics.
This is in fact Helvétius’ interpretation of what Rousseau 
is saying in La Nouvelle Héloise since the last sentence 
("nos talens, nos vices, nos vertus et par conséquent nos 
caractères ne dépendent-ils pas entièrement de notre 
organisation?") does not figure in the original text.
It might be argued that Rousseau’s reference to "un emporté" 
may indicate the presence of a bad characteristic in the 
individual, but Rousseau does not specifically include the 
questions of good and evil in this passage. However, the 
issue is confused in La Nouvelle Héloise by Julie’s 
reference to children who are "bien nés", letting the 
reader suppose that there are others who are not, and this 
can be used to justify Helvétius* interpretation and 
criticism of contradiction. However, in Emile. Rousseau 
carefully distinguishes between what are, in fact, two 
separate issues; on the one hand, the existence of inherent 
temperamental factors, on the other, the question of good 
and evil. We have already seen that the question of an 
innate individual temperament is followed throughout Emile.
1. La Nouvelle Héloise. p.568.
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Emile also represents a firm stand on the side of the 
natural goodness of the child:
"Posons pour maxime incontestable que les premiers 
mouvements de la nature sont toujours droits: il 
n*y a point de perversité originelle dans le 
coeur humain: il ne s ’y trouve pas un seul vice 
dont on ne puisse dire comment et par où il est 
entré."1
There is no doubt here that Rousseau entirely excludes the 
possibility of the child possessing an innate tendency 
towards evil.
The question of acquired or inherent characteristics, 
coupled with Helvétius’ conviction that the child cannot 
know intuitively what is just and unjust, prompts him to 
criticise Rousseau’s conception of conscience. On this 
point he finds Rousseau to be again self-contradictory.
He correctly quotes two instances where Rousseau 
clearly shows that he believes conscience to be innate.
His third quotation is, on the contrary, intended to show 
that Rousseau, at other moments, tries to uphold the 
completely opposite point of view, e.g. when referring 
to the poor:
"La voix intérieure ne se fait point entendre 
au pauvre qui ne songe qu’à se nourrir."2
This quotation is in fact, quoted somewhat out of context.
1. Emile, p.76.
2. De l ’Homme, Vol.II, p.4. Emile, p.306.
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It does not imply, as Helvétius would have us believe, that 
Rousseau thinks that in some cases conscience is not a 
primitive natural faculty of man, but, that there are 
conditions in which this innate principle can be completely 
stifled, and hence, apparently non-existent, This is the 
case of the young man who seeks the advice of the Vicaire 
Savoyard:
"Sans être ignorant, pour son âge, il avait 
oublié tout ce qu’il lui importait de savoir
et l ’opprobre, où l ’avoit réduit la fortune,
étouffoit en lui tout vrai sentiment du bien 
et du mal•"1
The accent is quite clearly on "étouffait", and does not 
imply that conscience never had nor ever could exist in 
the young boy. Then follows the generalisation, which is
in fact, only quoted in part by Helvétius, and which lends
itself to misinterpretation:
"II est un degré d ’abrutissement qui ôte la vie 
à l ’âme; et la voix intérieure ne sait point 
se faire entendre à celui qui ne songe qu’à se 
nourrir."2
Helvétius’ fourth quotation is also concerned with 
the lower classes and is intended to illustrate the fact 
that Rousseau believes that they have no innate sense of 
what is "honnête":
"Le peuple a peu d ’idées de ce qui est beau et honnête".^
1. Emile, pp.305-306.
2. Ibid., p.306.
3. De l ’Homme. Vol.II, p.4. E mile, p . 500.
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Whether or not Rousseau meant to say categorically that
some people simply do not possess an inherent sense of
justice, etc., and, consequently, either that conscience
is not inherent hut acquired, (which, as Helvétius maintains,
would he a contradiction of his statements elsewhere), or
that conscience is only granted to the privileged few, is
very dehateahle. He makes no direct reference to this
possibility, and Helvétius* interpretation can only be
implied from the passage. Moreover, Rousseau goes on to
say in the same passage that the distinction, if any, between
the social classes, is the result of social injustice rather
than innate inequalities:
"non qu*on soit plus vicieux dans les derniers 
rangs que les premiers, mais parce qu’on y a 
peu d ’idée de ce qui est beau et honnête, et 
que 1 ’injustice des autres états fait voir à 
celui-ci la justice dans ces vices mêmes".1
This interpretation is further strengthened by the fact
that, still in the same passage, Rousseau divides men into
his own classes of those who think and those who do not,
and attributes this not to inherent inequalities, but to
2
inequality of education.
However, Helvétius’ final quotation on this point :
"qu’avant l ’âge de raison l ’homme fait le bien 
et le mal sans le connaître."3
1. Emile, p.500.
2. Idem.
3. De l ’Homme. Vol.II, p.4. Emile, p.43.
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presents a much greater difficulty. Is this in fact a 
direct contradiction on Rousseau’s part of his statements 
elsewhere that conscience is innate? If he believes in a 
stage during which time conscience is ineffectual and 
apparently non-existent, how can he logically argue that 
conscience is an innate principle?
In Emile. Rousseau supposes that, from birth till 
around the age of fifteen, the child is a completely 
a-moral, a-rational, a-social and a-sexual being. Time 
and again he states in these or similar terms:
"Avant l ’âge de raison (i.e. about 15) on ne 
saurait avoir aucune idée des êtres moraux 
ni des relations sociales."1
If the child has no notion of moral relationships, then he
has no notion of what is right and wrong, and hence, he can
have no sense of conscience. What he does have is a basic
desire for his own well-being, amour de soi or the instinct
of self-preservation:
"La seule passion naturelle à l ’homme est l ’amour 
de soi-même, ou 1 ’amour-propre pris dans un sens 
étendu."2
This is good in itself, since it is restricted entirely to 
the individual who, at this stage, has no social relationships 
Later, with the emotional development of the adolescent.
1. Emile, p.71.
2. Ibid., p.76.
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this principle combines with a natural capacity for 
compassion:
"quand le premier dévelc^ement des sens allume 
en lui le feu de 1 ’imagination, il commence à 
se sentir dans ses semblables, à s ’émouvoir de 
leurs plaintes, et à souffrir de leurs douleurs",
and prompts the individual to seek the good of his fellow-
men as well as his own. But, since man is prone to error
by the use of his free-will, this same principle can
degenerate into selfish self-interest (amour-propre in
its narrower sense), and prompt the individual to commit
evil. However, the adolescent’s developing intellectual
faculties allow him to understand the difference between
good and evil, and his free will, guided by reason, enables
him to choose the good and attain the rational, and not
merely instinctive, achievement of virtue. For Rousseau,
however, knowledge of right and wrong is not merely, as
Helvétius maintains, based on an intellectual understanding
of morality gained from environmental experience, any more
than morality itself is merely an established code of
behaviour based on men’s social relationships. It is
rather, as we have already seen, the manifestation of God’s
will, communicated to man by the voice of conscience - which
is an inner intuitive conviction of right and wrong and a
1. Emile, p.251.
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desire for good:
"Les actes de la conscience ne sont pas des 
jugements, mais des sentiments: quoique toutes 
nos idées nous viennent du dehors. Les 
sentiments qui les apprécient sont au dedans 
de nous, et c ’est par eux seuls que nous 
connaissons la convenance ou disconvenance qui 
existe entre nous et les choses que nous devons 
respecter ou fuir."1
This inner sentiment is, in fact, dependent on the 
understanding, and can only develop in conjunction with the 
development of the rational faculties; i.e. man has no 
innate knowledge of right and wrong, hut an innate capacity 
to desire what is right once his understanding provides him 
with this knowledge. Consequently, Rousseau can say that 
during the a-rational period of childhood, man has no sense 
of conscience since he has no knowledge of morality, hut
that with the advent of reason, and the development of
social relationships, conscience, a latent hut inherent 
faculty can develop, and guide man towards the good:
"Exister pour nous, c ’est sentir; notre sensibilité 
est incontestablement antérieure à notre 
intelligence, et nous avons eu des sentiments 
avant des idées. Quelle que soit la cause de
notre être, elle a pourvu à notre conservation
en nous donnant des sentiments convenables à 
notre nature ; et l ’on ne saurait nier qu’au moins 
ceux-là ne soient innés. Ces sentiments, quant 
à l ’individu, sont l ’amour de soi, la crainte de 
la douleur, l ’horreur de la mort, le désir du 
bien-être. Mais si, comme on n ’en peut douter,
1. Emile, p.341.
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"l’homme est sociable par sa nature, ou du 
moins fait pour le devenir, il ne peut l ’être 
que par d ’autres sentiments innés, relatifs à 
son espèce; .... Or, c ’est système moral 
formé, par ce double rapport à soi-même et à 
ses semblables que naît 1 ’impulsion de la 
conscience. Connaître le bien, ce n ’est pas 
l ’aimer: l ’homme n ’en a pas la eeneel-enee 
innée, mais sitôt que sa raison le lui fait 
connaître, sa conscience le porte à l ’aimer; 
c ’est ce sentiment qui est inné."1
Consequently, we can say that none of the quotations 
chosen by Helvétius on the subject of conscience effectively 
prove inconsistency on Rousseau’s part. Helvétius has 
merely failed to unravel Rousseau’s tortuous arguments, and 
has classed as contradictions, statements which can in fact 
be reconciled. Moreover, his criticism in De l ’Homme that 
all men would be good if, as Rousseau suggests, they had an 
innate sense of what is just, completely ignores Rousseau’s 
insistence on man’s capacity for error, and hence, sin:
"il choisit le bon comme il a jugé le vrai; 
il juge faux, il choisit mal",^
and his more emotional conviction that, once corruption has
made its entry, the voice of conscience is extremely
difficult to hear:
"S’il parle à tous les coeurs, pourquoi donc y 
en a-t-il si peu qui 1 ’entendent? ... c ’est 
qu’il nous parle la langue de la nature, que 
tout nous fait oublier ...3
1. Emile, pp.341-342.
2. Ibid., p.328.
3. Ibid., p.343.
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However, this makes little difference to the main point of 
Helvétius’ criticism, which is to oppose his own belief in 
the acquis&tive nature of conscience to Rousseau’s conviction 
that conscience is innate. For Helvétius conscience is 
entirely dependent on the development of reason, and the 
mere result of knowing what is right and wrong:
"On peut .... donner à la Jeunesse des idées 
nettes et saines de la Morale: à l ’aide d ’un 
catéchisme de probité on peut donc porter cette 
partie de l ’éducation au plus haut degré de 
perfection."1
One of Rousseau’s "proofs" of the existence of 
conscience is that, without it, how could the individual 
sacrifice his own interests for the achievement of the 
public good? Helvétius criticises this statement on two 
counts: firstly, he believes that by achieving the public 
good, the individual is satisfying his own interests in 
that he receives honour and public esteem, and secondly, 
he feels that here again Rousseau is contradicting statements 
he has made elsewhere.
The first part of the problem revolves around 
Rousseau’s insistence in Emile that the private and public 
good are not identical. Since the individual is first 
conscious only of his own needs and desires and does not
1. De l ’Homme. Vol.II, p.359.
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contract any social relationships until the period of 
adolescence, his innate principle of self-love (amour de soi) 
can only prompt him to seek his own good. For Rousseau this 
can only he good, since it does not involve any considerations 
of social morality. However, when the adolescent enters 
society and forms moral relationships, he becomes a fraction 
of a total society and, consequently, must subordinate his 
interests to the common good. We have already seen, in the 
section on private and public education, the difficulties 
which Rousseau encounters by refusing to identify the 
private and public good, yet attempting to reconcile the two. 
Helvétius fails to understand this distinction between the 
individual’s desire for his own well-being and his decision 
to sacrifice it for the public good. He himself bases all 
human actions on self-interest which means that anything 
which achieves the public good is in fact only an incidental 
result of an attempt to achieve the individual good.
Moreover he fails to understand Rousseau’s definition of 
"interest". This leads him to his second point concerning 
Rousseau’s contradictions.
Throughout Emile Rousseau carefully distinguishes 
between the desired development from indifferent self-love 
(amour de soi) to enlightened interest (vertu) (i.e. from 
the individual to the community) and the possible degeneration
221
of self-love into self-interest (amour-propre):
"L’amour de soi, qui ne regarde qu’à nous, est 
content quand nos vrais besoins sont satisfaits; 
mais 1 * amour-propre qui se compare, n ’est jamais 
content et ne saurait l ’être, parce que ce 
sentiment en nous préférant aux autres, exige 
aussi que les autres nous préfèrent à eux; ce 
qui est impossible."1
When Rousseau declares, then, that without some inner
conviction of the general good and its desirability, a man
cannot be expected to sacrifice his own self-love (amour de
soi) for the interests of the community, he does not mean,
as Helvétius thinks he does, that without conscience, man
could only act out of self-interest (amour-propre) and
would therefore never sacrifice himself for the public
good. Helvétius’ criticism is based on a misunderstanding
of Rousseau’s arguments. Consequently, his accusation of
subsequent contradictions is also based on misinterpretation.
■ For Helvétius, the term ’intérêt’ represents either
self-interest regardless of others, or a kind of vanity
which prompts man to seek the general good, whatever
disadvantages it may have for his immediate welfare, in
an attempt to gain the public esteem. Why, he argues,
cannot Rousseau accept this second kind of self-interest
as a principle of motivation elsewhere in Emile? The whole
1. E m i l e , p.239.
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problem now becomes involved with Helvétius* basic 
incapacity to understand the distinction between amour de soi 
and amour-propre. When Rousseau says, for example, that:
"Je veux quand mon élève s ’engage avec moi, qu’il 
ait toujours un intérêt présent et sensible à 
remplir son engagement, et que si jamais il y 
manque, ce mensonge attire sur lui des maux 
qu’il voit sortir de l ’ordre des choses",1
he is dealing uniquely with the idea of self-love, which,
during the pre-adolescent period, prompts the pupil to see
external objects merely in their physical relationship to
himself and without any moral, and hence social, connotations
Rousseau’s method here is to make the child fulfil his
promise by forcing him to understand the importance of the
promise through concrete, physical repercussions which will
affect his "intérêt présent et sensible" (i.e. his immediate
physical interest) not his moral self-interest which would
imply a notion of moral relationships and the motivating
principle of vanity, neither of which Emile possesses at
this stage. The same remarks are applicable to Helvétius’
other quotations from Rousseau on this point. Either
Rousseau’s failure to define his terms precisely, or,
Helvétius’ unwillingness to find harmony beneath superficial
contradictions, result quite definitely in a transformation
1. De l ’Homme, Vol.II, pp.5-6. Emile, p.90.
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of Rousseau’s original meaning.
The question of self-interest also involves the
question of attention and application. For Helvétius,
attention is only possible if it is in the pupil’s interest
to be attentive. He would even go so far as to punish the
child in an attempt to make him attentive through fear of
further punishment. Although Rousseau allows self-love
(or indifferent self-interest) as a principle of motivation,
he cannot accept arbitrary punishment. To avoid this, and
to support his view that ’interested’ self-interest (amour-
propre) is not behind all human action, he maintains that
(a)natural curiosity is a satisfactory motivating force.^ ^
His theory is that the child’s developing strength will 
bring him, around the age of ten or twelve, to a period 
when, his needs adequately satisfied by an excess of 
physical strength, his superfluous strength will automatically 
turn to curiosity about the world around him:
"Le même instinct anime les diverses facultés 
de l ’homme. A 1 ’activité du corps qué^ cherche 
à se développer .succède 1 ’activité de 1 ’esprit 
qui cherche a s ’instruire. D ’abord les enfants 
ne sont que remuants, ensuite ils sont curieux;
(a) Even if we do not stress the distinction between
’indifferent’ and ’interested’ self-interest, Rousseau 
is not contradicting himself by one moment allowing 
self-interest and the next maintaining that natural 
curiosity is sufficient. Self-interest as a motivating 
force is suggested only for the period prior to the 
intellectual age (i.e. before the age of 12) when 
curiosity can develop through an excess of physical 
strength.
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"et cette curiosité bien dirigée est le mobile 
de l ’âge où nous voilà parvenus ..."1
We can say, then, that there is no real illogicality 
about Rousseau’s arguments on this subject. There is, 
rather, a basic opposition between the two thinkers: 
Rousseau’s theory of developing strength leading to 
intellectual curiosity versus Helvétius’ theory of attention 
based on self-interest.
Closely connected with the questions of conscience 
and self-interest is the important question of the natural 
goodness of man. Helvétius, basing his arguments on various 
passages of La Nouvelle Héloise and Emile, sees Rousseau as 
a decided advocate of natural goodness, yet, nevertheless, 
surprisingly contradictory on a point which he so obviously 
wants to accept.
That Rousseau believes in the non-wickedness of 
natural man is clear from his statements both in Emile and 
elsewhere. The first sentence of Emile stresses the goodness 
of creation, and its subsequent depravity in the hands of 
man:
"Tout est bien sortit des mains de l ’Auteur des p 
choses, tout dégénère entre les mains de l ’homme."
In La Nouvelle Héloise he asks:
1. Emile, p.178.
2. Ibid., p.1.
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’^ Lorsqu’on nourrit les enfans dans leur première 
simplicité d*où leur viendroient des vices, dont 
ils n'ont pas vu d*exemple?"1
and the whole of his system in Emile is based, as we have 
already seen, on the idea that evil is not an inherent 
characteristic, but acquired through environmental 
influences:
"Posons pour maxime incontestable que les 
premiers mouvements de la nature sont toujours 
droits: il n'y a point de perversité originelle 
dans le coeur humain; il ne s'y trouve pas un 
seul vice dont on ne puisse dire comment et par 
où il y est entré."2
Does Helvétius' quotation, then, that :
"On ne plaint jamais dans autrui que les maux 
dont on ne se croit pas exempt s o i - m ê m e " ,3
constitute the serious contradiction that he maintains it
does?
Our earlier analysis of Rousseau's conception of 
amour de soi helps us to explain this apparent discrepancy. 
According to Rousseau, commiseration with those with whom 
we can identify ourselves is merely a product of amour de soi, 
and hence, good in itself:
"Pour devenir sensible et pitoyable il faut que 
l'enfant sache qu'il y a des êtres semblables 
à lui qui souffrent, ce qu'il a souffert, qui 
sentent les douleurs qu'il a senties, et 
d'autres dont il doit avoir l'idée, comme
1. La Nouvelle Héloise. pp.583-4.
2. Emile, p.?é.
3. De l'Homme, Vol.II, p.15. Emile, p.253.
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"pouvant les sentir aussi. En effet, comment 
nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si 
ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous 
et nous identifiant avec l'animal souffrant, 
en quittant, pour ainsi dire, notre être pour 
prendre le sien?"^
Hence, our sensitivity, which is the origin of our self-love,
is also the natural origin of the extension of our self-love
to compassion. It is because of this progression, and not
because of self-interest, as Helvétius suggests, that
Rousseau believes that we can only feel pity for those
with whom our sensitivity identifies us. Helvétius, on
the other hand, believes that compassion is the natural
derivative of amour de soi but, in his case, amour de soi
2
means self-interest.
His further criticisms are based on the belief that 
no positive results can come of telling men, in their 
present state of corruption, that they are naturally good.
This can hardly be taken as an effective refutation of 
Rousseau's system, since he, like the rest of his generation, 
accepts the corruption of modern man, and vehemently 
criticises it, while expressing his belief in man's 
hypothetical natural goodness.
Although Helvétius says in De l'Homme that man is 
born neither good nor evil, but becomes good or evil according
1. Emile, p.252.
2. De l'Homme, Vol.II, p.15.
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1 (a^to his education,  ^ he nevertheless extends his criticism
of the belief in natural goodness to an attempt to prove
that man, if not naturally wicked, is naturally cruel. He
seems to ignore the fact that Rousseau also examines the
question of cruelty in the young child and answers it very
differently. For Rousseau, cruelty before the age of
fifteen cannot be defined as evil since, at this stage,
the child has no knowledge of right and wrong. Moreover,
since compassion is a relatively late development, which
only occurs in conjunction with the birth of the imagination
and other emotions, the young child cannot, according to
Rousseau, extend his knowledge of suffering and physical
pain to a creature other than himself. Consequently, his
cruelty is not the result of an evil intention, but of the
discrepancy between his desires and physical strength:
"Toute méchanceté vient de faiblesse; l'enfant 
n'est méchant que parce qu'il est faible; 
rendez-le fort, il sera bon: celui qui pourrait 
tout ne ferait jamais de m a l ."2
1. De l'Homme, Vol.II, p.17.
2. Emile, p.42.
(a) Diderot in turn combats this idea in his Réfutation 
(pp.408-9). Eor him, tendencies towards good or evil 
depend on the original disposition of the individual:
"Ou ne donne point ce que la nature a refusé; peut- 
être détruit-on ce qu'elle a donné. La culture de 
1'éducation améliore ses dons."
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For Helvétius, however, strength is often the cause 
of injustice, in adult and child alike:
"Le Puissant est souvent injuste; l'enfant ro^buste 
l'est de meme: n'est-il pas contenu par la présence 
du Maître, à l'exemple du Puissant, il s'approprie 
par la force le bonbon ou le bijou de son camarade ; 
il fait pour une poupée, pour un hochet, ce que . 
l'âge mûr fait pour un titre ou un Sceptre .
Moreover, the child's cruelty to insects proves, according
to Helvétius, that the child has no natural feeling of
compassion:
"Si le sentiment de la compassion leur était aussi 
naturel que celui de la crainte, il les avertirait 
des souffrances de 1'insecte ...."2
It is clear from this statement that Helvétius does not
accept, and has probably not understood, Rousseau's system
of developing faculties, of which compassion is a late
development, any more than he understands the late development
of conscience and the early incapacity to commit evil. For
him goodness and humanity are entirely the results of
education.
Helvétius' remaining criticisms of Rousseau's 
arguments are concerned with the purpose and usefulness 
of education. According to Helvétius, Rousseau contradicts 
himself time and again by affirming and then denying that 
education is useful. However, when Helvétius' quotation
1. De l'Homme, Vol.II, p.16.
2. Ibid., Vol.II, Note 13, p.53.
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from Rousseau on the supposed danger of education is seen 
in its context, it in fact does not refer to education in 
general, but only to education in a limited sense, i.e. a 
uniform education which disregards individual characteristics.
"Qu'arrive-t-il d'une éducation commencée dès le 
berceau et toujours sous une même formule, sans 
égard à la diversité des esprits?"
in fact precedes Helvétius' paraphrased version of:
"on donne à la plupart des instructions nuisibles 
ou déplacés .... on les prive de celles qui leur 
conviendroient .... on gêne de toutes parts la 
nature .... on efface les grandes qualités de 
l'âme pour en substituer de petites et apparentes 
qui n'ont aucune réalité ...."1
The argument chosen by Helvétius to illustrate Rousseau's
belief in the detrimental effects of education in fact,
when placed in its context, merely serves to condemn that
very education which Helvétius sought to recommend.
Throughout Emile, whenever Rousseau condemns education it
is always either a uniform education, or the traditional
education of his time, which he has in mind. As for
education in general he stresses its importance at the
beginning of Emile:
"Nous naissons faibles, nous avons besoin de force, 
nous naissons dépourvus de tout, nous avons besoin 
d'assistance: nous naissons stupides, nous avons 
besoin de jugement. Tout ce que nous n'avons pas 
à notre naissance et dont nous avons besoin étant 
grands nous est donné par l'éducation.“"2
1. La Nouvelle Héloise. p.563. Le l'Homme. Vol.II, p.21.
2. Emile, p.3.
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Rousseau's anxiety, however, to save the child from 
an unsuitable, and therefore worthless education, prompts 
him to put forward some rather extreme statements. Helvétius 
picks on one of these, (the idea that if the child did not 
even know his right hand from his left at the age of twelve, 
provided he was healthy and strong, his understanding would 
immediately respond to his first lessons) and opposes it by 
one of his own theories that without long years of training 
the child would not acquire the necessary degree of 
attention with which to succeed later in life. This, of 
course, takes us back to the earlier arguments on the 
principles of motivation. It also involves us in the fact 
that because he holds very different basic tenets to 
Rousseau, Helvétius cannot accept Rousseau's system of 
negative and progressive education, in which the child 
is first left to develop physically until the exercise 
of his senses prompts intellectual activity, and in which 
the methods used to educate him develop and change according 
to his physical and intellectual capacities. His 
unwillingness to accept this prompts him to again look 
for contradictions in Rousseau's statements, this time 
on the question of a premature education.
One of Rousseau's main concerns in his programme 
of education is that, during the period from birth to about
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the age of twelve, the child should learn nothing which 
he cannot properly comprehend, and since, according to 
Rousseau's supposition in Emile, the child does not at 
that age have any notion of moral and social relationships, 
any education which he receives must only he concerned with 
the physical relationships between himself and the world 
around. His reasoning is as follows:
(1) The most dangerous time in a child's existence is
the period between birth and twelve, during which time
the seeds of error and vice are sown and cannot be
destroyed as the powers of reason and conscience are 
as yet undeveloped.
(2) It is therefore useless to educate children in the 
traditional manner as if they were in full possession 
of their reason:
"Si les enfants sautaient tout d'un coup de la 
mamelle à l'âge de raison, 1'éducation qu'on 
leur donne pourrait leur convenir; mais, selon 
le progrès naturel, il leur en faut une toute 
contraire."1
(3) The only solution is to 'waste' time, - hence the
remark quoted by Helvétius:
"La marche de la nature est la meilleure; il faut 
surtout ne pas la contraindre par une éducation 
prématurée."2
By allowing the child's faculties to develop freely
1. Emile, p.97.
2. De l'Homme, Pt.II, p.23.
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and naturally by teaching him only that which he is 
able to understand, one will create "un prodige de 
1'éducation"; and preserve the child from error and 
vice.
This plea against orthodox education is, then, to a 
large extent, the result of logical reasoning. Confusion 
is caused, as Helvétius so aptly points out, by Rousseau's 
inability to define properly what he means by lack of 
judgement or reasoning power. There is an apparent 
contradiction between;
(1) "Avant l'âge de raison l'enfant ne reçoit pas
d'idées, mais des images, .... Une image peut 
être seule dans l'esprit qui se la représente; 
mais toute idée en suppose d'autres. Quand on 
imagine, on ne fait que voir; quand on conçoit, 
on compare ....
"on montre que, loin de savoir raisonner 
d'eux-mêmes, ils (les enfants) ne savent pas 
même retenir les raisonnements d'autrui; car 
suivez ces petits géomètres dans leur méthode, 
vous voyez aussitôt qu'ils n'ont retenu que 
l'exacte impression de la figure et les termes 
de la démonstration .... Tout leur savoir est 
dans la sensation, rien n'a passé jusqu'à 
l'entendement",
and (2) "Je suis cependant bien éloigné de penser que les 
enfants n'ont aucune espèce de raisonnement. Au 
contraire, je vois qu'ils raisonnent très bien 
dans tout ce qu'ils connaissent et qui se rapporte 
à leur intérêt présent et sensible ...."2
1. Emile, p. 77.
2. Emile, p. 97.
233
Rousseau is attempting here, though with insufficient 
clarity, and in too absolute a manner, to distinguish 
between the young child's obvious inability to reason in 
an abstract manner, and his capacity to deduce information 
from concrete material with which he has been taught to 
deal. In Emile he insists on training the child's judgement 
through the exercise of his senses, and at the same time, 
declaring that the child cannot judge. It is because of 
this inability to define his terms that Helvétius thinks 
that he can refute Rousseau's theory by observation:
"L'expérience montre que l'Enfant discerne au 
moins confusément au moment même qu'il sent, 
qu'il juge avant douze ans des distances, des 
grandeurs, de la mollesse des corps; de ce qui 
l'amuse ou l'ennuie; de ce qui est mauvais au 
goût, qu'enfin il sait avant douze ans une 
grande partie de la langue usuelle et connaît 
déjà les mots propres à 1'exprimer."1
This is in fact exactly the sort of education which Rousseau's
system achieves in Emile, Books I and II, as we can see from
the summary of Emile's prowess at the end of the first stage
in his education:
"Parmi les enfants de la ville nul n'est plus 
adroit que lui, mais il est plus fort qu'aucun 
autre. Dans tout ce qui est à la portée de 
l'enfance, il juge, il raisonne, il prévoit
mieux qu'eux tous. Est-il question d'agir, de
courir, de sauter, d'ébranler des corps, d'enlever 
des masses, d'estimer des distances, d'inventer
1. De 1'Homme, Vol.II, p.27.
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"des jeux, d*emporter des prix? on dirait que 
la nature est a ses ordres, tant il sait 
aisément plier toute chose à ses volontés,"**
Rousseau is not, then, proscribing all education until the 
age of twelve, he is merely condemning book learning etc., 
which teaches the child things that he is not ready to 
understand fully:
"Sans étudier dans les livres, la mémoire d'un 
enfant ne reste pas pour cela oisive : tout ce 
qu'il voit, tout ce qu'il entend le frappe, et 
il s'en souvient; il tient registre en lui-même 
des actions, des discours des hommes, et tout 
ce qui 1'environne est le livre dans lequel sans 
y songer, il enrichit continuellement sa mémoire, 
en attendant que son jugement puisse en profiter. 
C'est dans le choix de ces objets, c'est dans le 
soin de lui présenter sans cesse ceux qu'il doit 
connaître et de lui cacher ceux qu'il doit 
ignorer ^ue consiste le véritable art de cultiver 
la premiere de ses facultés, et c'est par là 
qu'il faut tâcher de lui former un magasin de 
connaissances qui serve à son education durant p 
la jeunesse, et à sa conduite dans tous les tems."
This is Rousseau's method-of education, and he is entirely
consistent in his statements when he declares that it is
possible from birth:
"Pourquoi donc l'éducation d'un enfant ne 
commencerait-elle pas avant qu'il parle et 
qu'il entende, puisque le seul choix des objets 
qu'on lui présente est propre à le rendre timide 
ou courageux?" etc.3
Rousseau's meaning, when he talks about not giving
the child a premature education, is that the child should
1. Emile, p.172.
2. La Nouvelle Héloise, pp.580-581, and Emile pp.103-104.
3. Emile, pp.37-38.
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not be taught things beyond his grasp. This is a result 
of his belief that the young child does not reason in the 
same way as the grown man, and must, therefore, have an 
education adapted to his needs and capacities. It does 
not mean that the child must receive no education at all, 
and is therefore, in no way a contradiction of his statements 
elsewhere that the child is educable, and should be educated, 
from birth.
However, Rousseau's more extreme statement that, if 
kept in a state of complete ignorance until the age of 
twelve the child's reason would develop automatically with 
the first instruction received, is more difficult to 
reconcile with his remarks elsewhere. It is, however, 
quite probably, merely an extreme attempt to preserve the 
child from an unsuitable education, which would, according 
to Rousseau, lead to the introduction of error and vice by 
teaching the child things he was unable to comprehend. 
Helvétius foresees this explanation, but can only answer 
it with scorn:
"Sur ce point tout le monde est de son avis et 
convient que, mieux vaut refuser toute éducation 
aux Enfans que de leur en donner une mauvaise.
Ce n'est donc pas sur une vérité aussi triviale 
que peut insister M. Rousseau."1
1. De l'Homme. Vol.II, pp.22-23-
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On the other hand, as we have mentioned before, Rousseau 
does tend to see the development of intellectual reason 
("la raison intellectuelle ou humaine") as a more or less 
automatic development which occurs at a certain stage in 
the individual's physical development (curiosity about the 
age of twelve, when the child's physical strength exceeds 
his needs and is hence transformed into intellectual 
curiosity, and adult reason about the age of fifteen, 
which coincides with the development of the passions, 
imagination and desire for human relationships). Helvétius, 
in fact, opposes this theory by his own conviction that a 
child's capacity for sensation necessarily renders him 
capable of judgement, since, and here we come back to the 
original subject of contention, sensation and judgement 
are one and the same thing. The question for him is merely 
the degree of judgement of which the child is capable:
"La jeunesse réfléchit moins que la vieillesse, 
parce qu'elle sent plus, parce que tous les 
objets, nouveaux pour elle, lui font une 
impression forte. Mais si la force de ses 
sensations la distrait de la méditation, leur 
vivacité grave plus profondément dans son 
souvenir les objets qu'un intérêt quelconque 
doit lui faire un jour comparer entre eux."1
As a result of what he considers to be contradictions 
on Rousseau's part concerning the value of education,
1. De l'Homme, Vol.II, p.30.
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Helvétius assumes that it is consequently quite natural
that Rousseau should be an advocate of universal ignorance.
As we have seen, Rousseau does not condemn education in
general, and Helvétius is merely drawing the conclusion
he desires from Rousseau's apparently contradictory ideas.
Moreover, Helvétius somewhat unfortunately chooses to
illustrate his point a quotation from Emile, which when
correctly placed in its context, clearly does not prove
the point he wishes to make.
"Ce n'est pas dans des Livres que les Enfans 
doivent tirer leurs connaissances; les 
connaissances ne s'y trouvent pas,"1
does not imply that knowledge and civilisation are completely
worthless, but merely that the method whereby knowledge is
culled from books without reference to observation and
concrete facts, and which is consequently badly understood,
leads to error and hence, according to Rousseau, vice.
We may suppose that Helvétius' criticism is prompted less
by such a statement, which he must surely have understood,
than by the reputation which Rousseau had already gained
for himself by condemning the arts and sciences in his
first Discours.
Like many of his predecessors, (Saint-Pierre and
Rollin for example), Rousseau prefers virtue to knowledge.
1. De l'Homme. Vol.II, p.34. La Nouvelle Héloise. p . 582.
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Hence, in La Nouvelle Héloise he declares:
rien n'est moins nécessaire que d'être 
savant, et rien plus que d'être sage et bon.
Helvétius is compelled to oppose this since he believes
that virtue is actually based on knowledge:
"Si l'espèce de probité nécessaire pour n'être 
pas pendu .exige peu de lumières, en est-il 
ainsi d'une probité fine et délicate? Quelle 
connaissance des devoirs patriotiques cette 
probité ne suppose-t-elle pas? Parmi les 
stupides, j'ai vu des hommes bons, mais en 
petit nombre."2
However, what he once again fails to notice is that Rousseau's 
remark is merely a relative statement, not an absolute 
condemnation of knowledge.
Rousseau's real plea in favour of ignorance is based 
on the belief that error comes from judgement. Consequently, 
if we never needed to judge we would never be wrong. Hence,
since the more men know, the more occasion they have to
judge they are subsequently more prone to error and the 
only solution to this can be ignorance:
"Puisque plus les hommes savent plus ils se
trompent, le seul moyen d'éviter 1'erreur
est 1'ignorance ..."3
It is because of this tendency to err through judgement that:
1. La Nouvelle Héloise. p.581.
2. Le l'Homme. Vol.II, p.35.
3. Emile, p.230.
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"très sûrement il y a plus d'erreurs dans l'Académie 
des sciences que dans tout un peuple de Hurons",1
since the Hurons have little knowledge to submit to their
judgement. Helvétius combats this with arguments concerning
cruelty caused by ignorance, but fails to notice Rousseau's
concluding remark. Total ignorance, he argues, is now
impossible. Since man has lost his primitive independence
and innocence, and is forced to live in a state of dependence
where he needs to know how to choose and judge, he must be
educated for this:
"Puisque au milieu de tant de rapports nouveaux 
dont il va dépendre il faudra malgré lui qu'il 
juge, apprenons-lui donc à bien juger."2
Helvétius' remarks on these various aspects of Emile 
are interesting in themselves, in that they illustrate the 
opposition of basically different philosophical concepts to 
some of Rousseau's arguments. It is also interesting for us 
to see the very different conclusions reached by the two 
thinkers, despite their initial acceptance of the interaction 
of senses and mind. Helvétius' comments in fact represent 
the only important reaction to Rousseau's psychological 
theories during the period studied. Moreover, Helvétius 
is one of the first writers to give a detailed analysis of
1. Emile, p.230.
2. Idem.
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Rousseau's alleged contradications in Emile, and it is 
important for us to see from this the extent to which his 
accusations are valid, and the amount of misinterpretation 
and even misrepresentation contained in them. The inability 
on the part of another philosopher to fully comprehend 
Rousseau's arguments (always supposing that Helvétius' 
misinterpretations are for the most part involuntary) gives 
us some idea of what the reading public could have understood 
of them. Considerable silence on the part of pedagogical 
writers on these aspects strengthens the impression that 
Rousseau's ideas on psychology in Emile were of little 
general interest, and that the early reputation of the book 
depended very little on their impact. It would be interesting 
to see how much attention is paid to them at a later date, 
and to what extent this, if any, is subject to earlier 
misinterpretation and the spreading of ideas like Helvétius' 
that Rousseau, though on all these points he contradicts 
himself, condemns education, supports ignorance, thinks the 
child totally incapable of judgement etc. etc.
Apart from Helvétius' detailed analysis, very little 
attention seems to have been paid to Rousseau's psychological 
theories in Emile. Although Formey refers to a number of
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points, for the most part his comments are concerned with
the practical application of Rousseau's theories to education,
rather than the theories themselves.
In the first place, Pormey does not accept Rousseau's
idea of an a-moral period. At a superficial level, he
considers the attempt to keep the child in complete ignorance
(a)of social morality^  ^ as likely to he interpreted as deceit
on the part of the tutor, who will subsequently lose his
pupil's confidence, once the latter realises he has been 
1
misled. At a more serious level, he places the child who
chooses good, or even the child who chooses evil, because
he has knowledge of good and evil, above the child who
cannot commit evil because he has no knowledge of social 
2
morality. Here he overlooks the fact that Rousseau makes 
a similar distinction between innocence and goodness through 
ignorance, and the conscious achievement of virtue through 
knowledge of moral relationships, but that he only renders 
possible the conscious achievement of virtue after the 
development of the rational faculties.
1. Pormey, op.cit., pp.70-71.
2. Ibid., p.73.
(a) Pormey does not discuss the fact that Emile acquires
some elementary notions of social morality during his
early education (the gardener episode etc.), but that
these are all notions which he can learn through 
concrete, physical examples which intimately concern 
his ov/n well-being.
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However, Pormey*s main reason for not accepting the 
a-moral period is that, unlike Rousseau, he does not suppose 
that the child is naturally innocent, hut accepts the 
opposing belief that man possesses inherently bad 
characteristics which must be quashed as soon as possible. 
Consequently, he believes that it is only by punishing the 
child when he does wrong that he can be expected to achieve 
virtue at a later age. The more he is taught what is right 
and wrong, the greater the chances of his bad characteristics 
being successfully eliminated, and to do this one should not 
wait, as Rousseau suggests, for the child's rational 
faculties to develop, but, instead, encourage him to acquire 
behavioural habits, which his reason will accept at a later 
stage. Hence Pormey's remark:
"Si vous attendez à les former, à les dresser, 
qu'on puisse leur parler raison, comptez que 
vous ne leur ferez jamais entendre raison.
L'enfant est d'abord un automate, un petit 
animal; il faut vaincre, et s'il est possible, 
détruire en lui toutes les répugnances qui 
seroient dans la suite préjudiciables à sa 
santé, à son éducation, aux moeurs qu'on veut 
lui donner.
Although, like Rousseau, Pormey believes that the
rational faculties are slow to develop, he does not, however,
accept Rousseau's subsequent decision not to anticipate their
(a^development in any way.  ^ Por him, the tutor should encourage
1. Pormey, op.cit., p.32.
(a) This of course means the faculties for abstract reasoning. 
Rousseau encourages reasoning from concrete, physical 
examples from an early age.
243
the child to reason as soon as possible, simply because the 
rational faculties are slow to develop:
"Vouloir qu'un enfant raisonne tout d'un coup, et 
sur des choses qui ne sont pas encore à sa portée, 
c'est forcer la nature, au lieu de l'aider. Mais 
rien de plus salutaire aux enfans que d'avoir 
quelque accoucheur de leurs premiers raisonnemens, 
qui, faute de ce secours, demeureroient ensevelis 
dans leur cerveau."1
Because of this, he recommends that if one does not actually 
reason with the child, one should, at least, reason in his 
presence. Moreover, since, like Helvétius, Pormey believes 
that virtue is based, not on conscience, but on the knowledge 
of right and wrong,^ he also believes that this early 
training of the reason will effectively help to destroy 
any undesirable characteristics which the child may possess.
Rousseau's greatest mistake according to Pormey is 
that he fails to see that, although Emile is not in full 
possession of his rational faculties, he is, nevertheless, 
a rational being. He interprets Rousseau's "negative" 
education as a complete lack of exercise of the intellect 
until the age of ten or twelve, and maintains that this 
will cause more harm than if the body were kept in 
swaddling-bands until the same age He fails to see the 
distinction Rousseau makes between "raison sensitive" and
1. Pormey: op.cit., p.65.
2. Ibid., p.66.
3. Ibid., p.49.
4. Ibid., p.69.
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"raison intellectuelle", and interprets the system of 
education through the senses as an exaggerated exercise
2
of the sensory organs, which he considers is superfluous.
He also rejects Rousseau's belief that a weak body will 
produce a weak mind, maintaining that the weakest bodies 
have, in fact, produced the greatest minds.^
Pormey's main criticism of Rousseau's system is that 
he seems to suggest that the rational faculties will develop 
naturally at a certain age. Although the advent of 
intellectual reason in Emile is brought in somewhat 
ex machina, it is, nevertheless, preceded by the training 
of the child's judgement through, what Rousseau terms, the 
formation of simple ideas. Consequently, Pormey's insistence 
that the child is capable of judging and reasoning before 
the age of ten and twelve,^ is based partly on a misunder­
standing of Rousseau's definitions, and also on Pormey's 
own conventional belief in the existence of the rational 
faculties in the child from an early age. Pormey, himself, 
believes that the rational faculties are present from birth, 
and can be encouraged to develop more or less rapidly 
according to the education the child receives:
1. Emile, p.121.
2. Pormey, op.cit., p.47.
3. Ibid., p.40.
4. Ibid., p.78.
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"Ne diroit-on pas (according to Rousseau's statement 
that the child's spiritual nature should he left 
untouched until the child is in full possession of 
all his faculties) que les facultés viennent à 
l'ame à un certain age, à tel jour de tel mois 
et de telle année? Ces facultés existent dans 
l'ame dès que l'enfant ouvreti=^  les yeux à la 
lumière; il s'agit de l'aider à les déveloper; 
et le plutôt, des que d'ailleurs on s'y prend 
bien, est toujours le meilleur."^
It is Rousseau's insistence on the late development 
of intellectual reason and its sequence of a long negative 
education based on the training of the senses and the 
formation of simple ideas acquired from these, that seems 
to have attracted most attention during the pre-Revolutionary 
period. Like Pormey, most of those who comment on this 
aspect of Emile fail to discuss Rousseau's distinction 
between sensitive and intellectual reason. Most writers 
simply disagree with the idea that the child cannot reason 
until the age of fifteen, and consequently return to a more 
conventional system of education based on intellectual 
studies.
Le Beaurieu, however, follows Rousseau's pattern of 
development by placing the birth of reason at fifteen. 
However, as he does with other aspects, he carries this 
idea to extremes by interpreting the period prior to the 
development of reason as a time when the child should
1. Pormey: op.cit., p.68.
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receive no education whatsoever. As we have already seen, 
in order to safeguard him from vice and error, Ariste's 
father keeps him in a cage until the age of fifteen, when 
he is shipped off to his desert island and allowed to learn 
from environmental nature. As he is being transported to 
this island, Ariste reasons to himself about the movement 
he feels:
"en un certain langage intérieur qu'ont tous les 
hommes, et que les animaux mêmes me paroissent 
avoir jusqu'à un certain point".**
Despite this capacity for internal reflection, which seems
to exist independently of the senses, Ariste, like Emile,
receives his knowledge, which is restricted to the physical
world, through the senses, although this is his only
education at a time when Emile is studying history and
human relationships. Even as early as his existence in
the cage, Ariste is portrayed as being naturally curious.
"Mon ame, avide de sçavoir, envoyoit continuellement 
mes sens à la découverte de tout ce qui arriveit 
dans 1'étroite enceinte où j'étois enfermé ..."2
an idea very similar to Rousseau's insistence on the natural
development of curiosity,^ which would enable the child to
profit from his first lessons, even if he had been kept, as
in fact Ariste is, as a complete automaton for the first
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit.. Vol.I, p.11.
2. Ibid., Vol.I, p.13.
3. Emile, p.178.
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twelve years of his life. De Beaurieu, however, unlike 
Rousseau, leaves this aptitude for learning as a completely 
unexplained phenomenon.
Although De Beaurieu continues, in his plans for
education of Book III, to believe in the need for the child
to vegetate until the development of his reason at fifteen,
he nevertheless changes this considerably in his proposals
for a syllabus. Consequently, we find him saying, on the
one hand, that the precocious exercise of the mind exhausts
the body, (which is somewhat different to Rousseau's
insistence that the health and perfection of the body will
serve to improve the quality of the mind), and, on the other,
that since man is destined to perfect himself by the
acquisition of knowledge, he should start to learn little
by little during his early years. Ariste's children do,
in fact, receive most of their education by the age of
fifteen, at which time they are considered to be old enough 
1
to marry.
Despite his alleged concern for the intellectual 
faculties of the child. De Beaurieu departs quite considerably 
from Rousseau by teaching the child about God, religion and 
morality from an early age:
1. See De Beaurieu, op.cit.. Vol.Ill, pp.101-143.
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"ne craignez pas d'apprendre trop tôt à votre 
fils, à connoître Dieu, à se connoître lui-même, 
à connoître les hommes, et ses principaux 
devoirs ..."1
This, of course, is closely connected with his desire to 
form the child for society rather than for himself,
De Beaurieu's point of view coincides with Rousseau 
on various other points. He accepts the idea that the child 
should he left in ignorance concerning ideas of right and 
wrong, and, like Rousseau, teaches him elementary morality
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit.. Vol.Ill, p.105.
(a) Bernardin de Saint-Pierre also rejected Rousseau's 
belief that the child should not be taught religion 
before the age of fourteen or fifteen. In his book 
on Rousseau, he writes:
"Pour moi je voudrois qu'on leur parle de 
Dieu des qu'ils comencent a jouir de la 
vie; que, cette vérité étant dans le coeur 
avant de l'être dans l'esprit, des qu'ils 
sont capables d'aimer, de distinguer ce 
qui leur nuit, qu'on en joignit l'idée 
avec tout ce qui peut être agréable ...."
(Bernardin de Saint-Pierre: La Vie et les ouvrages 
de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. Maurice Souriau.
Paris 1907, p.158)
In contrast, he warmly supports Rousseau's criticisms 
of the evils of contemporary education:
"Touttes ses reflexions sur le danger des 
colleges, sur l'émulation, les vaines 
jalousies, sur les fausses, dangereuses, 
et vaines lumières qu'à cet âge on nous 
met dans l'esprit, sur le vice qu'on 
nous plante dans le coeur, sur tout 
cela ... ses observations sont de la plus 
grande vérité." (Ibid., p.157).
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by means of concrete examples which affect his physical 
well-being:
"Voulez-vous qu'un enfant soit ni voleur ni 
menteur, laissez-lui ignorer ce que c'est 
que vol et mensonge ;
but, if by any chance he steals, for example, sweet-meats,
then he should be deprived of lunch, etc., until he
understands. De Beaurieu acknowledges that his examples
2
on this point are inspired by Emile.
De Beaurieu also coincides with Rousseau on the 
question of the naturalness of compassion. When Ariste 
attempts to kill a rabbit he is overcome by emotion at the 
sight of the suffering he has caused:
"je fus d'abord assez insensible pour le voir 
tranquillement se débattre et lutter contre 
la mort. La colère éteint l'humanité: celle- 
ci reprit bientôt le dessus. Je fus touché 
de voir ce pauvre animal souffrir, ... me 
reprocher par ses mouvemens, par ses regards, 
que je détruisois, avant le temps et sans 
l'aveu de la n a t u r e ".3
However, despite similarities to, and departures from 
Emile, it would be difficult to assess the extent to which 
De Beaurieu is actually following Rousseau. He himself says 
merely:
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit.. Vol.Ill, p.112.
2. Ibid., Vol.Ill, Note pp.113-114.
3. Ibid., Vol.I, p.113.
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"je prends pour maître 1*Auteur d ’Emile 
dans tous les endroits où de grands motifs 
ne m ’obligent pas de 1 ’abandonner".1
The most we can do is to point to these similarities and
differences, and point out that it is quite possible that
these ideas were popularly interpreted as being based on
Emile.
The Abbe Coyer also follows Rousseau’s pattern of
development to some extent and precedes intellectual
learning by learning through the senses. However, he
refers to Aristotle, Gassendi, Montaigne, Locke, and,
above all, Condillac on the development of the thought
process, and makes no direct reference to Rousseau.
Nevertheless, his support of Rousseau elsewhere, and the
obvious similarity of his statement:
’’La première raison de l ’homme est donc une 
raison sensitive. Ses premiers Maîtres de 
Science sont ses pieds, ses mains, ses yeux 
ses oreilles."2
to Rousseau’s:
"Comme tout ce qui entre dans 1 ’entendement 
humain y vient par les sens, la première 
raison de l ’homme est une raison sensitive; 
c ’est elle qui sert de base à la raison 
intellectuelle: nos premiers maîtres de 
philosophie sont nos pieds, nos mains, nos 
yeux",3
1. De Beaurieu: op.cit.. Vol.III, Note pp.113-4.
2. Coyer, op.cit., pp.115-116.
3. Emile, p.121.
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indicates clearly that he is following Rousseau closely 
on this point. However, Coyer brings the whole development 
of the child’s faculties considerably further forward in 
time than Rousseau, and is able to teach his pupils moral 
notions by the time they are seven or eight and Latin by 
the time they are ten.^
In 1775, the Abbe Auger suggested that the plan of 
education in Emile should be adopted, but with modifications 
concerning the teaching of religion and the slowness of the 
early education. This he bases on his conviction that one
p
can reason with the child from the age of ten.
Carpentier, too, in his book published the same year,^ 
suggests that the physical organs should be allowed to gain 
some consistency before the child is required to study.
His approval of Emile elsewhere suggests that here he may 
well be supporting the progressing stages in Emile’s education 
In 1776, Borelly suggests that children should not 
enter the national colleges until the age of ten:
"pour laisser leur tempéramment et leur esprit 
se fortifier peu-à-peu, et pour ne pas nuire 
l ’un à l ’autre par des études, une contrainte
1. Coyer: op.cit., p.191.
2. Auger, Abbé Athanase: Discours sur 1 ’éducation. Rouen & 
Paris, 1775, p.130.
3. Carpentier: Nouveau plan d ’Education. Paris, 1775,
p.120.
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"et des efforts qu’ils seroient incapables de 
supporter".1
However, they are not to be left entirely without education 
until that time, but are to be prepared for the later 
instruction they are to receive. Although Borelly does 
not attribute his method to Rousseau, this delaying of 
formal education till a time when the child is physically 
and intellectually capable of it, would suggest that he 
has Emile in mind.
In 1782 Cai^lhon points out that Rousseau’s negative 
education is not to be taken seriously, and that, in fact, 
a positive education of the senses is possible from birth. 
Unlike Helvétius, he realises that in delaying instruction 
until a seemingly late age, Rousseau is merely trying to 
exclude :
"cette méthode dogmatissante et pédantesque, dont 
il a rendu ailleurs l ’absurdité si p a l p a b l e ".3
Dr. Tash notes that in the same year. Bouillon
recognises Rousseau as the first to have realised that
childhood is the time for the formation of the body and
has encouraged (though he adds, perhaps a little too much),
moderation in teaching through precepts, and an increase
1. Borelly: Plyi de Réformation des études élémentaires.
La Haye, 17^6, pp.12-13.
2. Ibi^., p. 13.
3. Cavrlhon: Vues sur l ’éducation de la première enfance. 
Paris, 1782, p.2.
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in teaching through facts and examples.^ He also recognises 
Rousseau as having pointed out the two important moral and 
physical revolutions which occur at adolescence, and for 
having shown how to slow down the development of the passions.^
In 1783; (Toly de Saint Vallier advocates a negative 
education, maintaining that education is simply a matter 
of following nature until the age of about twelve or fourteen. 
He does not, however, mention Rousseau as the originator of 
this idea.^
In 1789, Daunou declares that negative education is 
Rousseau’s best point, but that he makes it last too long.^
Apart from Joly de Saint Vallier*s proposal of a 
long negative education, this seems to be the usual sort 
of criticism which Rousseau’s attempt to delay formal 
education encounters. Most of his successors, in fact, 
place the development of the rational faculties at an 
earlier age and subsequently curtail the period of negative 
education. It is this practical result of Rousseau’s theory 
of the late development of the rational faculties, and not
1. Bouillon: Considerations générales sur 1 ’éducation. 
Quoted by R. Tash, op.cit., p.95.
2. Idem.
3. Joly de Saint Vallier: Traité sur l ’éducation des deux 
sexes. Londres, 1783, p.33.
4. Daunou (P-Gl.P.): Lettres sur l ’éducation, quoted by 
R. Tash, op.cit., pp.106-107.
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the psychological theories themselves, which seems to have 
attracted most attention during the pre-Revolutionary period. 
That Rousseau’s system of "negative" education achieved 
success in the practical field, although this was understood 
to be a system of laissez-faire, implying a complete lack 
of training even through the senses, is attested by Madame 
de Genii8 in her Mémoires which were first published in 
1825:
"depuis 50 ans, elles (l’éducation publique et 
1 ’éducation particulière) ont été soumises à 
une infinité de systèmes opposés les uns aux 
autres. D ’abord on éleva a la Jean-Jacques; 
point de maîtres, point de leçons; les enfans 
de la première jeunesse furent livrés à la 
nature ; et comme la nature n ’apprend pas 
1 ’orthographe et encore moins le latin, on 
vit paroître tout d ’un coup dans le monde des .
jeunes gens de 1 ’ignorance la plus surprenante".
She herself correctly interprets Rousseau’s method in her
essay: La Religion considérée comme l ’unique base du bonheur.
and this is reproduced in her Discours sur l ’éducation
publique des femmes. Here she comments again on those who
have misunderstood various aspects of Emile, and who have
consequently put into practice ideas which are exactly the
opposite of what Rousseau intended. She agrees that he was
right not to encourage the teaching of Latin and geometry
1. Genlis (Stéphanie Félicité Ducrest de Saint-Aubin, 
Comtesse de: Works , Paris 1785-1828. Mémoires:
Vol.VI, pp.11-12.
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to children, hut criticises his proscription of formal 
lessons. She hastens to add, however, that although 
Rousseau does not intend the tutor to teach the child 
conventionally, he, nevertheless, intends him to teach 
him constantly:
"Voilà", she goes on to say, "ce qu’en général 
on n ’a pas compris, parce qu’il étoit plus 
commode de simplifier, ce système et de le 
réduire à ceci: "Ne point payer de maîtres, 
ne point enseigner de catéchisme, ne point 
contrarier les enfans, ne point s ’occuper 
d ’eux; voilà tous les principes de J-J.
Rousseau, et la meilleure éducation qu’on 
puisse donner," Il a résulté de cet extrait 
d ’Emile, des éducations qui ne doivent pas 
encourager à suivre cette méthode, mais qu’on 
auroit grand tort d ’attribuer entièrement aux 
principes de Rousseau."1
This evidence of extremism on the part of the general
public, can be placed alongside our earlier examples of
extremism in physical education.
Genlis: op.cit.. La religion considérée comme l ’unique 
base du bonheur et de la veritable philosophie. Note 8, 
pp.389-390 I1st edition 1787) and Discours moraux:
No.III, Discours sur la suppression des couvens de 
religieuses, et sur l ’éducation publique des femmes, 
pp.114-115.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusions drawn are necessarily limited to the 
three issues discussed in the thesis, and do not claim to 
give a complete assessment of the reputation of Emile during 
the period studied.
The popular reputation of Emile during the period 
1762 to 1790 can, to some extent, be kept distinct from 
its professional reputation, although the two are, 
ultimately, closely linked and must also be considered in 
their relationship to one another.
The popular success of Emile seems to have depended 
to a very large extent on the enthusiasm it provoked among 
women readers, especially on the subject of maternal breast­
feeding. Madame de Créqui’s early r e g r e t s f o r  not having 
breast-fed her son and for having used swaddling-bands, 
indicative of the "crise de conscience" which Emile seems 
to have provoked. The letter published by De Beaurieu in 
his De 1 ’allaitement et de la première éducation des enfans 
of 1782 stresses the impact of Emile on women readers:
"Les femmes sur-tout, furent frappées de la 
lumière que répandirent les Ecrits de J.J.
Rousseau ... Elles virent avec effroi la
(a) See p. 33.
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"multitude de maux qu’elles attiraient et sur 
leurs enfans et sur elles-mêmes, elles voulurent 
s ’acquitter des devoirs délicieux et sacrés que 
la Nature impose aux meres, et dont elle les 
récompense si bien",^
and this is confirmed by Madame de Genlis in her Adèle et
Théodore, also of 1782:
"C’est aux Femmes qu’Emile a dû ses plus grands 
succès; toutes les femmes en général ne louent 
Rousseau qu’avec enthousiasme, quoiqu’aucun 
Auteur ne les ait traitées avec moins de 
ménagemens. "2
This popularity with women readers and the subsequent return 
to maternal breast-feeding was undoubtedly accompanied by 
the kind of emotional fervour which Monglond^ and Buffenoir^ 
have described in their accounts of Rousseau’s prestige, and 
which is manifest in the numerous letters and visits to 
Rousseau during his life-time and pilgrimages to Ermenonville 
etc. after his death in 1778. The letter quoted above in 
particular gives the impression of an emotional uplifting, 
which was, however, of short duration:
"II nous pénétra d ’un trait de flamme: nous eûmes 
le courage de regarder un moment la vérité, et 
nous allions voler dans son sein; ..."5
1. Fourcroy ife-fln±llrervil-lre, op.cit., p.64.
2. Genlis, op.cit., Pt.I, p.190.
3. A. Monglond: Le Préromantisme Français. Grenoble 1930 
(especially Vol.II, pp.34-72).
4. H. Buffenoir: Le prestige de J.-J. Rousseau, Paris 1900.
5. De Beaurieu: op.cit., p.63.
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This reaction to the impact of Emile is very similar to, for 
example, Madame Roland’s later appreciation of the spiritual 
inspiration occasioned by Rousseau’s works:
"Son génie a échauffé mon âme; je l ’ai senti 
m ’enflammer, m ’élever et m ’ennoblir.
Reports of this return to maternal breast-feeding 
first appear in the late 1760s (Anel Lerebours), but Rousseau 
is only acknowledged as the leader of the reform in 1774 
(Fourcroy de Guillerville). This seems to have reached its 
peak between 1775 and 1780 (suggested by the different 
reactions of Fourcroy and Landais to the importance of 
the reform) and to have acquired a fashionable quality 
(described by Madame de Genlis) which condemned its hopes 
of effecting a deep spiritual re-birth and obtaining lasting 
r e s u l t s ( r e g r e t t e d  by Le I ’Epinoy in 1785). From 1779 
onwards, however, Rousseau’s reputation as leader of the 
reform is generally acknowledged (Landais, Le Beaurieu’s 
letter, Roze de I ’Epinoy) and his success attested where 
others had failed. That his reputation was extremely great 
at this time is obvious from the theorists’ attempts to help
1. H. Buffenoir: op.cit., p.123.
(a) That maternal breast-feeding was noticeably waning during 
the early 1780s is further attested by L.S. Mercier: 
"Pendant un temps, les femmes ont nourri elles- 
mêmes; mais ce n ’était qu’une mode, elle a passé." 
Tableau de Paris, Amsterdam 1783, Vol.VI, p.42).
259
their readers to put his influence into perspective 
(Landais, De Beaurieu*s letter). Although the fashion 
for maternal breast-feeding obviously drops during the 
early 1780s, and is also discouraged by the theorists, 
who now begin to attack the abuses it has entailed (De 
l*Epinoy, the official approbation signed by Desbois de 
Rochefort), the principles of the reform, and Rousseau’s 
reputation as an authority on physical education do not 
decline along with it, but, in fact, become more firmly
(a)established, although they are now more open to criticism.^  ^
The other aspects of physical education which 
attracted attention during the period and which were 
subsequently attributed to the influence of Emile, regardless 
of whether this was so or not, (see Landais’ remark page 96) 
are very much subordinated to the new enthusiasm for maternal 
breast-feeding. However, the topic which attracted most 
interest after maternal breast-feeding seems to have been 
the controversial subject of the cold bath. This seems to 
have been popularly attributed to Rousseau even before 1770 
(Fourcroy de Guillerville), although the mi sunderst and ing 
that Rousseau advocated cold baths right from birth and 
without any preliminary preparations only spread to the
(a) cf. pp. 116-117.
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theorists and became inextricably linked with Rousseau’s 
name around 1783 (Philipon de la Madeleine). Throughout 
the period of excitement concerning physical education 
(mainly 1770 to 1780) the question of the cold bath remains 
as much a subject for popular disapproval as approval. The 
main advocates of the cold bath seem to have been the 
theorists themselves (Tissot, Fourcroy, Grivel), but examples 
of popular, though minority attempts to introduce the cold 
bath are attested by Leroy as early as 1 7 7 2 . Although 
Leroy does not refer to Rousseau on this point, Grivel’s 
a s s u m p t i o n ^ t h a t  the idea of the cold bath will be 
automatically associated with Rousseau’s name, suggests 
that he may well have been held responsible for any 
unfortunate effects caused by the practice of cold baths 
from birth.
The disappearance of swaddling-bands begins before 
1767 (Anel Lerebours), but does not seem to have been 
attributed to the success of Emile until after Rousseau’s 
death, when his reputation as an authority on physical 
education was already established. In 1772 Leroy mentions 
the change and so does Sancerotte in 1777. Coyer recommends 
Rousseau’s ideas on the subject as early as 1770, but he
(a) See p. 86.
(b) See p. 91.
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does not suggest that Rousseau had obtained any success
in this field by that date. However, we know from Landais
that all the reforms of physical education were being
popularly attributed to Emile by 1779, and it is probable
that Rousseau’s arguments did, in fact, encourage an already
initiated reform, and were then interpreted as the original
impulse behind the reform. At all events, the destruction
of swaddling-bands was one of the themes chosen for the
tombstone at Ermenonville, to illustrate the importance
(a)of Rousseau’s work^  ^ and his rôle in achieving both the
physical and moral freedom of the child seems to have been
the aspect most closely associated to his name by Louis-
Sebastian Mercier in 1791.^^^
On the other hand, a closely associated reform,
that of the whale-bone corset, was attributed to Rousseau’s
influence as early as 1772 (Leroy), and without any previous
references to reform independently of Rousseau. Sancerotte
(c)confirms Rousseau’s influence on this subject in 1777, 
but after this date, this particular reform seems to have 
been absorbed in recognition of Rousseau’s general 
advoca&en: of physical freedom. De Beaurieu in fact 
does not recommend Rousseau, but Macquart and Winslow,
(a) See Note p. 107.
See Note p. 106. 
c) See p. 94.
\ .j
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on the subject of swaddling-bands and corsets in 1782.
Popular enthusiasm for Emile also seems to have led 
to extremism on a number of points other than cold baths. 
Leroy reports the use of a badly placed belt and the 
cutting of the child’s hair (or probably even the shaving 
of the head) as elements of educational programmes allegedly 
"à la Jean-Jacques". Isolated examples of an extreme 
naturalistic education have long been w e l l - k n o w n , b u t  
all these reports suggest that this was very much the work 
of a minority group. However, it seems that less extreme 
versions of educational programmes supposedly "à l ’Emile" 
acquired a certain degree of fashionable popularity during
(n)
the pre-Revolutionary period. Proyart^ ' maintains that 
some teachers tried to introduce various elements from 
Emile into the school curriculum (his main example is not 
giving the child religious instruction until the age of 
about fifteen), and Madame de Genlis, looking back on the 
education of the previous fifty years, reports (and this 
must refer to the 1770s approximately, since her Memoirs 
date from the 1820s) that educations "à l ’Emile" were 
fashionable for a short time. She also tells us that Emile’s
(a) See p. 84.
(b) Of. M o m e t 2 "L’influence de J.-J. Rousseau au 
dix-huitième Siècle", p. 47.
(c) See p. 176.
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education was popularly interpreted as a system of laissez- 
faire in which the pupil received no training whatsoever.
The popular reputation of Emile was, then, restricted 
to a handful of topics concerned with child care and 
"natural" education, and depended mainly on the issues in 
which Rousseau appeared to gain most success in the practical 
field and which were, in fact, the questions which most 
interested his contemporaries. Emile certainly seems to 
have been instrumental in sparking off the various reforms 
which had, until then, obtained little success. Evidence 
of early popular acclaim and success in the practical field 
certainly implies that at least certain elements of the 
reform were a direct result of the popularity of Emile, 
but it would be difficult to prove that Emile is, in fact, 
the decisive factor in the campaign. More important from 
our point of view, however, is that Emile is believed to be 
the focal point of the movement towards reform, and that, 
as a result of the popularity of Emile. Rousseau is 
acknowledged both as the leader of the reform, and as an 
established authority on physical education.
Popularity of Rousseau’s ideas on physical education 
among the general public certainly precedes recognition by
(a) See p. 254.
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the theorists, the majority of whom, with the notable 
exceptions of De Beaurieu and the Abbé Coyer, remain silent 
or criticise Emile until the early 1770s when they are 
forced to notice Rousseau’s success and recognise him as 
the leader of the reform. Though they support his advocation 
of maternal breast-feeding and the abolition of swaddling- 
bands, and acknowledge the role he has played, many of them, 
nevertheless, show a certain reluctance to praise him 
unreservedly even by the time his reputation as an authority 
on physical education is well established. Landais and 
De Beaurieu*s letter both try to put Rousseau’s influence 
into perspective, while Roze de I ’Epinoy criticises the 
fashionable element in the reform, which he believes to 
have been directly provoked by Emile. Much earlier, Leroy 
had also criticised Rousseau for having concentrated 
attention on boys’ education at the expense of girls’, 
at the same time as he was congratulating him for having 
obtained some positive results in the campaign against the 
use of corsets.
The theorists themselves are interested in rather 
more aspects of Emile than the general public. Nevertheless, 
the topics which they choose to discuss are also very 
limited, and, on the whole, do not reveal a very deep 
understanding of Emile.
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The aspects of Emile which appear to obtain most 
success with the educational theorists are also concerned 
with physical education, but refer to the education of the 
young child as well as to the infant. Many of the theorists 
do not acknowledge their debt to Emile, and the details they 
use may well be independent of it, but their obvious 
similarity to the educational programme of Emile cannot 
be ignored, especially since, by the time of the Revolution, 
they figure prominently in educational treatises allegedly 
inspired by Emile, and are obviously closely associated with 
Rousseau’s name.
In 1770, for example, the Abbé Coyer recommends 
Rousseau’s ideas on physical exercise through suitable 
games, and includes in his essay many details (education 
in the country, fresh air, walks, hard beds, healthy diet 
etc.) which may well be inspired by Emile. Grivel, in 1775, 
also recommends Rousseau’s ideas on physical exercise through 
suitable games, and his suggestion of the use of cold baths. 
Although he often disagrees with Rousseau, his educational 
programme also contains many elements common to both Coyer 
and Rousseau. De la Madeleine’s essay of 1783 also contains 
these same details of physical education, while De Beaurieu 
remarks in 1782 that the subject of education as distinct 
from child care has already been sufficiently well-discussed
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by Locke, Rousseau and Balexserd so as not to need any 
further comments on his part. In 1789 Villier recommends 
a school in the country so that the curriculum can include 
long walks, while Fèvre du Grandvaux’s Emile réalisé 
recommends a school in the country, physical freedom, a 
vegetarian diet etc. etc. Moreover, all these essays
recommend ideas from Emile or Rousseau’s other works, and
it is more than probable that these details of physical
education, even when unacknowledged, owe their popularity
to Emile, since it was quite obviously the most well-known 
and most highly discussed book on education of the period.
The popularity of "naturalistic" educations finds 
its theoretical counterpart in the growing popularity of 
the theme of nature as opposed to art among the physical 
educationalists of the 1770s. It has already been 
suggested (pages 115-117) that this growing popularity 
is closely connected with the practical results of the 
campaign for maternal breast-feeding, and the development 
of Rousseau’s prestige, and that this declines in favour 
of the possible introduction of the artificial once the 
basic principles of the reform are established.
The question of private and public education is 
quite obviously a subject of interest to the theorists 
rather than the general reading public. Right from the
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start Emile is interpreted as a treatise of private education 
and criticised as such (Poncelet, Eormey), and this continues 
throughout the pre-Revolutionary period. Little attention 
is paid to the subject at the time when interest in physical 
education is at its height, and most of the comments which 
do exist do not attain a very high level of criticism.
De Beaurieu and Debry alone seem to understand the dual 
nature of Emile’s education and that he is ultimately 
destined for society, but, when they themselves adopt the 
dual formation of Emile, they entirely subordinate the 
formation of natural man to social man and sacrifice the 
synthetic quality of Rousseau’s system to an education in 
two consecutive stages. Like all their contemporaries, 
they are primarily interested in the formation of social 
man, and consequently attempt to "correct" the individualism 
which features so highly in Emile.
Despite their hostility to Emile in that it is 
understood to represent an anti-social system of education, 
the theorists do not hesitate to incorporate details from 
Ernjl A into their own treatises of public education (Coyer 
is the first example of this in 1770), and by the time of 
the Revolution this has become the normal practice (see 
pp. 181-182). Moreover, from 1789 onwards Rousseau’s 
position on private and public education ceases to arouse
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interest. J.-F. Major is the only writer to criticise 
Rousseau’s choice of private education and this is purely 
on practical issues (see page 179).
The question of isolation from society during the 
educational period is difficult to place. This may owe 
much to Emile, hut, on the other hand, may arise 
independently of Emile. The question of the need for 
parallel and political reform certainly seems to develop 
independently of Emile, and to crystallise only as the 
result of political events at the Revolution.
The psychological aspects of Emile play an even 
smaller rôle in the growth of Rousseau’s reputation as 
an educationalist. Discussed at length only by Helvétius, 
they attract attention only as a result of their consequence 
of a long "negative" education. In the practical field 
this inspires a fashion for not educating children at all, 
and, at a theoretical level, stimulates discussion concerning 
the development of the rational faculties, and the age at 
which formal education should begin.
The type of adverse criticism which we noticed among
the early reactions to Emile (of. pp.35-36), based on
Rousseau’s alleged "paradoxical" approach to the questions
of the moment and his desire to shock and attract attention, 
is
much less common to the educational theorists than to
269
those intent on refuting the Profession de Foi. Nevertheless, 
Fourcroy’s information of 1771 suggests that Rousseau was 
considered at that date, at least by one section of the 
public, as the originator of extremist ideas in education 
(see page 81), and Grivel’s report of 1775 confirms this.
He expects the public’s reaction to his recommendation of 
the cold bath to be:
"Eh quoi: vous adoptez les paradoxes de l ’Auteur 
d ’Emile? De pareilles nouveautés ne sont 
recommandables que par leur bizarrerie ...."
Even when the return to maternal breast-feeding is 
at its height, an article in the Correspondance secrete 
de Métra accuses Rousseau of being a "Sophiste adroit" 
and Madame de Genlis’ appreciation of 1782 (which, even 
if it does not represent her own point of view, certainly 
represents a point of view common at the time) renews all 
the elements of the earlier attacks;
"Son ouvrage [i.e. Emile] , rempli de morceaux 
d ’une éloquence sublime, de déclamations de 
mauvais goût, et de principes dangereux, 
manque d ’intérêt, et offre, presque à chaque  ^
page, les inconséquences les plus révoltantes.
1. Grivel: Théorie de 1 ’éducation, p.271, cf. p.91 of 
thesis.
2. Correspondance de Métra. 25 February 1779, quoted by 
P-P. Plan, op.cit., p.182.
3. Genlis: Adèle et Théodore, Pt.I, p.190.
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All this is counterbalanced by recognition of the 
existence of good points in Emile and admiration for 
Rousseau’s eloquence and style. Two articles in the
Correspondance secrète de Métra of 1778 refer to "l’immortel
1 2 auteur d ’Emile" and "son immortel ouvrage d ’Emile"
respectively. Another in 1777 had said:
"Son Emile n ’est pas un livre excellent, mais 
il est rempli d ’admirables morceaux ...."3
while Madame de Genlis counterbalances her attack with:
"Mais on devoit, sans doute, en oublier les 
défauts, en faveur des beautés supérieures 
qui s ’y trouvent.
By the Revolution adverse comment has completely disappeared, 
while Rousseau’s style is ranked as one of the finest 
examples of the beauties of the French language (Villier).
Rousseau’s reputation as an educationalist (though 
this is based on only a few aspects of Emile) seems to have 
been established by about 1780, and to have acquired an 
assured air of authority during the years which follow.
1. Correspondance secrète de Métra. 12 July 1778, 
quoted by P.-P. Plan, op.cit., p.140.
2. Ibid., 14 November 1778, quoted by P.-P. Plan, 
op.cit., p.157.
3. Ibid., 23 March 1777, quoted by P.-P. Plan, 
op.cit., p.129.
4. Genlis: op.cit., Pt.I, p.190.
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This is particularly obvious from the way in which his 
name becomes linked with other reformers (especially 
Locke) and his ideas confused with theirs. It is 
especially interesting to note the way in which his 
ideas obtain a more general interpretation by the theorists 
as the years go by and how misinterpretations which had 
been popularly attributed to him remain and form the later 
image of Emile.
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